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asking her to take full charge of him and to have him removed to a hospital in parish P (province of Cashel), as B and her family could no longer keep him owing to his disease. This C did. He remained a considerable time in P, and, having learned that his disease would prove fatal, he told the chaplain that he would not go from the hospital in P, but would remain until his death. He made this statement very definite as there seemed to be some suggestion of his removal. He died there (province of Cashel) and was buried in parish N (province of Armagh), where offerings were taken. Now it appears that Counsel on both sides in a law case (settled outside the court) agree that a farm in parish N is assets of the deceased.
The priests of N contend :
(a) B's letter refusing to accept A any longer terminated his quasi domicile on her side ; nor could he make her home any longer his quasidomicile, for the reason that he would not be allowed.
(6) (19) A's intention to return to work and reside at the mill was withdrawn and ceased when he mentioned that he would remain in the hospital in P until his death. (2o) His intention to return to reside and work at the mill proves that he had no intention of returning again to his quasi-domicile and so his quasi-domicile ceased. (3°) His intention of returning, etc., to the mill, did not give him any claim to any kind of domicile, for it is necessary for domicile of any kind that there be actual commoratio ' or residence. Therefore, as far as parish M is concerned, he was a 'vagus.'
(c) From the decision of Counsel on both sides in the case mentioned in the preamble the farm as assets of the deceased carries with it all rights -one of these rights is to reside in the parental home.
(d) Therefore A had a parental domicile in N (province of Armagh). The priests in P (province of Cashel) waive any claim; but, if they have any, point (c) places them on a plane of disinterestedness.
To sum up, they claim the offerings on either of two counts : (1°) that A was a 'vagus' and that the place of offerings has absolute claim, seeing that he died outside the limits of Armagh, or (29) that he was their parishioner, and theirs only, by right of domicile.
We are fairly safe in saying that at the time A came to live with his sister, he had given up his parental domicile. His subsequent historyand especially the fact that, even when he knew the disease was fatal, he had no thought of returning there--would seem to put the matter beyond doubt.
But he a had a quasi-domicile in parish M. And that quasi-domicile remained until he gave up, not merely residence, but also the intention of returning. When he was an inmate of the first hospital, he had not given up that intention. Whether he was to live in the mill or in his sister's house, is a matter of absolute indifference. For domicile and quasidomicile are attached, not to a special house, but to the parish.
Nor can it be shown that he lost his quasi-domicile even when he went to the hospital in parish P. His sister, no doubt, was unwilling to receive him back ; but even she could not exclude him from the parish.
But, towards the end, it would seem clear enough that the bond with M was broken. The invalid learned of his condition, and, in a very definite' statement, expressed his absolute intention to have nothing more
to do with Armagh. That ended everything : he became a parishioner of the parish priest of P, and of no other.
The fact that he was, or became, heir to a small estate in parish N does not keep, or make, him a subject of the northern province. A man may be heir to the whole State of Texas; but, if he comes to Europe with the intention of not returning, he cannot, no matter how his intention changes, recover his American domicile until he goes back to Texas again.
If all this be true, 1 some of the points raised by N become of little interest. But we may say a word on each of them in order :
(a) On her side, perhaps, but not on his ; and it is his that counts. Except in case of quasi-domicile of law,' we do not pick up quasi-domiciles from others, we make them ourselves. Others may oppose us : that does not matter : we are all, we hope, continually doing things to which some one or other is opposed. And that is true, even on the suppositionwhich is not likely—that she was opposed to his return to the parish. If, as seems to be the fact, she only intended to exclude him from her own house, the case is ever so much stronger.
(6) 1°. That is our view.
2°. Rather it proves the very opposite. He meant to return to the parish.
3°. Quite true. But he had had 'residence' already, and the onus probandi lies on anyone who is anxious to have it appear that he had no intention of resuming it. If he had that intention, as he evidently had, , the quasi-domicile remained.
(c) A man may be left fifty farms in fifty parishes. He has no domicile in any of the parishes, unless he goes and lives there.
(d) Perhaps it is just as well that they do. The general law would give them a hearing, and point (c) would cause them very little trouble.
All of which indicates our views on the two points in the summing-up.
But what about the offerings ? Parish P has given up any claims it might urge under the general law, so the issue is between M and N. The Armagh laws gives little help : A did not die, we think, “outside the borders of the parish'; and, moreover, the statute attaches no importance to the place of burial. But equity and custom would seem to suggest that the offerings should go to N rather than to M: it was the clergy of N that performed the funeral rites, and presumably it was the parishioners of N that contributed most of the amount. And, if the general law be invoked, it would give them everything except the 'parochial portion payable to men who are generous enough to waive any claims they might assert (1236, § 1).
M. J. O'DONNELL.
1 On the principles involved see articles in the Irish Theological Quarterly, January 1916 (pp. 26-40), July 1916 (pp. 294-307), July 1917 (pp. 230-249.)
A QUESTION IN CONNEXION WITH NOVEMBER OFFERINGS
Rev. DEAR SIR,_Will you kindly answer in your next number of the I. E. RECORD the following query :
The offerings made by the people for the dead on the 2nd of November (All Souls Day and thereabouts), commonly called the November offerings in Ireland, are divided among the officiating priests of a parish. There is an obligation imposed by a Diocesan Law to say a number of Masses in discharge of these offerings. In my Diocese this obligation may be discharged by High Masses, and a honorarium of five pounds is allowed for each Mass. Is it lawful for a priest to get these High Masses discharged by another priest or by the Superior of a Religious Order at a lesser honorarium, e.g. £1 for each High Mass, because it may happen to be more convenient ? Of course the so-called November offerings are not looked on as ordinary manual Masses and are mere parochial revenue. Thanking you for an answer in your columns.
The Code requires those who transfer manual Masses to transfer also the full honoraria, unless the donor has permitted them to retain a part, or unless the amount by which honoraria exceed the diocesan stipend has been given as a personal gift.1 When Masses ad instar manualium form part of the endowment of a benefice or pious cause, the amount by which they exceed the diocesan stipend can also be retained in case of transference, unless the founder has made some contrary provisions. These are the only express regulations of the Code on this question.
The Masses to be said in connexion with November offerings, as our correspondent points out, are not manual in the ordinary sense of the term, neither are they ad instar manualium.: To determine therefore whether and in how far part of these offerings may be retained when the Masses are transferred, we must have recourse to the old discipline. Cardinal Gasparri, in his treatise De Eucharistia,' refers to a decision of the Sacred Congregation of the Council in a case which bears a very close resemblance to that submitted by our correspondent. It would seem that, in Munich and the other dioceses of Bavaria, on the occasion of certain functions, such as funerals and marriages, parish priests received large stipends for the celebration of Masses, and that these stipends were regarded as a partial endowment of the parish. When it became necessary to transfer these Masses, it was much disputed as to the amount of the honorariam which should be transferred with them. Was it necessary to send the amount actually received ? Or did it suffice to transmit that
1 Canon 840, § 1. 2 Canon 840, 2.
3 Cf. Canon 826, § 2. 4 Vol. i. n. 603.
fixed by diocesan statute or custom for manual Masses? The Archbishop of Munich, having submitted the matter to the Congregation of the Council received, in July, 1874, the following reply :
'Seeing that the stipends of the Masses of which there is question in the petition constitute part of the parochial endowment, it is lawful for the parish priest, if he cannot discharge them himself, to transmit the Masses to another priest, and to give him the ordinary stipend of the place, whether for Masses that are said or for those that are sung.'
A somewhat similar reply was also given to the Archbishop of Cologne, in the same year. In the diocese of Cologne a much larger honorarium was fixed by the Ordinary for nuptial than for the usual manual Masses; and again, when transference became necessary, the same doubts arose. Was it the honorarium for nuptial Masses that should be transmitted ? Or did it suffice to send that fixed for ordinary manual Masses ? The Sacred Congregation replied to the following effect. 'Since there is question of Stole fees, it is sufficient if the parish priest gives the celebrant the ordinary honorarium.''
It is quite clear, therefore, that when the Masses to be said in connexion with the November offerings are transferred by the parochial clergy, it suffices to transmit with them the ordinary diocesan honorarium for manual Masses. The diocesan honorarium, we need scarcely point out, may be fixed either by statute or custom ; when there is question of High Masses it is custom that usually intervenes. If then, in the case under consideration, the diocesan honorarium is £l or less, the priest acts quite lawfully in merely transferring this amount, althongh he himself receives £5 for each Mass celebrated.
Although the Code, as we have stated already, does not expressly legislate on this matter, yet its regulation in connexion with the transference of Masses ad instar manualium helps to confirm the conclusion which we have reached. As we have already seen, if the large honoraria, sometimes given for the celebration of these Masses, form part of the endowment of a benefice, in case of transference the amount by which they exceed the diocesan stipend may be usually retained. The Masses said in connexion with the November offerings are not, indeed, ad instar manualium according to the technical definition of Canon 826, § 2; they, however constitute in part the endowment of the parish; and consequently there is the same reason for not requiring the transference of the full honorarium,
1. Attento quod eleemosynae Missarum de quibus in precibus pro parte locum teneant congruae parochialis, licitum esse parocho, si per se satisfacere non possit, Missas alteri saecrdote committere, attributa eleemosyna ordinaria loci sive pro Missis lectis sive pro cantatis.'
2 ' Cum agatur de juribus stolae, satis esse, si parochus retribuat celebranti eleemosynam ordinariam.'
PROFESSORS IN SEMINARIES AND MASSES FOR DECEASED
BENEFACTORS Rev. DEAR SIR,—I should like to have your opinion on the following little controversy :
I am attached with other priests to a certain college (diocesan) in Ireland. Besides the obligations connected with the teaching profession we are also required by the college discipline to says a number of Masses each year for the benefactors, living and dead, of the institution. Beyond the ordinary salary which we receive, no other form of stipend is given for those Masses. The question is raised :
1o. Are we bound 'sub grave' to the fulfilment of those Masses. 2°. If so, under what virtue? Does strict justice bind us?
Some of my friends are inclined to look lightly on the obligation, regarding it as one rather of mere fidelity or of gratitude. Others as of mere obedience, but question its reasonableness, as no stipend is offered. Others cannot see how strict justice can be affected, as there is no present voluntary agreement to this effect between the actual professors and the authorities. And personally, myself, I am inclined to take a rather strict view of the whole case, I look upon the obligation as grave, and in my estimation it springs from justice-originating from the primary contract entered into between the ecclesiastical authorities.
The question for us is one more for debate sake than practical ; however it does raise a most important point in Theology : can a moral body, e.g., a college, a diocese, etc., not enter into a contract with its first benefactors in such a way as to impose afterwards upon future generations a serious obligation in justice. Your opinion on this point of discussion shall be highly prized by
A SUBSCRIBER. As the last point-the possibility or otherwise of a moral body entering into a contract with its benefactors and thus undertaking a perpetual obligation in their favour-is the most fundamental, we shall discuss it first of all. Well, of this possibility there is not the slightest doubt ; canonists have always taken it for granted, and have regarded it as pertaining to the essence of moral personality. Thus Cardinal D'Annibale writes: 'When once they (moral persons) have been properly established, they are like private persons. They can therefore, acquire for themselves, either by acts inter vivos or by wills, enter contracts, take part in judicial processes, etc.'l Cardinal Gasparri, in his definition of a foundation, implies even more clearly that corporate bodies are capable of undertaking perpetua) obligations. A'foundation,' he states, is a donation of temporal goods made to an ecclesiastical institute, whether secular or regular, on condition of performing some spiritual work either for ever or for a long time.'2 But there is really no need of quotation : the matter, as we have said, is a commonplace amongst canonists. And if there had been previously any doubt on this subject, the Code would have removed it; its definition of pious foundations is quite as clear on the point as Gasparri's. 'By the
1 Summul. Th. Mor., vol. i. n. 44 : At cum semel rite coierint, instar privatorum habentur. Ideo possunt sibi acquirere actibus seu inter vivos seu ultima voluntate, contractu iniri, judicio agere,' etc.
2 De S. Eucharistia, vol. i. n. 559.