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THE VALIDITY AND LAWFULNESS OF

GENERIC CONFESSION

BY REV. DAVID BARRY

THE importance of having clear ideas as to the validity and lawfulness of generic confession is very likely to be brought home forcibly to the confessor when he is called to attend some one who has been suddenly stricken with a mortal sickness, and is quite insensible, or at any rate so helpless as to be unable to give any detailed account of his sins. The question is also practical in the numerous cases where people confess faults that are only imperfections or slight venial sins, without mentioning any serious sin; although they are ready enough to acknowledge and deplore the fact that they have frequently offended God during their past life. In such cases, of course, the confessor can very often induce the penitent to tell some particular sin, for instance, having been late for Mass or having taken too much drink. But if such a sin is not told spontaneously, and if the penitent had not adverted to its malice previously, there is danger that it may not be covered by his act of contrition at the end of confession -elicited, as it almost necessarily is, without much time for deliberation anew. Whereas if the penitent, of his own motion, mentions a sin of his past life, and has been in the habit of doing so, the danger of a lip sorrow, the outcome of mere routine, is manifest. Besides, it will very likely be a considerable inconvenience to the penitent to mention a sin, although previously confessed, that he is specially sorry for; and so bringing any pressure to bear on him to confess such a sin twice is manifestly undesirable, if it can be avoided.

Another case-though a rare one-in which it would be convenient to avail of a generic confession, if this were lawful, is where the penitent expresses heartfelt sorrow for all his sins, but through want of instruction, or weakness of memory, or because he has led such a blameless

life, he cannot remember or will not mention any sin in particular.

The term generic confession has three meanings.1 In one sense it is taken to indicate the accusation which just falls short of giving the species infima of the sins committed. Thus, if a person confesses that he broke the Third Commandment, without specifying whether this was done by remaining away from Mass or by doing servile work; or that he violated the virtue of temperance, without saying whether this was through over-eating or through drunkenness, he may quite legitimately be held to be making a merely generic confession.

For though he gives a certain amount of information about the sin-its species subalterna-he does not give its species infima.

Now, of course, all authorities deny that this form of confession is sufficient if the penitent has necessary matter -that is, mortal sin not already told in a valid confession -and if he is under no disability that would prevent his being more explicit. But all or practically all hold that such a confession is both valid and lawful if there be question of only voluntary matter; or of necessary matter conjoined with a physical or moral impossibility of being more detailed. Though, in the latter case, what has been omitted must be mentioned at the next confession after the impossibility ceases.

In the second place, generic confession is taken to cover the case where the penitent says: 'I committed a mortal sin,' or 'I accuse myself of all my mortal sins,' without indicating in any way what virtue or commandment he violated. Understood in this sense, generic confession, according to the view that is by far the more probable, is valid and lawful in the circumstances where I have just said that confession of the species subalterna suffices.

In the third and most usual acceptation of the term, generic confession refers to the case of those who accuse

1 Lehmkuhl uses the term in a fourth sense also, to correspond with the case of a person who, while giving one of the species infimae of a sin, does not give another one that is superadded, or does not tell how often he has been guilty of it. But no one does or could question the validity of such a confession on the mere score of its not giving sufficient matter for a judgment.

2 As is well known to my readers, it is sometimes not necessary to mention sins that have been told even in an invalid confession, in a subsequent one made to the same priest.

3 Tanquerey, De Sacramentis, n. 359.

themselves by words or signs only in the most vague way possible of having committed sin or sins, without indicating what virtue or commandment they have offended against, or whether they have sinned mortally, or venially. As to the sufficiency of confession of this kind, in the circumstances already contemplated, the views of the theologians may be divided into three classes: some maintaining that it is neither valid nor lawful; some that it is valid, but usually unlawful; while, according to others, generic confession in the circumstances named is both valid and lawful. This last view is held by Ballerini, Genicot, Bucceroni, etc. Thus Ballerini says1: 'Sententia contraria tamen improbabilis haud apparet. Neque enim confessio in specie actibus absolute necessariis ad valorem hujus sacramenti adnumerari potest, nec de lege, quae accusationem materiae sufficientis in specie praecipiat, certo constat.'

These authorities formulate the proposition that any accusation of his sins, however vague, made by a person, constitutes a real confession. This, consequently, is valid, and lawful also when the Divine Law requiring the declaration of our sins in specie infima is not binding. So, if a person is in the state of grace, or even if he has a mortal sin on his soul which he has forgotten, or the obligation to confess which he is inculpably ignorant of, it is quite sufficient positis ponendis to secure him the substantial graces of the sacrament, if he says: 'I am a sinner,' or words to the same effect. Though, of course, in order to obtain what may be called the accidental fruits of Penance, viz., prudent direction and an overflowing measure of God's grace, it would usually be necessary to be sorry for and to mention one's sins in detail.

The principal argument brought forward to sustain this view is that in certain cases it is the practice of confessors -a practice which is not only tolerated but is approved by the Church-to give absolution unconditionally on the strength of a mere generic accusation. This practice shows that the fact that confession is vague and indefinite is not recognized as endangering in any way the efficacy of the absolution. They argue, accordingly, that if this class of confession is certainly valid in one case or in a few, it is valid in all, seeing that the matter or the pre-requisites of the Sacrament do not change for different circumstances,

1 Gury-Ball., note to n. 421.

And assuming its validity, they have very good reason for challenging anyone to mention any law making it unlawful.

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The cases that these theologians have in mind to support their position are, I think, principally three a penitent who is dying; one who is a mute; and soldiers going into battle. It will, accordingly, be of interest to try to ascertain whether it is the approved practice to give an unconditional absolution in such cases or not. For, if only a conditional absolution were given in circumstances of such necessity, it may merely prove that there is some probability attaching to the views of the theologians in question; and this no one denies.

Is a priest, then, to give absolution absolutely or conditionally when he is called to attend a dying penitent who can only say a word or two to him; or make some sign of sorrow by raising his eyes or striking his breast, etc.? What, I think, is by far the more common opinion is to the effect that the absolution should be given unconditionally. Those who maintain this, base their view very largely on the instructions of the Ritual, which directs that a person in such circumstances should be absolved, without giving any direction that this is to be done conditionally. These are the words of the rubric: Quod si . . . antequam incipiat confiteri vox et loquela aegro deficiant mutibus et signis conetur, quoad ejus fieri poterit, peccata poenitentis cognoscere: quibus utcumque vel in genere vel in specie cognitis, vel etiam si confitendi desiderium sive per se, sive per alios ostenderit, absolvendus est.'

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In regard to the theologians: St. Alphonsus is very emphatic as to the sufficiency of generic confession in these circumstances. For, discussing the case of one who shows signs of penitence in the presence of the priest (as distinct from doing so by proxy), he says: certum est quod... absolute est absolvendus. Et expedit illum toties absolvi quoties nova ipse praestet signa doloris.'1 And the only authors he mentions in opposition to this teaching are Soto, Canus, and Ledesma.

Lugo also says the priest is bound to give absolution in this case but he supposes that it is to be given conditionally :

Infero secundo. . . quando infirmus unum peccatum in genere dixit non solum posse, sed debere ex obligatione absolvi, quia cum possit

1 Theologia Moralis, de poenitentia, n. 480.

sacerdos licite amplecti illam sententiam tot et tantorum doctorum, et absolvere sub conditione quod prodesse potest aegroto ad aeternam salutem, tenetur ex charitate erga proximum subvenire illi eo modo quo potest, ne forte habens attritionem solam damnetur, qui cum beneficio absolutionis salvus fieret, quod cum Suario et Vazquio observarunt recentiores cummuniter.1

Lugo mentions more authors as being opposed to giving absolution conditionally or unconditionally in the case than St. Alphonsus does; but he explains that some of them would not press their objection if the dying person were able to tell his sins in genere subalterno, and some even would be satisfied if he were able to indicate that he sinned mortally.

The principal objection that Lugo sees to his own view is also that 'discussed by St. Alphonsus. It is briefly this: that an absolution pronounced in connexion with a purely generic accusation on one who is insensible is neither direct nor indirect. It is not direct, for if it were, the sick person would not, if he recovers, be bound to tell any mortal sins he may have had at the time, in detail; whereas it is quite certain that he is so bound. Neither is the absolution in the case indirect, because this is conceivable only when, some sin having been mentioned and directly remitted, all other mortal sins disappear owing to the influence of sanctifying grace which is given by the direct absolution.

The answer in substance given by St. Alphonsus, Lugo, and Suarez to this objection is that when a generic confession is admissible the ratio communis or malice common to every sin, v.g., that it involves a turning away from God, is remitted directly; whereas the special and specific malice of this individual's sins, v.g., that they are violations of the Seventh Commandment, is absolved from, indirectly. And so this particular malice must be told afterwards should the person have an opportunity of doing

This answer does not satisfy Ballerini, who thinks it better to maintain that the sins in their entirety are directly remitted, but that there is a special law binding the person to tell them afterwards if this be possible. And he seeks an analogy in the theory of those who maintain that sins. confessed as doubtful and absolved from, should be afterwards confessed as certain, if the certainty of their commission or gravity should have transpired in the meantime.3

1 De Poenitentia, disp. xvii. sect. i. n. 20.
2 Opus. Theol. Morale, v., n. 449.
St. Alphonsus, op. cit. n. 478, says this.

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