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Another serious objection to the possibility of giving a valid absolution as the result of a purely generic confession is that this gives the confessor no information. For he knows beforehand that no one can be long without committing at least some kind of venial sin; it being a dogma of the Church that this is not possible during one's entire life, without a special privilege such as the Blessed Virgin had.

No one would contend, of course, that the penitent should always tell the priest something he does not know already. For the priest can very well give absolution when he is told a sin that he has extra-sacramental knowledge of. But what is necessary is that he should get some material as a result of which he can pronounce on, and discriminate the case of his penitent from that of others; in a word, that he should know something about him that he does not know about the rest of the world. But where a confessor hears a penitent making a vague self-accusation, it is part of his equipment for hearing every confession to expect this. It is a presupposition that he has in dealing with every case; and so to mention wholly indeterminate guilt gives him no information new or old; nor does it seem to be a real accusation when one merely confesses what everyone has to confess.

Lugo's answer to this objection is that in order to have a real accusation all that is necessary is that some crime or sin should be alleged-whether the judge knew this already or not-and that he should be asked to exercise his office in regard to it. And, however strange this notion of confession may seem to us, it is well to remember that it corresponds very closely with the idea of St. Thomas, the Angelic Doctor. For he says: Sic igitur requiritur ex parte poenitentis: primo quidem voluntas recompensandi; quod fit per contritionem; secundo quod se subjiciat arbitrio sacerdotis loco Dei; quod fit in confessione; tertio quod recompenset secundum arbitrium ministri Dei; quod fit in satisfactione. Et ideo contritio, confessio, et satisfactio ponuntur partes poenitentiae.'

1

Lugo 2 advances an argument in favour of generic confession in the case of the sick that if it were valid at all would, as is clear, apply universally. It is, that generic confession must be valid because penitents are sometimes

1 Summa Theol., p. iii. q. xc. art. ii. in corp.

2 Op. cit. n. 10.

bound to resort to it. Thus he says that, if a person is certain that he committed a mortal sin, but does not remember anything more about it, he is bound to tell so much. Nay, more, if a penitent knows he committed sin, but does not know the species of it, or whether it was mortal or venial, he is bound to give this very indefinite information in confession.

But, of course, the first example does not prove the validity of lawfulness of a purely generic confession. For one who accuses himself of a mortal sin without saying what kind it is, is in a very different position from one who does not tell anything at all about his sin. And so, as we saw already,' the great majority of theologians are quite satisfied with such accusation of free matter. In regard to Lugo's second example-that is where the character and gravity of the sin are quite unknown-I doubt very much if many theologians at the present day would admit that the penitent is bound to mention the matter in confession.

As for the modern theologians: they seem generally to insist on the giving of absolution-and apparently unconditionally-to the sick person in the circumstances mentioned. Thus Tanquerey, speaking of a more doubtful case, says: 'Si moribundus coram testibus petiit sacramentum, antequam sensibus orbaretur, certo absolvi debet, quamvis hic et nunc sit sensibus destitutus ; nam petendo absolutionem, manifestavit se esse contritum, et ille actus contritionis virtualiter perseverare potest. Juxta communiorem sententiam absolvi debet sine conditione in hoc casu.'2 Ballerini says: Porro ubi expresse aliquo signo aut desiderium confessionis aut dolor peccatorum ab infirmo proditur, manifesta res est et absolutio impertienda est et quidem sine conditione."3 Lehmkuhl is equally clear: 'Accusatio omnino indeterminata in casu summae necessitatis. pro sufficienti haberi debet. Quod obtinet in articulo mortis . . . Secundum doctrinam enim Ritualis R. ejusmodi moribundus “absolvendus est," ne mentione quidem facta conditionis adiciendae.''

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But Lehmkuhl goes on to state that it does not follow because absolution is validly given in the case of a dying

1 See p. 144 supra.

2 Theol. Moralis, iii. n. 653.

3 Opus. Theol. Morale, v. n. 417.

4 Theol. Moralis, ii. n. 362. Eleventh ed.

person who is unable to give more than a mere sign of his sins, and his sorrow for them, that it would be valid in other cases even if there were question of free matter. For he says that this dying penitent virtually, though not explicitly, accuses himself of a certain or a doubtful mortal sin. Because his confession being so equivocal and indefinite, and he not being able to make it clearer, it may be taken that perhaps he has a mortal sin to tell; while one cannot entertain this thought or suspicion in other circumstances, where the person has the use of his speech, and yet says nothing about a mortal sin. So that the confessor has something definite to go upon in the first case but not in the other. But I think it is plain enough that to read into the confession of the dying man an accusation of a certain or doubtful mortal sin is the outcome of mere surmise on the part of the priest, and is not warranted by any word or sign on the part of the penitent.

However, true to his theory, Lehmkuhl allows an absolution to be given over such indefinite matter only when the penitent is in somewhat similar need of it to what he would be in if he were dying. And he mentions two cases in particular where it is admissible: that of a shipwreck; and where the penitent, though perhaps guilty of mortal sin, cannot recall this, through ignorance or defective memory. But in this last instance he allows absolution to be given only if the penitent has been a long time without it.1

He also bases his right to discriminate between what is required for the validity of a dying confession and a confession in other circumstances on the condemnation of the following proposition by Clement VIII: 'Licet per litteras sen internuntium confessario absenti peccata sacramentaliter confiteri et ab eodem absente absolutionem obtinere.' Now, Pope Clement declared, viva voce, that he did not mean to embrace the case of the dying in this condemnation; consequently Lehmkuhl concludes that what is valid in such an extremity for there is certainly question of validity in the proposition 3-may not be valid in other circumstances. But the exact effect of the condemnation is too debatable to found much of an argument on it. However, it is certain from a declaration of Paul V that

1 Op. cit. n. 362

2 St. Alphonsus, op. cit. n. 481. 3 Lugo, op. cit. sect. iv. n. 63.

the proposition was condemned in sensu diviso; that is, the Pope meant to declare that either confession or absolution given in the way specified was invalid.

Mention of this proposition naturally brings me to claim a little more in the way of validity and lawfulness on behalf of generic confession. And though some of the theologians are or rather were a bit nervous in face of the condemned proposition, the common opinion1 is that absolution can be given to a dying person whom the priest finds unconscious, and who never made any sort of confession to him at all, but who simply sent for him or expressed in the presence of the bystanders his desire to be absolved. St. Alphonsus gives a long list of theologians and saints and councils in favour of this view; and the words of the Ritual that I quoted already ought to be conclusive in its favour.

Nor can it be contended, as used to be done by some, that the Ritual was merely passed or approved-merely got an imprimatur-and is not the authoritative teaching of the Church. The Bull of Pope Paul V puts such a view out of the question.

Indeed, as is well known, the majority of theologians are in favour of absolving conditionally a dying person, at least if he is a Catholic, who has given no sign of penitence at all either to the priest personally or to anyone who may communicate with him. In answer to the obvious difficulty due to the want of any sort of confession, some say none at all is required in the circumstances; while others say that the dying person, though insensible, may be conscious, and so may perhaps be trying to make a generic confession through the sighs or groans he is emitting or through the motions of his limbs. Others again, like Lehmkuhl, find the generic confession in the good Christian life that the man is supposed to have lived. But I think it may fairly be said that sacramental confession should always be consciously directed towards a particular absolution'; and certainly the ordinary faithful have no intention of connecting their good works and acts of devotion with an absolution that they may receive when they are unconscious.

However this may be, I venture to think I have said enough to show that it is almost unquestionable that generic

1 St. Alphonsus, op. cit. n. 481.

2 This is not universally admitted.

confession is valid and, of course, lawful in the case of a dying person unable to give any details of his sins. And if it is valid in such a case, it would seem to be valid always; and lawful as well-when the Divine law enforcing greater detail in the case of mortal sins not already confessed is not in force.

This conclusion is strengthened by the practice of giving absolution in globo to those whose lives are endangered by shipwreck, or in the case of soldiers going into battle, even though they are in a position to give only the vaguest expression of their sinfulness and penitence. And the evidential value of this practice is all the greater because, as far as I know, no authority directs or teaches that the absolution is to be conditional in such circumstances.1 Ballerini distinctly supposes the opposite.

In regard to the dumb, everyone agrees that they must indicate the number and nature of their mortal sins in so far as they are able to do this by signs. And many insist on their obligation to give the usual details in writing if they are able to write; but the opinion exempting them from adopting such an unusual or dangerous method is quite safe in practice. If they are not able to give the ordinary details by signs, and are unable or unwilling to do so in writing, Lehmkuhl is for admitting them to absolution, but only aliquoties. However, I have not seen this restriction in any other author. St. Alphonsus quoting Busenbaum has nothing about it, but supposes that they can be absolved after explaining as much as they can by signs. And the same is true of Ballerini, Noldin, and Tanquerey.

In the case of those whose language the priest does not understand, everyone is agreed that if possible they should go to another confessor; and inasmuch as the disability of these penitents is usually only temporary, manifestly the same freedom in making a generic confession may not be allowed to them as to mutes. And the practice to be followed in such cases was authoritatively laid down

1 Unless, of course, those whose lives are in danger are scattered or too far away from the priest.

2 Op. cit. n. 421; also Lehmkuhl, Casus, ii. n. 303.

Lehmkuhl, op. cit. n. 433.

4 n. 434.

5 Except, perhaps, Billuart, vol. 18, diss. v. ii. art. ii. sect. i. Op. cit. 479.

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