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One other remark before we leap in medias res. The strength or weakness of arguments adduced in favour of a position do not constitute its truth or falsity. The arguments adduced by Descartes and Kant to prove the existence of God can be easily shown to be worthless. Does it, therefore, follow that God does not exist? Absit. Similarly, with regard to the Real Distinction, arguments adduced in favour of this doctrine may be, and often are, worthless; but what then? They do not interfere with other valid arguments which seek to prove the same point. This may seem commonplace, but in argument it is but too frequently ignored, and hence it may be well to recall it.

We are seeking to defend the Real Distinction in the case of creatures, and hence we shall consider those who deny it, as adversaries. We will put up our own arguments and consider the arguments of the opposite side, whether constructive or merely destructive, as objections. We do not hope nor intend to be either original or exhaustive, and if we succeed in showing that even one of our arguments can withstand attack we shall consider ourselves as occupying a secure position.

The first, therefore, of our promised suggestions is that some of our opponents do not understand our general position, hence their arguments are often ignorationes elenchi. As an example, we may cite Harper, the most voluminous of English-speaking Catholic writers on philosophy. A thing either exists or it does not; if it does not, it is merely possible. Therefore it is contradiction in terms to say that a being is actual and at the same time receptive of existence.'

Now, with regard to the first half of the first sentence we may note that it is entirely extra rem. The question is not whether a thing exists or does not, but whether its existence is really distinct from its real essence or not. As regards the second half of the same sentence, it must mean one of two things if it means anything at all. Either it means that if a thing exists not, it exists not, prescinding from the question whether existence is really distinct from essence or not, in which case it is an obvious ignoratio elenchi; or it means that if an essence exists not, it can come to exist only by existence really identified with it, it is an equally obvious petitio principii. In neither case does the argument prove anything. Concerning the second

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sentence of the quotation (it is a contradiction,' etc.) we quite agree with the author; it is perfectly absurd to talk of a thing getting an actus which it has already got. But that is not the point at issue. By an actual essence the defenders of the Real Distinction mean (to use Harper's own words) an essence in act, which in the present case means already existing.' But again, that is not the point at issue. There is no question of a thing which already exists postulating a new act of esse (except esse secundum, of course, which we are not discussing), but of an essence being real (not actual) apart from the entative act which holds it outside its causes and hence being distinct from this latter.

We have come upon this same fallacy in a modified form in different Latin text-books. The authors in question would have us believe that the Realists teach that a thing can exist without existence. The answer to be given to this argument is substantially the same as that given to Father Harper's difficulty. The authors in question confound actuality and reality. We do not say that a thing can be actual without an actus, but we do say that it can be real; it can be pure subjective potency, which is not an ens quod, but an ens quo, nay, more, an ens quo potentiale. That such an ens can be real is our contention, and whether as a matter of fact it is or not; in other words, whatever be the objective truth of the doctrine of the Real Distinction, we do not see any contradiction in terms in our assertion.

Our next step is to put up positive arguments in favour of our position. There are various arguments, more or less modified by different authors, but for the sake of brevity we shall confine ourselves to two.

Our first argument may be briefly stated as follows: Existence is a perfection which in its notion and hence in reality bespeaks no limitation. Hence where it subsists unlimited by a subjective potency in which it is received, it is simply infinite. Now, creatures are not simply infinite. Therefore their esse is limited by such a potency in which it is received, and being so received, is really distinct from that which receives it. This latter cannot be anything else than the essentia realis, and therefore the essentia realis in created things is really distinct from the existentia.

Various objections have been brought to bear on this

proof of which the chief are the following: First, as regards our major premise, we are accused of falling into the same fallacy as St. Anselm with regard to the existence of God. Because we have a notion in our minds that a thing is so in reality, therefore (according to our adversaries) we say it is so. But the difference between our style of reasoning and that of St. Anselm is as wide as that between the poles. The venerable Benedictine (as did Scotus, Descartes and Leibniz after him) argued that because we have the idea of an ens perfectissimum, which idea contains existence, therefore such an ens really exists. Here there is undoubtedly undue transition from the logical to the actual order. But our argument is free from this defect; we do not say that because we have an idea of esse which denies limitation that, therefore, such esse is to be found in the order of actuality. The supposition we go on is merely this that our minds are made for truth; that our ideas (at least our simple and direct ones) are expressive of objectivity and find their counterpart therein. Whether the order of objectivity be logical or actual in a given case is another question. Our idea of esse (existence), we contend, is such as to include in itself infinite perfection (mentally conceived), while at the same time denying that any perfection can be which is not included in it. This notion has objective value, in fact infallibly so, as any tyro in scholastic philosophy will prove to us with regard to all simple apprehensions. But whether in the order of actuality there are to be found limited beings and a Being who is infinite or not is another question which demands and has a posteriori proofs. To both parts of the question, of course, we return an affirmative answer as do also our adversaries. But our proofs of the fact, or rather pair of facts, are not dependent on our original assertion. Therefore our argument with regard to real existence and its properties is not idealistic but is a legitimate immediate inference. Hence this part of our major is quite sound.

But what about the first part of our major in which we state that existence is an actus or perfection (meaning, of course, a real perfection). Well, to deny this is to make existence a subjective form and commit intellectual suicide. Therefore we feel entitled to reassert that existence is a real perfection, and if there are things possessing this perfection (there are, as all agree) they possess it in such a way as to correspond to our notion.

A much more subtle argument is levelled against our

first inference, which implies that esse can only be limited by a subjective potency in which it is received. Our adversaries tell us that esse can be limited by an extrinsic (efficient) cause; hence, in virtue of Occham's razor there is no need to suppose an intrinsic limiting cause to account for the finite esse of creatures. We do not deny that the first efficient Cause does limit esse; but we do deny that He can do so without an intrinsic cause, just as we deny that He can make a square circle. Even omnipotence is bounded by absurdity. We hold that an actus limited extrinsically by an efficient cause and intrinsically merely by itself is unthinkable; we contend that this will appear from an examination of the notion of existence. It is perfectly absurd to talk, let us say, of a glass full of water where there is no glass, and it appears equally absurd to talk of an actus limited without an intrinsic limiting cause, which is subjective potency. We are dealing, of course, with actus entitatis, but our statement holds equally well of an actus formalis. By a consideration of any such actus perhaps our position will be more clearly understood. Take, for example, wisdom. The perfection of wisdom prescinds from human, angelic or divine wisdom; it implies no limitation in its own line, and if independent of a subject, or in other words subsistent, it is infinite. Where we have wisdom limited to a definite grade of perfection, say human or angelic, why is it so limited? The answer seems clear; simply and solely by the subjective capacity of the subject. Why has an angel so much wisdom, no more and no less? Because he is an angel, not God and not a human being; not because he is wise merely, but because he is a being of such or such a grade of entative perfection who has an exigence for a corresponding grade of wisdom. Analogously with regard to esse. If we seek an answer to the question why any given creature partakes being (existence) to such a degree and such a degree only, the only answer forthcoming is that such is his capacity. Why is a human being a human being, not an angel nor a beast? Surely not because he is, but because he is a human being. Hence our general doctrine is that no simple perfection can limit itself in its own line, even under the influence of an efficient cause. Esse, the forma omnium formarum, cannot limit itself in any line whatsoever, and hence where it subsists (as it does in God) it is simply infinite. Now, on the hypothesis of our adversaries, every creature would be an esse

subsistens, and hence we say would be infinite. The consequent is false; every creature is finite, and therefore we insist its esse is receptum, and being receptum is really distinct from its receiver, which is its essence, and hence this latter is real apart from the actuality which holds it in the ontological order.

This argument appears to us to be absolutely conclusive, whether it is so or not in reality. Id viderint sapientiores. We insist, however, that its force is not to be measured in terms of compiled authorities, but in terms of prolonged and solid thought. The fallacy that knowledge is a matter merely of reading seems almost characteristic of our day. The fact is that knowledge-especially philosophic knowledge is much more the outcome of thinking than of reading. The prevalence of the opposite opinion, we believe, accounts for the continuance in existence of the various modern systems of philosophy in spite of their shallowness. Reading is comparatively easy work: thinking is very difficult. But if we will attain to knowledge of the truth, and only the truth can set us free, then the means we are to adopt must be adequate for the purpose, and the only adequate means is honest thinking, how so laborious it may be.

Having made this brief digression we shall now proceed to give our second argument in favour of the Real Distinction. It is as follows: If the essence of a creature were identified with its existence a parte rei, the definition of the essence would contain existence; but it does not. Therefore, the two are not really identified.

We pointed out, when dealing with our first argument that it is often misunderstood and misinterpreted by our critics. This is even more true of our present argument. First of all, our adversaries tell us that they are quite willing to admit that existence is not to be found in the adequate notion of essence, provided this latter be considered in statu possibilitatis. But once it is looked on in statu reali, then existence forms part of its connotation. Otherwise, they say, our notion of real essence would be that of a thing existing without existence. Such a notion is selfcontradictory. Yes, such a notion would be undoubtedly self-contradictory, but it is not our notion of real essence. Our adversaries, by confounding actuality and reality are enabled to fulminate their supposed difficulty. But as a matter of fact their bolt falls wide of the mark. If we look upon essence in statu reali, meaning by this last word

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