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circumstances in which it has hitherto been employed, e.g., in doubts concerning the natural or positive divine law or in doubts of fact about the ecclesiastical law.

The same canon deals also with laws which are doubtful on account of a doubt of fact. 'In a doubt of fact,' it declares, the Ordinary may dispense from them, provided there is question of laws from which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense.' Ordinaries have this power even at present, so that this disposition introduces no change. Nothing is said as to whether such laws really bind or not; and, consequently, the position in this respect remains unchanged. It depends, therefore, on the solution of the doubt whether or not they bind objectively. For example, when it is doubtful whether Friday has ceased and Saturday begun, the law of abstinence urges objectively, if de facto it is Friday, otherwise it does not. Subjectively, however, an individual may free himself from all obligation in accordance with the moral system which he favours, provided there is question merely of liceity. But, when an invalidating law is in question, the stricter view must always be followed.

EFFECT OF IGNORANCE ON ECCLESIASTICAL LAWS

By the natural law itself invincible ignorance and subjective obligation are incompatible. Consequently, even though there is no reference to this point, a person who violates any law whatsoever under the influence of invincible ignorance still continues to be free from all subjective fault. On the other hand, without some enactment of positive legislation, ignorance, even though invincible, does not excuse from the effects of invalidating laws; and hitherto such an enactment has been wanting, except, indeed, in the case in which invalidity was imposed as a punishment. Not only is it wanting in the new Code, but, in fact, there is a statement to the contrary effect. 'No ignorance of invalidating or inhabilitating laws,' it is declared, 'excuses from them, unless the contrary is expressly stated' (can. 16, §1).

Invincible ignorance, when it really exists, always excuses from fault in the internal forum. In order, however, that it be admitted as an excusing cause by ecclesiastical superiors in the external forum, its existence must be proved. The Code confirms some presumptions of the old discipline which are important in this connexion. Ignorance

is presumed not to exist, when there is question of:(a) Law; (b) punishment; (c) a fact which has reference to oneself; (d) a fact which has reference to another, but which is notorious. On the other hand, it is presumed to exist in the case of a fact having reference to another, but which is not notorious (can. 16, § 2). These are merely presumptiones juris, not juris et de jure ; and, consequently, they may be upset by contrary proof.

As we indicated in the beginning, there is nothing in the Code about the effect of grave difficulty or impossibility upon ecclesiastical laws. The position, therefore, will be the same as at present, subject entirely to the terms of the natural law. There is no trouble, of course, except where invalidating laws are concerned. The general principle is that inconvenience or impossibility does not excuse from such laws; but it is pretty widely admitted that this principle is not without its exceptions. Thus many hold that a diriment impediment ceases when it clashes with an individual's natural right to marriage, provided, of course, that it is impossible to seek for a dispensation."

LACUNAE IN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW

There are three canons on interpretation; but as they merely summarize the existing teaching, and as, besides, our space is limited, we shall not deal with them. We shall pass on, then, to the interesting enactment on lacunae in ecclesiastical law, that is to say, on points upon which there is no express prescription of law.

Hitherto, canonists were divided as to the source from which these lacunae were to be filled up. It was generally maintained that the deficiency was to be supplied from Roman Law, as it, and it alone, had received general approbation from the Church. D'Annibale, however, and not a few other recent writers held that in such contingencies the modern civil codes should be applied to, as thus disputes between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities would be most effectively avoided.

1 'Deinde, nullam epicheiam recipiunt ; atque ideo nullum incommodum, ne gravissimum quidem, ab eis servandis excusat."-D'Annibale, l.c., n. 216. In a note, however, he adds: 'Sed in jure canonico hoc perpetuum non est.'Suarez, 1.c., lib. v. c. 23.

'Excipe si impedimentum juris ecclesiastici in illis circumstantiis sit in oppositione cum jure naturali ad matrimonium, quia quis a matrimonio simpliciter se abstinere deberet; tunc enim impedimentum, quatenus juri naturae oppositum, cessare non est dubium.'-Gasparri, De Matrimonio, n. 313.

Vide Wernz, l.c., 198.

41.c., n. 201.

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The regulation of the Code is quite different from both of these opinions. If there is wanting,' it declares, express prescription of law, either general or local, about any particular matter, the rule must be taken from laws made for similar cases, unless there is question of applying penalties; from the general principles of law observed with canonical equity; from the style and practice of the Roman Curia; and from the common and constant opinion of learned men.'

In the determination of the rule to be applied all these sources may not, of course, be always available; in fact, generally speaking, they will not. The general principles of law, however, can be always brought to bear on a point of this kind; and a regulation can be thus evolved, even though no other means is at hand.

In this connexion we should like to draw attention to canon 1529, which gives a general approbation, and canonizes, so to speak, the laws of modern civil codes regarding contracts and payments to creditors, and thus involves a modification of the regulation which we have just quoted. 'What the civil law,' it is stated, 'decrees specifically or generally about contracts, whether nominate or innominate, and about payments to creditors, the same also is to be observed with the same effects by Canon Law in ecclesiastical matters, unless it is opposed to the divine law, or unless there is some other provision in Canon Law.' In so far, therefore, as these laws are concerned, D'Annibale's opinion has been legalized.

CESSATION OF THE END OF A LAW

In accordance with canon 21, laws made as a precaution against a general danger urge, even though in a particular case the danger is not present. The end of a law in circumstances of this kind is said to cease negatively it is said to cease in contrarium when the observance of the law involves grave inconvenience. There is no provision for this latter contingency; and, hence, the position under the Code, as we have already indicated, will be the same as at present, subject entirely to the terms of the natural law.

Neither is there any statement as to the position, when the end of a law ceases for the entire community. But here, again, the natural law supervenes, and declares the complete cessation of the law under the new legislation, just as well as under the old. Private individuals, however,

will be scarcely ever justified in assuming that a law has ceased to be of value for the entire community; and so, to avail of this disposition, an authoritative declaration will be usually required.

ABROGATION OF AN ANTECEDENT BY A SUBSEQUENT LAW

Under the new legislation (can. 22) a subsequent law made by competent authority abrogates an antecedent one in the following circumstances :

1o. When it contains an express declaration to that effect.

2o. When it is directly contrary to the antecedent law. 3o. When it regulates the whole matter with which the antecedent law is concerned.

The first case of abrogation mentioned is quite in conformity with the existing discipline, and requires scarcely any explanation. It is quite clear that a competent superior may revoke a law already in existence; and there is no reason why he might not express his will to do so in some subsequent law, even though it be not in direct opposition to, or of the same extension as, the preceding one.

Abrogation of an antecedent by a subsequent law in direct opposition to it is also no innovation. From the very nature of the case the subsequent law in these circumstances contains an implicit expression of the superior's will to revoke the antecedent. This rule finds its most complete application when the two laws are of the same personal or territorial extension. When the antecedent is general and the subsequent particular, then the latter, in virtue of this rule, derogates from the former, in so far as the special places or persons are concerned.

When, however, the antecedent is particular, it was specially provided in the old legislation that a subsequent general law, even though directly contrary, did not abrogate it without an express clause to that effect. In the canon with which we are dealing the Code makes a similar provision. A general law,' it declares, does not by any means derogate from statutes for special places and particular persons, unless there is an express provision to the contrary in it.'

Neither in the old discipline or the new is there any express regulation regarding the effect of a subsequent

1 C. 1, tit. De Constit., lib. i. in vi.

particular law upon an antecedent one less extensive than itself; and, hence, this point will cause some trouble in the future, just as it has in the past. As the self-same difficulty arises in connexion with the abrogation of particular custom, we shall reserve our discussion of the matter to a future article.

The last case of abrogation mentioned is peculiar to the new Code. Hitherto, even though a subsequent law ranged over the whole ground covered by the antecedent one, yet it revoked the latter only in so far as opposition existed. Now, even though there is no opposition, abrogation will take place. The regulation providing that, without express mention, a general does not abrogate a particular law holds, of course, in this case also.

It must be remembered that there is a special statute regarding the effect of the new Code upon antecedent laws, both general and particular; so that its canons are not affected by the regulations just discussed, in so far as they disagree with this special statute.

Existing legislation has always enjoyed a position of favour in Canon Law; it is not surprising, therefore, to find the Code (can. 23) confirming the old disposition that in case of doubt the presumption is against the revocation of an existing law. Whenever, then, the opposition between an antecedent and a subsequent law is not quite clear, in virtue of this presumption the latter must be interpreted so as to agree with the former.

PRECEPTS

The final canon (24) of this title deals with precepts. It modifies considerably the existing discipline on this subject. Whilst the general teaching hitherto, indeed, has been that a precept bound everywhere and ceased with the cessation of the power of the superior who imposed it, yet some very prominent canonists maintained, with a good show of reason, that, when imposed in virtue of territorial jurisdiction, it did not bind outside the superior's territory, and did not cease with his death; in other words, that, so far as local extension and permanence were concerned, it was in the same category as a law. The old discipline, too, drew no distinction between precepts orally imposed and those imposed in writing.

The new legislation states, without any distinction

1 Vide D'Annibale, l.c., n. 249.

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