It is important to note that the principle that I have been discussing is subject to the very important quali fication, that if two laws cover the same matter, an act in contravention of them has not necessarily a twofold malice. It has such malice only when the reasons actuating the two legislators were different. Nec concedenda,' says Lugo, diversitas specifica ex diversitate quacunque superioris: durum esset enim, et contra praxim communem obligare poenitentem ut quoties se accusat de furto vel de fornicatione, explicet an illa peccata prohibita sint in illa provincia aliqua lege positiva humana."1 So a person guilty of theft, though it is forbidden both by the Divine and human law, has committed only one sin, because the two legislators had the same object in view. And, as St. Alphonsus says, 'diversitas legislatorum non efficit praeceptum esse formaliter diversum sed tantum materialiter'.'

Whereas, if a person has made a vow to fast, and breaks it on a fast day, he is guilty of two sins. Because the motive of the Church in making the law of fasting was to restrain our passions, lessen the attacks of temptation, and help us to satisfy for our sins; while the object of a vow is to honour God directly. Again, for a similar reason one who kills a priest commits two sins. But one who is bound to say the Divine Office both as a priest and a beneficed ecclesiastic is, if he neglects it, guilty of only one sin according to the more probable opinion, in the event of his not retaining the revenues of his benefice. For it is the same motive the Church has in view in making the Office compulsory on a priest and on one who is in the enjoyment of a benefice.

Of course, as is well known to my readers, the theologians are very far from being unanimous in recommending to confessors, as being the most handy and most workable, the principle that formally different laws are the basis of specifically distinct sins. Everyone, indeed, admits that this canon gives substantially accurate results, for, unquestionably, it is the violation of law that makes an act a sin. But St. Thomas, the Angelic Doctor, for instance, holds that sins are directly and proximately specified by the objects of the sinful acts. According to him:... Peccata specie distinguntur ex parte actuum voluntariorum magis

1 De Poenitentia, disp. xvi. n. 248.

2 Theol. Moralis, lib. v. n. 33.

3 Summa Theologica, 1a, 2, q. lxxii. art. i. in corp.

quam ex parte inordinationis in peccato existentis: actus autem voluntarii distinguntur specie secundum objecta, ut in superioribus ostensum est (q. 18, art. 2); unde sequitur quod peccata proprie distinguntur specie secundum objecta.'

The object that St. Thomas refers to in this passage as the distinguishing characteristic of sin is what is technically known as the objectum formale proximum, or, in other words, the motive; and not the object as contradistinguished from the end and circumstances of an act. This is clear from many parts of the same question, e.g. 'Patet tamen quod haec tria pertinent ad unam perfectam peccati speciem cum ab eodem motivo procedant.' 1 again: Et ideo ubicunque occurrit diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est diversa species peccati."2 And the Saint uses almost identical words in article 9.

And

But other theologians, as Scotus and St. Alphonsus,3 while mentioning the view of the angelic Doctor with respect, do not give their adhesion to it, as a satisfactory working principle for confessors. And principally, doubtless, because we cannot gauge whether, or how far, an act is immoral if we consider it in itself, and without reference to some rule or standard, e.g., a law or precept as I have indicated already.

Scotus himself, with many others, finds such a standard in the different virtues. And he bases his view on the fact that 'peccatum formaliter sumptum consistit in oppositione ad virtutem, qua privat.'

4

Even St. Thomas does not by any means rule out reference to the virtues as a useful principle for ascertaining the specific distinction of sins. For he says: Praecepta

non pertinent ad diversas virtutes, sed ad diversos gradus virtutis et per consequens non oportet, quod contrariarentur diversis peccatis secundum speciem.' 5

But, on the other hand, the difficulties against taking the virtues as a workable standard whereby the confessor may estimate the malice of sin, seem almost insurmountable. For, in the first place, there are some virtues the violation of which does not involve any sin at all. Thus

1 Art. vii. in corp.

2 Art. viii. in corp.

3 loc. cit. n. 32.

4 Apud Sanctum Alphonsum, loc. cit.

• Summa Theologica, 1a 2se q. lxxii. art. vi. ad 2.

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virginity is distinct from chastity and does not bind under sin, and the exercise of it belongs to the category of acts that are matters of counsel merely.

Moreover, there are many sins in the declaration of which no one would say that it is necessary to indicate even implicitly the virtue in specie infima that has been violated. Thus a person may confess a sin, and a mortal sin, without specifying which of the partes subjectivae or integrales of the cardinal virtues he has sinned against. For instance, one who has violated the cardinal virtue of temperance in a certain way is not bound to declare whether his sin is opposed to mansuetudo or clementia. Or to put the matter in another way, many virtues seem to be recognized as distinct, although they do not involve, for confessional purposes, at any rate, a specific distinction of the sins against them, even though these be mortal

ones.

And, on the other hand, it is the case that a person may sometimes violate the same virtue, and apparently in the same way, and yet be guilty of sins that are specifically distinct. This, I think, is a fair inference from the words of Lehmkuhl: Extenditur illa virtus [pietas] etiam in conjuges et liberos, ita ut officia, quae conjugi a conjuge, et quae liberis a parentibus debentur, etiam pietatis officia dicantur: quamquam ratio honestatis infima specie non eadem est.'1 For here, apparently, though it is supposed that it is the same virtue of piety that regulates the duties of children to parents, as those of parents to children and of married people to each other, it is explicitly stated that the moral qualities of the respective acts in the three cases are not of the same species; and consequently, the sins opposed to this virtue in the different cases are not of the same species.

Another reason for considering sins to be specifically distinct is the fact that they are opposed to the same law or precept in a manner that is substantially different. And a corresponding principle, of course, is adopted by those theologians who make the virtues the norm of the distinction of sins.

It is evident that such a principle is very difficult of application, and cannot always be expected to give satisfactory results. Because the principle itself is vague and indefinite, inasmuch as what appears substantially or

1 Op. cit., n. 922.

morally alike to one will appear quite different to others; even though these be theologians, who, owing to their outlook and mental equipment may be expected to arrive at fairly uniform conclusions. The fact is, then, that rigidly accurate results cannot be looked for, from the operation of the principle that different kinds of opposition to the same law beget different sins; and this is the explanation of a good many of the doubts that theologians entertain as to the fullness and accuracy required in our confessions.

The indefinite character of this norm is the basis, for instance, of the disputes as to whether one guilty of sins of aspectus and tactus must state in which of these two ways he violated the Commandment forbidding them; and whether the former contract--as the latter certainly doany special malice that may be in the object of the act.2 And most of the disagreement as to the necessity of disclosing such circumstances as Quis, Quid, Quomodo, Quando, etc., referred to by Lugo in the famous sixteenth chapter of his work on Penance, hinges on the application of this principle.

Many acts, of course, against the same law can be recognized at once as differing substantially in their mode of opposition to it; and so as specifically distinct. Thus a sin by defect against any law differs vitally, as is plain, from a sin by excess against the same law. So it is that despair and presumption, though both violations of the First Commandment, are of a different species, as are irreligiositas and superstitio. For, as the Angelic Doctor says Manifestum est autem quod non est idem motivum ad peccandum in peccatis quae sunt secundum superabundantiam, et in peccatis, quae sunt secundum defectum : quinimo sunt contraria motiva; sicut motivum in peccato intemperantiae est amor delectationum corporalium: motivum autem in peccato insensibilitatis est odium earum : unde hujusmodi peccata non solum differunt specie, sed etiam sunt sibi invicem contraria.' 3

But outside such evident cases, to apply the canon in question, and decide when two methods of violating a law are so different as to be specifically distinct, is not an

1 As Lehmkuhl (op. cit. n. 347) says: 'Tota haec distinctio non physica exactitudine sumitur. . sed morali quadam estimatione.'

2 Tanquerey, de vir. Castitatis, n. 25; Slater, Moral Theology, p. 338. 3 loc. cit., art. viii. in corp.

automatic process, but one of patient and painstaking investigation. And it may be of interest to see the mastermind of Lugo at work on the solution of a few cases by the application of it, and of its allied principle-based on the virtues.

In answer to the question1: 'Quid dicendum de conjugato peccante cum conjugata, vel de religioso peccante cum religiosa, de quibus aliqui dicant sufficere explicare speciem adulterii, vel copulae sacriligae, absque eo quod explicetur id provenire ex parte utriusque,' he says: Communiter tamen in utroque casu negant Doctores sufficere.' And after having referred to one reason, he says a more probable explanation can be given: dicendo illas duas malitias non differe solum numero, sed specie, et ideo debere utramque explicari: quia diversa specie obligatio est, qua debeo observare votum meum, v.g., ab ea qua debeo non procurare quod alter violet votum suum, sicut diversa specie obligatio est qua debeo esse castus ab ea, qua debeo non esse causa alteri, quod peccet contra

castitatem..

2

Again, treating of another case of the violation of a vow, he refers to the dispute as to whether the fact that it is a solemn one must be mentioned by the penitent. Many theologians, he says, are of opinion that there is no need to give this detail, for solemn and simple vows are of the same nature, while many other authorities hold a different view. As for Lugo himself, he believes that the mild view is well-founded and safe; but he is clear that, considering the matter apart from authority and on the ground of reason alone, a sinner of the kind who is a religious should tell this fact in confession.

In connexion with the circumstance, Quomodo, he says that a person who kills a man and mutilates the body is guilty of two specifically distinct sins, because through the mutilation contrahitur malitia feritatis specialis.'

4

In regard to a penitent who has sinned as a result of knowingly going into an occasion, Lugo says it is not necessary to mention this circumstance, if only a short period intervened between going into the occasion and the actual commission of the sin. Because in this hypothesis the sins are not numerically distinct; nor are they specifically so, for to go into the occasion of sin, and to commit

1 De Poenitentia, disp. xvi., sect. iv. n. 258. 2 Ibid., n. 146.

8 Sect. xii. n. 497.

n. 511.