of the Church, and consequently of the commonwealth, was against my keeping the oath.' Acquitted.-4. 192.

Who shall bind Proteus? Who shall tie to truth and fair dealing men who can have recourse to Rome's casuistry as often as their consciences become uneasy?

But, for purposes of illustration, we need not have recourse to cases which may be considered imaginary. The Treatise of Equivocation,' which we have placed at the head of our article, supplies us with the same principles; and the events connected with it tell us how those principles were applied by their authors and defenders. This treatise, published from a MS. in the Bodleian two years ago, has scarcely attracted so much attention as it deserves, regarded as a literary and historical document, apart from its controversial bearings. It was well known that such a treatise had existed, and that it was the authorized manual, employed, not without provocation, by the missionary priests and others in England, during the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth. It had been produced by Sir Edward Coke, in the trial of Garnet and the other conspirators in 1604. And here,' says the authorized Report of the Proceedings,' was shown a book, written not long before the queen's ' death, at what time Thomas Winter was employed into Spain, 'entitled A Treatise of Equivocation, which book being seen and ' allowed by Garnet, the superior of the Jesuits, and Blackwell, the arch priest of England, in the beginning thereof Garnet with his own hand put out these words in the title, of Equivocation, and made it thus, A Treatise against Lying and Fraudulent Dissimulation, whereas, in deed and truth, it makes for both; Speciosaque nomina culpa Imponis Garnette tuæ. And

in the end thereof Blackwell besprinkles it with his blessing, "saying, "Tractatus iste valde doctus et vere pius et Catholicus 'est. Certe S. Scripturarum, Patrum, Doctorum, Scholasti'corum, Canonistarum, et optimarum rationum præsidiis planissimè firmat æquitatem æquivocationis. Ideoque dignissimus 'est qui typis propagetur ad consolationem afflictorum Catholi'corum et omnium piorum instructionem." Morton, Bishop of Durham, wrote a systematic reply to it in 1606, in his Full Satisfaction. Dr. Robert Abbott, in his Antilogia, in 1613, and Henry Mason, in his New Art of Lying, in 1624, discussed its principles. Parsons, in his Treatise tending to Mitigation, in 1607, spoke of it as a certain Catholicke manuscript treatise, made in defence of Equivocation, and intercepted by them :' and Casaubon gave an account of it in his Letter to Fronto DuBut where was the Treatise itself, which had once made such a stir in the world? Nobody knew, and it was generally

cœus.

supposed to be lost. A hue and cry was raised for it by an anonymous inquirer in Notes and Queries; and, near the end of the year 1850, it was found in the Bodleian Library among the Laudian Miscellaneous MSS. The way in which it got there is curious. The occasion on which it was first made publici juris is thus recorded by Sir Edward Coke, in a manuscript note on the first leaf of the Treatise. This book, containing sixty-one 'pages, I found in a chamber in the Inner Temple, wherein Sir Thomas Tresham used to lie, and which he obtained for his 'two younger sons. This 5. of December, 1605. Edw. Coke. Os quod mentitur occidit animam. After having been produced at the trial, as mentioned above, it was laid up in the State Paper Office. In 1612, it was borrowed from thence by Archbishop Abbott, and lent by him to his brother, the Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford, who was at that time composing his Antilogia versus Apologiam Andrea Endomon-Joannis pro Henrico Garneto. A memorandum of the State Paper Office, which has been accidentally preserved, notices that the Archbishop, in restoring the other papers which had been delivered to him, had omitted to send back the Treatise. Thus it came into Laud's possession, when he succeeded Abbott at Lambeth, and was by him given with other papers to the Bodleian Library.

The author of the work is unknown. Abbott, in the polite language of the controversy of his day, styled him quietly, Sacerdos quidam Sathanæ.' Casaubon says that it was written ' ab eruditis Pontificiis in hoc regno.' It is corrected for the press by Garnet, approved by Blackwell, and defended by apologists, not on the plea of the exigency of the times,-thi very noticeable,-not on the plea of the exigency of the tin but on account of the righteous nature of the doctrine which propounds.

The object of the book is twofold: first, to justify South in having instructed a witness that she might conscienti

it

well

Dusly

affirm on oath, in a court of justice, that she had not seen him in Bellamy's house, although she had been in the constant habit of meeting him there, provided that, at the time of taking the

oath I have not seen him, she said to herself, so as to tell

you of it;

and secondly, to provide an authorized system for evading the truth, without being guilty of what the Church of Rome con

siders to be a lie.

The first chapter lays down the principle, that an oath ought to fulfil three conditions to be a lawful oath: it must be sworn

in truth, in justice, and judgment.' The premise

seems far

enough away from the conclusion which is to be reached; but the

1 Jer. iv. 2.

space is very quickly bridged over. It is clear that, if au asser tion is true, the same assertion confirmed by an oath is likewise true if, therefore, there is no deficiency of truth in the assertion, I have not seen him, with the aside, so as to tell you, when nevertheless I have seen him,-in that case, the oath confirming that assertion is not wanting in truth. The point, of course, is to prove that such an assertion is truthful. For this end propositions are divided into four kinds :

66

:

The first is a mental proposition, only conceived in the mynde, and not uttered by any external signification. . . The second is a vocal proposition, as when I utter these words with my mouth. The third is a written proposition, as if I should set down the same in wryting. The last of all is a mixt proposition, when we mingle some of these propositions, or parts of them, together; as in our purpose when, being demanded whether John at Style be in such place, I, knowing that he is there indeed, do say nevertheless, "I know not," reserving or understanding within myself these other words, "to the end for to tell you." Here is a mixt proposition containing all this" I know not to the end for to tell you." And yet part of it is expressed, part reserved in the mynde. Now, unto all these propositions it is common that then they are trewe when they are conformable to the thing itself; that is, when they so affirm or deny as the matter itself in very deed doth stand. Whereof we inferre that this last sort of proposition, which partly consisteth in voyce, and partly is reserved in the mynde, is then to be adjudged trewe, not when that part only which is expressed, or the other only which is reserved, is trewe, but when both together do contain a truth.'-P. 8.

We will not pause to point out the puerile confusion here exhibited between material truth and moral truthfulness. Our object is rather to show the contents of the book, than to undertake so superfluous a task as that of refuting it. The third chapter consists of a metaphysical consideration,' proving that such mixed propositions are true propositions, and that their 'veritye is not to be judged according to that which is uttered in words severally, but according to the words and some other 'thing understood or reserved.' The fourth is an appeal to authority. David used mixed propositions; for he said that the wicked should not rise again in the judgment, which is a false and heretical proposition,' unless he reserved something in his mind. Our Saviour used them; for He said that whatsoever He had heard from his Father, He had made known to His disciples; and that whatsoever two faithful persons should ask, it should be done; and that He was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel; and that Jaïrus' daughter was not dead, but asleep; and that His disciples could not go where He was going; and that the Son knew not the day of judgment; and that He was not going up to the feast. S. Paul used them; for he said that no man had seen or could see God; and yet 'Moses, as most holy fathers do affirme, and our blessed Ladye,

'as most schoolmen hold, and S. Paul hymself before that time, saw the very essence of God.'

This is quite enough for the first purpose which the Treatise was to serve; and so, in the three last chapters, we are brought triumphantly to the conclusion, that such an oath as that which Southwell taught Miss Bellamy to take, is wanting neither in truth, nor in justice, nor in judgment. It is not wanting in truth; for an oath of an equivocal proposition is a trewe oath, 'because of the truth of the proposition alone-because of the 'doctrine of the fathers-because it skylleth not that the pro'position is conceived as false-because in every oath there is ' understood this condition, that I will do so far as it is lawful' and because, in not meaning to perform the oath in the imme'diate sense of the judge, I have no contrary meaning to the principal meaning and intention which he hath, or should have.' It is not wanting in justice; for when the partye which is examined is asked that particular question, Was he there? what 'hyndereth that he may not say No? Not his oath; for that 'falleth not upon that question, being an unlawful question. Then it is only the lye; and being hurtful to nobodye, the I most that these canonistes can make of it is but an officious lye, which is but a small veniall synne, and rather to be incurred than the other, of prejudicing so highly cur neighbour. And yet, if he did equivocate, meaning No, to tell you, then was it no lye at all, and it was but an equivocation not sworn ; for the oath, as I said, did not nor could fall upon that question: 'so that it is an equivocation very far from perjury.' It is not wanting in judgment,-that is, it may be taken without rashness or indiscretion; for so long as there is, in the sense of that which I swear, veritye and justice,'-which has just been proved, 'I may without all rashness swear in this manner, so ofte as, having the fear of God before my eyes, I probably repute that either my own just profitt, or of my neighbour, or 'the honour of God, doth so require.' The conclusion is as follows:

6

'So that all allow this speech, I will answere whatsoever I knowe, meaning, for to tell you. If they will not admit that limitation, then, according to Bannez, they are bound to understand it, notwithstanding, in all his answeres. But, for further direction of the partye examined, if the oath be ministered generally, let hym admit the oath with this intention, that he will answere directly and truly, and (if so they urge hym) without all equivocation, so far as he is assured, without all doubt or scruple that he may or is bound. And if they make hym swear that he hath no private intention, or secret meaning, let hym swear it also with that very same secret understanding, that he hath no such meaning-to tell them. And with this general meaning at the beginning, when he took the oath, let hym not doubt but he shall be safe from all perjury, although he answer truly to nothing, because in these cases he is bound to answer directly to nothing. Yet, for

no.

to save hymself from lying, (which, notwithstanding, were but a very veniall synne in these matters, and of far less account than, perhaps, many other synnes which he hourly committeth,) let hym use some reasonable kynds of equivocation, as he may easily learn, of the wiser sort; that is, let hym speake some words which may satisfye the hearers, and, with some other words which he conceiveth, may make a trewe sense. And let hym assure hymself, that by no way he can sinne more heinously in these matters than to disclose that which is indeed, whether he have sworn it or But if he had no intention of equivocation, at the first when he took the oath, yet let hym persuade hymself, nevertheless, that he is not bound by his oath to do anything which becometh not an honest man; and so, if he equivocate in the particular question, he synneth not at all. If he tell plain lyes, without any true sense reserved, those do not so much offend God with their falsitye, as He is wont to reward such fidelitye, as we read in the midwives of Egypt, and in that honest harlot, if so we may call her, Rahab, to whom God hymself showed special favours. Fynally, if he be urged to swear the truth of some particular matter, let bym intend to tell the truth-so far as he is bound. If to do any particular unlawful matter, if it be such a thing as may be well interpreted, and not to tend to any scandal or dishonour of God, let hym swear it with equivocation, but not meaning to do it. If it be scandalous, or manifestly contrary to Christian duty, he must needs refuse it, as hath been declared before.'—P. 103.

Thus Southwell's good faith is vindicated, as well as the 'practice which was common in all Christian courts, and in all politicke governments, before these accusers or their greatgrandfather Luther was born, when the world was governed 'with as great piety, justice, and learning, as these scrupulous persons will ever establish in this realm, though they use never so great diligence.' The Treatise would not, however, be complete in its character of a manual, if it contained no more than this. There are other ways, besides this method of mental restriction, (here called equivocation,) whereby, without a lye, a trewth may be covered; and these must be enumerated. The first of these answers to Liguori's first form of Amphibology, where a word hath many significations, and we understand it ' in one sense which is trewe, although the hearer conceive the 'other which is false. .... The like whereunto were, if one 'should be asked whether such a stranger lodgeth in my house, ' and I should answer, "He lyeth not at my house," meaning that he doth not tell a lye there, although he lodge there.' To the second we have no objection to make, if it is used discreetly, when unto one question may be given many answers; we may yeelde one, and conceale the other.' The third corre sponds with Liguori's second form of Amphibology, where the 'whole sentence which we pronounce, or some word thereof, or the manner of poynting and dividing the sentences, may be

1

1 P. 49. A similar case is given in p. 29. If I be asked whether such a one be in my house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin, Non est hic, meaning that he eateth not there, for so doth est signifye.'