steal in grave necessity is immoral, says Innocent. True, but to permit a man to steal in very grave necessity is moral, reply the Casuists, and we have the privilege of explaining what very grave' means. This they accordingly proceed to do. And first a man is to be considered labouring under very grave necessity, if he is in probable danger of incurring death-next, if he is in danger of losing a principal limb-then, if he is in very near risk of being imprisoned for life—or of being sent to the galleys -or of catching a very bad disease-or of incurring disgrace. This last heading covers the case of the distressed nobleman. He would feel disgraced if he were to dig or to beg; therefore he is unable to have recourse to this method of relieving his wants, and is labouring under very grave or quasi-extreme need. That is all that is necessary. At once the laws of meum and tuum, so far as he is concerned, have perished. He may take what he wants. In providing for his needs out of other people's goods he cannot steal if he would. But if a man's want is so pressing that he is in risk of prostituting his daughter, the same authority tells us that that does not justify him in providing for himself.' To save his own character in the eyes of men he may take clandestinely. To save his daughter's ruin of body and soul he may not.

In connexion with this subject of extreme necessity, there are, says Liguori, many difficult questions. They are, 1., whether men in captivity to the Turks may purloin what is not theirs, and whether rich men are bound to redeem them. To this question Rome's oracle replies: In this doubt, which 'has heaped upon me a mighty confusion, and on which the 'Doctors speak so obscurely, I dare not decide anything. It is enough to have put forward the arguments of both sides. Let the wiser judge.' Question 2. is, whether a poor man in extreme necessity may secretly purloin (occulte alienum surripere) without going through the previous ceremony of begging. To this Coninchius answers in the negative; Lessius, Layman, and Concina, in a qualified affirmative; Cardinal Lugo and Liguori have recourse to a distinguendum. In reply to Question 3. we learn that no one is bound to spend so much as 6007. or '8007. to save another man's life, although the donor should 'not lose his station by giving more.' Question 4. asks if the thief who consumes what he has taken away in extreme necessity has to restore it. Palao, Concina, Navarrus, Diana, Sporer, Lessius, and Tamburini, are on the negative side, On the grounds that, as in extreme necessity all things become 'common, the thief has not only the right of taking others' goods, but also of consuming them, just as he has the right ' of purloining again.' Lessius, Sylvius, Armilla, Azorius, and

Concina, are on the other side. Liguori thinks both 'probable." The 5th question is whether the purloiner is bound to restore when his extreme necessity has ceased. Here there are three opinions. The first, affirmative, supported by seven Doctors; the second, negative, supported by eight Doctors; the third, a distinguendum, supported by twelve Doctors. Question 6. asks, If a rich man, who does not help a poor man in extreme necessity, is afterward bound to restore? Here there are eight Doctors on the affirmative side, nine on the negative, which Liguori says is the 'more probable; 'for, though the poor man has a right to take the rich man's goods, yet the same justice does not require the rich man to give."

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The next case of purloining not thieving, is when a man 'takes by way of just compensation, if he cannot otherwise get what is due to him; e. g. if a servant cannot get just wages ' otherwise, or if he has been unfairly induced to undertake the 'place at an unfair price.' This being a liberty given especially to domestics (though not confined to them), we shall defer its consideration till we are able to take a panoramic view of the indulgences granted by Rome to wives, children, and servants, to take clandestinely at the expense of the master of the house. At present we will content ourselves with Pascal's illustration of the principle in the story of John d'Alba.

"Father Bauny," said the monk, "has established a prime maxim in favour of those who are not content with their wages: May servants who are dissatisfied with their wages use means to raise them, by laying hands on as much of the property of their masters as they may consider necessary to make the said wages equivalent to their trouble? They may, in certain circumstances; as when they are so poor that, in looking for a situation, they have been obliged to accept the offer made to them; and when other servants of the same class are gaining more than they elsewhere."""Ha, Father!" cried I, "that is John d'Alba's passage, I declare.' "What John d'Alba?" inquired the Father; "what do you mean?" "Strange, Father," returned I," do you not remember what happened in this city in the year 1647? Where in the world were you living at that time?" "I was teaching Cases of Conscience in one of our colleges at a distance from Paris," he replied.

"I see you don't know the story, Father: I must tell it you. I heard it related the other day by a man of honour whom I met in company. He told us that this John d'Alba, who was in the service of your fathers, in the College of Clermont, in the Rue St. Jacques, being dissatisfied with his wages, had purloined something to make himself amends; and that your fathers, on discovering the theft, had thrown him into prison on the charge

Elsewhere we find :-'If a man gets something by borrowing, hiring or asking, and then consumes it in extreme necessity, he is not bound to make restitution. Nay, "probably" he is not bound to restore what he has previously stolen and afterwards consumed in this necessity, because his stealing does not take away from him the right which in such a case he had to the thing, no more than if he had taken it when actually in the necessity and consumed it.'-L. iv. 623.

2 L. iv. 520.

of larceny. His case was reported to the court, if I recollect right, on the 16th of April, 1647; for he was very minute in his statements, and, indeed, they would hardly have been credible otherwise. The poor fellow. on being questioned, confessed to having taken some pewter plates, but maintained, nevertheless, that he had not stolen them; pleading in his defence this very doctrine of Father Bauny, which he produced before the judges, along with a pamphlet by one of your fathers, under whom he had studied Cases of Conscience, and who had taught him the same thing. Whereupon M. De Montrouge, one of the most respected members of the court, said, in giving his opinion, 'That he did not see how they could discharge the accused on the ground of these fathers' writings, containing as they did a doctrine so illegal, pernicious, and contrary to all laws, natural, divine, and human, and calculated to ruin all families, and sanction all sorts of household robbery. But his opinion was, that this too faithful disciple should be whipped before the college-gate by the hand of the common hangman, who should at the same time burn the writings of those fathers which treated of larceny, with certification that they were prohibited from teaching such doctrines in future, upon pain of death."

"The result of this judgment, which was heartily approved of, was waited for with much curiosity, when some incident occurred which made them delay proceedings. But in the meantime the prisoner disappeared nobody knew how, and nothing more was heard about the affair; so that John d'Alba got off, pewter plates and all. Such was the account he gave us; to which he added, that the judgment of M. De Montrouge was entered on the records of the court, where any one may consult it. We were highly amused with the anecdote." "What are you trifling about now?" cried the monk; "what does all that signify? I was explaining the maxims of our Casuists, and was just going to speak of those relating to gentlemen, when you interrupt me with impertinent stories." "It was something suggested by the way, Father," I observed.'—Letter vi.

We will only add here that John d'Alba would, as we shall presently show, be equally justified by S. Alfonso's system of morals, as by that of Father Bauny, in spite of another fruitless attempt of Innocent XI., which we shall notice in its place. The last case of purloining not thieving is interesting to our Eastern protegés at the present moment, and may be of some advantage to our French allies-more, happily, to them than to our own soldiers-in preparing their commissariat on the Danube. All, and more than all, that the Emperor of Russia requires for his justification is freely allowed him. The Czar's claim is not a tenth part as bold as that of Molina, Cajetan, Victorelli, Naldus, Duvallius, Rebellus, Velasquez, Covarruvias and Diana, any one of which theologians is of sufficient authority to make the opinion which he espouses 'probable,' and therefore enough for a sovereign to act upon.

A bye-question here arises whether Christians may lawfully purloin the property of Turks? If Christians are captives in Turkish territories, it is certain that they may purloin from their masters enough for their redemption and for their return home, by way of compensation for their unjust slavery, and the losses which they consequently suffer. This is according to a decree of the Sacred Congregation, Aug. 23, 1630, in which it is declared-" Captives, unjustly detained by unbelievers, may take from their own masters, without doing wrong, enough for a proper compensation

to the amount of their redemption, from them, or from others who belong to the state, whether it be Jewish or Turkish." The only real question is, if every Christian, without distinction, may purloin the goods of Turks. Azorius and Filliuccius say No, but, "with probability," Molina and Cajetan say Yes. So do Victorelli, Naldus, Duvallius, Rebellus, Velasquez, Covarruvias, and others in Diana, who also holds it " probable." The reason is, that it may be rightly presumed that every Christian has this permission given him by Christian sovereigns, who have a right'-[hear it, O Nicholas!]-'to despoil Turks of all their goods and of the territories usurped by them. Felix Potesta agrees in this, provided that (as he rightly limits it) there be not among the Turks a time of truce, or of safeconduct, and provided that it do not apply to any single Turk living in Christian countries, whether free or a slave, especially if he is there as a public official under royal protection.'—L. iv. 525.

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So much for purloining which is not thieving. We now proceed to venial thieving. Mortal sin,' the Homo Apostolicus says, is that which deprives man of divine grace, which is the life of the soul, and is therefore called mortal. Venial sin is that which does not deprive of grace, and does not diminish 'God's love towards us, but does diminish our love towards 'God.' The distinction between mortal and venial sin being so enormous-venial sins being so trifling, that we are told a man does not sin gravely who deliberately determines to commit every venial sin under the sun-it is very important to see what are the conditions which bring acts under one class or the other. That there are some sins less offensive to God, which, if we please, we may call venial, and some sins more offensive to God, which, if we please, we may call mortal, we do not deny; but it is clear that according to any system which is not wholly unspiritual, it must depend altogether upon the disposition of mind in which the sin is committed, whether it is light or grave; and that to lay down an abstract chart in which certain sins are dotted down as venial, and certain others as mortal, is intellectually ludicrous and morally unprincipled. Rome's theologians think otherwise. One of the chief purposes of such books as that which we are reviewing is to classify all acts as respectively venial and mortal. The rules by which these writers have to direct themselves in deciding between the two classes, are three :-All sins requiring advertence on the part of the intellect, and consent on the part of the will; a sin is not mortal unless the advertence be full and

1 Hom. Apost. Tract. iii. 66. Vide Christian Remembrancer, No. LXXXIII. p. 44, for a further explanation of 'mortal and venial sin.'

Does any Christian man sin gravely who determines to commit every venial sin? Sanchez and Bonacina say Yes, because, as S. Thomas teaches, venial sins naturally dispose towards mortal sin but, "with greater probability," Palao and Antony of the Holy Ghost say No; (provided however that he does not act in contempt, and is not in proximate risk of falling into mortal sin, which he would learn from his past experience). The reason is, that really a purpose of this kind only conduces in a remote manner to mortal sin.'-Theol. Mor. 1. v. 12.

the consent be perfect. So far good: those two rules, if assailable on any other ground, are not liable to the charge of unspirituality. But there is a third: for a sin to be mortal there is also required 'gravity of matter;' and hard are the shifts to which those who try to divest Rome's morals of a hard, dry, calculating, mechanical character, are driven to explain what this gravity of matter' is. Sometimes they will say that it means the gravity of the sin;' but matter and sin' are not the same thing; and Liguori, in so many words, distinguishes them. Sometimes they will say that it means the objective and material badness of the act.' This is less tenable than the former; and so at last they are compelled to acquiesce in the simple account given of it by all the commentators on S. Thomas Aquinas, and adopted from them by S. Alfonso. We will take Cardinal de Lugo's account, as representing the earlier writers. He says:

'It is certain that in this (i.e. in stealing) a sin may be allowed to be light, not only on account of defect of advertence, but also on account of levity of matter. The whole difficulty is in determining how much matter is enough for a mortal sin of theft. . . . Though we can with certainty determine some matter to be small, viz. an obol or penny, and other matter to be certainly grave, viz. 207. ; yet between these two extremes we cannot define what approaches to each of these two matters, so as to be light if up to that sum, and grave if beyond it.'-Lugo de Just. d. 16. n. 27, 28.

The meaning, then, of gravity of matter in the case of theft is the amount stolen. If the amount stolen is equal to a certain quantity, which is called notable, then the theft is in grave matter, and (supposing that it is committed with full advertence and perfect consent), the act is a mortal sin. If it is below that quantity, then the theft is in light matter, and (in spite of full advertence and perfect consent) the act is a venial sin. S. Alfonso accordingly asks, on the subject of theft,

'What is notable quantity for mortal sin?'... Various are the opinions on this subject. Navarrus, with too great scrupulousness, says that 24d. is enough; others, with too great laxity, say 27. 108.; with greater moderation, Toletus, Medina, Lessius, &c. say 10d., though less than that is enough, if it does notable damage.'-L. iv. 526.

These authors are but rough artists. As yet, we may observe, the attempt is to fix an absolute sum, settling at once (as one of three conditions) the spiritual price of each theft; viz. below 10d. purgatory, above 10d. eternal death. But what this absolute sum should be, it was difficult to decide. There is some difference between 27. 10s. and 24d.; nor does 10d. seem a fair medium between them. But by degrees the science grows more exact, and it is determined that the sum fixed must be relative, not absolute; and that it must be higher or lower, according to the circumstances of the person from whom the thief steals.