What is grave quantity with respect to different sorts of persons, or to different circumstances?... The Doctors say "in common," that in theft that is grave matter which would be enough for a man to support himself and his family with for a day, according to their condition in life, counting, as Croix, Sporer, Gomez and others well note, not only his board, but also the price of his clothing and lodging. But as this rule is very obscure and confused, and cannot be applied to all without exception, we will bring forward the Doctors who fix what is grave matter for different kinds of persons.

1. With respect to poor mendicants, Habert, Elbel, Sporer, and Holzmann, fix on a few coins as grave matter. But others "more commonly" fix 5d., or sometimes even 24d. (but rarely, as the Salamanca Doctors say). So Busembaum, Lessius, Bonacina, Viva, Anacletus, Escobar, Renzi, Mazzotta, Wigandt, with Bannez and Serra; so too Navarrus, Reginald, and Diana in Lugo.

2. With respect to poor labourers, speaking generally, Layman and Lugo say that anything equal in value to a day's maintenance, or to the ordinary wages which are given to a labourer for a day, is grave matter. Others, however, speak more distinctly. Roncaglia and Habert fix 5d. for grave matter; but others "more commonly" say 10d., both for labourers and artizans or mechanics. So Layman, Lessius, Medina, Bonacina, Viva, Wigandt, Concina, Renzi, Escobar, Mazzotta, Tamburini, Busembaum, Holzmann, Serra in the Salamanca Doctors, and Navarrus, Reginald, and Diana in Lugo. Nevertheless, Soto, and Peter Navarrus in Lessius, require for artizans more than 10d. to make grave matter, and so Elbel and Potesta say; Filliuccius requires 1s. 3d., Lugo 18. 8d. Hence I say with "probability," that 10d. is enough for labourers, but that for artizans at least 1s. Od. is required for grave matter, if they earn as much or more a day. Habert, however, rightly notes that if a workman supported himself with difficulty, earning 7d. or 8d. a day, such an amount would be grave in regard to him.

3. With respect to men rich in a common or ordinary way, men who live on their own income, Concina and Roncaglia fix Is. 3d. for grave matter, Layman about 2s. 6d. ; but" more commonly," Busembaum, Lessius, Bonacina, Gordon, Habert, Viva, Anacletus, with Peter Navarrus, Elbel, Tamburini, Holzmann, Potesta, Wigandt, Bannez, Serra, Reginald, Diana, with the Salamanca Doctors, say that for these 1s. 8d. is grave matter. Nay, Filliuccius, Escobar, Mazzotta, Renzi, and Tamburini extend it to 28. 1d. Viva, however, rightly notices that this does not apply to men who live very closely, although they do live on their own income: in their case I certainly think 1s. 3d. is grave matter; nay even less in the case of those who keep themselves and their household in exceedingly wretched plight. On the other hand, for a person absolutely wealthy, Sporer requires 2s. 1d., Lugo 2s. 6d. or 2s. 11d. But with regard to tradesmen of small fortune, I think that 1s. Od. is grave matter. For others of moderate fortune, I think, with Elbel, Viva, Anacletus, and Croix, 1s. 8d. For a very rich tradesman Croix requires 38. 4d. Tamburini, Renzi, and Potesta require 58. But Layman, Elbel, Holzmann, Angelus, Sylvester, Rodriguez, Peter of Aragon, Antony of Cordova in the Salamanca Doctors, require 2s. 1d.

4. With respect to very rich noblemen, Sylvester, Angelus, Peter of Aragon, Antony of Cordova and Rodriguez in the Salamanca Doctors, require more than 10s. for grave matter; Viva, Elbel, Sporer and Croix, at least 10s.; but " more commonly" it is said that 58. is enough for grave matter, by Bonacina, Gordon, Mazzotta, Filliuccius, Anacletus, Tamburini, Lugo, Navarrus, Reginald, Diana, Lessius, Soto, Peter Navarrus, Roncaglia, Holzmann. And Filliuccius, Roncaglia, Holzmann, and Lugo, say that this applies to kings too, because though, absolutely regarded, 5s. may seem light matter to them, yet really, they say, considering the burdens and functions of kings,

it is grave. The Salamanca Doctors say that 78. 6d. at least, is enough for kings. Others however "probably" say that at least 10s. is required, as Croix, Bonacina, Busembaum, Sporer, Mazzotta, Elbel, Tamburini, Viva and Serra in the Salamanca Doctors. Nay, Potesta requires more than 10s. for kings, and very many others extend it to 15s.; as Wigandt, Bannez, Serra, Layman, Peter Navarrus, Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, Peter of Aragon, Rodriguez, Antony of Cordova, and the "common opinion," as Layman

says.

5. With respect to a community, Sanchez and Cardenas in Croix, think that 5s. is always grave matter; but Croix says "probably," that if the community were very rich, grave matter might be extended further, so that it did not exceed 10s.

'Conclusion, and " more probable opinion." From all this I draw, in conclusion, what seems to me "more probable." 1. With respect to mendicants, I think that 5d. is grave matter, or still less, if any poor persons gain less per day by alms. 2. With respect to labourers and similar workmen, commonly speaking, 10d.; for artizans, 1s. Od. 3. With respect to ordidarily or moderately rich men, 1s. 8d.; and less for those who live in wretched plight or on their own goods; but for the absolutely rich, 2s. 1d. or 2s. 6d. ; and I think the same for very opulent tradesmen. 4. With respect to very rich noblemen, 5s.; and I think the same for a very opulent community-at least for this, I think that 7s. 6d. is enough for grave matter. With respect to kings, 10s.'-L. iv. 527, 528.

Is this morality or arithmetic? And what does it all mean? It means this. First, the principle is admitted that unless a certain quantity is stolen a sin of theft is not mortal. Then, as Cardinal Lugo says, comes the difficult task of fixing what this sum must be. At first an absolute sum was fixed for all cases, whether 2 d., or 10d., or 2l. 10s. It was soon seen that that would not do, and so the absolute sum was changed into a sum relative to the income of the sufferer. Still, however, more exactness was demanded, and men were accordingly divided into so many classes, and a certain sum affixed to each one of these classes. He who stole anything under the sum fixed for each class from any member of that class sinned venially; he who stole as much as the sum fixed sinned mortally. On the question, What should be the recognised scale of prices? we have seen that doctors have considerably disagreed. The last tariff, the one with which we have to do, is as follows:

:

In the same way that the theory of predication in Logic is supposed to be made more perfect by the quantification not only of the subject but also of the

Now mark the inexpressibly absurd consequences resulting from laying down scales of this nature. Let there be 2s. 6d. lying on the table-let a man with full knowledge that God's law forbids him to appropriate it, yet wilfully and deliberately steal it for present gratification, nay, let there be added in his mind a malicious feeling of hatred against the owner. Is it not clear that he has been guilty of as perfect an act of theft as could be committed? that in God's sight he is a malicious thief, and must bear his burden accordingly? Distinguendum answers Rome. We must first ask to whom that 2s. 6d. belonged. If it belonged to a mendicant, if it belonged to a labourer, if it belonged to an artizan, if it belonged to a moderately rich man or to an absolutely rich man, then it is true the sin of theft was mortal. But in case that it belonged to a very rich nobleman, a very rich community, or to a king, the character of the act is changed; two of the conditions of a mortal act of theft are fulfilled, but the third is wanting. True, the man's mind, soul, and spirit remain in exactly the same disposition, but he has not stolen enough. He is excused from mortal sin on the ground of levity of matter. He has but committed a venial act of theft, and for that God's love is not diminished towards him, though his own love towards God is dulled. He need not confess what he has done.

Again, suppose a man standing between a country squire and a rich peer. Let him be affected exactly in the same manner and degree towards each. Let him know and bear in mind that God has forbidden him to take what does not belong to him, but let him wilfully determine to do so. He puts out his right hand and steals 3s. from the peer. God's love is not thereby diminished towards him-it is a venial act of theft. He puts out his left hand and steals the same sum of 3s. from the squire. He has earned to himself eternal hell fires, and his soul is dead-it is a mortal act of theft.

Once more, a man is sitting in a railway carriage, the temptation comes upon him, and though he is aware of the wickedness of the act he filches 28. from his neighbour's pocket. Has he sinned mortally or venially? He does not know. If his neighbour was an absolutely rich man he sinned venially; if a moderately rich man he sinned mortally. Purgatory and everlasting death are in the balance.

Such are some of the absurdities which the introduction of predicate; so we think that the theory of notable quantity in Theft should be perfected by the sum fixed being made relative to the income of the Thief as well as of the sufferer. We should then have a very pretty and ingenious puzzle, which might be represented in a diagram, something after the fashion of the 'Scheme of Opposition' in Aldrich. Perhaps some of the commentators on S. Alfonso (already he has several) will take advantage of this suggestion.

the Quantitative Principle into morals produces. The date of such introduction we need scarcely say is that period at which the vicious system of modern casuistry was in its strength. That there is a hint of it or approach to it in S. Augustine, and' the moralists of the early Church, it would be an insult to them and to Christianity to suppose. Nay, it is not found in S. Thomas Aquinas. The names referred to in the passage quoted from Liguori will show its origin. The cause of its introduction is mainly twofold; first it may be traced to that spirit of defining, materializing, and making tangible, which has so unhappily pervaded Roman theology, doctrinal and moral; and next to a false idea that theft was only so far and to such degree sinful as it harmed our neighbour more or less. The fallacy which makes this latter notion plausible is easily exposed. It is true that the wilful harm done to our neighbour adds another sin to the sin of theft; but the sinfulness of the latter is already complete in its own kind as soon as a man has consciously and wilfully appropriated any sum, however small, knowing at the time that such appropriation was contrary to God's law. For example, God has written in our hearts the moral law of justice, Thou shalt not take that which is not thine to take;' and upon it has founded the positive law in His Word, Thou shalt not steal.' A man is conscious of these laws, and aware that he is bound by them. In the midst of this consciousness his eye lights upon something which he covets. The temptation is too strong for him, and he stretches out his hand and takes it. The sinfulness of the act is perfect, and yet not a thought has come into his mind of the harm, greater or less, done or not done, to his neighbour. So far as the sin of theft goes, it is wholly unimportant whether the thing which he coveted and appropriated was worth 2d. or 200l. It is true that if it were worth 2007., and if that 2001. had been gathered together by a poor man in the sweat of his brow, and was his all, and the thief was conscious of this, another offence would be added to that of theft. Had the rich man in Nathan's parable taken the ewe lamb from another rich man, still he would have been guilty of a perfect sin of plunder, though he would not have added to it the further aggravation of cruelty and hard-heartedness. As it was, he was guilty first of seizing that which was not his, so transgressing the law of justice, and then, concomitantly with that sin, and by the same act, he was guilty of a host of other iniquities, by which he transgressed the laws of charity and humanity. We need not say that, without any additions or aggravations, theft and plunder are in themselves deadly sins.

So in murder. The formal sinfulness of murder consists in transgressing the law of God written in our hearts and in his

Word, Thou shalt not take another's life.' Thou shalt do no murder.' The sin would be a perfect sin of murder, although good rather than harm should come to the sufferer. The harm done to the sufferer adds another sinfulness to the already mortal sin of murder.

We shall be met by the question, What, then, is a boy a thief who eats a turnip as he is passing through a field? Čertainly not, in virtue of that act taken abstractedly. What we have maintained all along is, that the guilt of the act depends upon the frame of mind of the agent. A merry boy who lightly takes an apple from an orchard is not blameless, but he is not guilty of a serious act of theft. But if he took that apple or that turnip not thoughtlessly, or because it was an allowed thing, but with a firm conviction all the time that it was forbidden by God, and that he was transgressing his law in doing so, then it would be a grave sin. But, says Lessius, 'for a theft to be mortal, it is 'necessary that the quantity of matter be considerable: and this 'is clear, for it is not possible that taking any little thing such as an apple or a penny, can be deadly guilt." We, on the other hand, lay down no abstract rule. In every case we say it depends upon the disposition of mind of the agent.

We now return to some more of the consequences of making notabilis quantitas furti, a condition of a mortal sin of theft.

Lessius, Trulenchius, and Villalobos, say, that in separate small thefts twice as much is needed for grave matter, i.e. if 1s. 8d. is grave matter of itself, 3s. 4d. is required for grave matter by small thefts. Holzmann requires the same quantity, if these petty larcenies are committed on different persons, and if they take place at considerable intervals, he requires three times as much. To us, however, it seems more fair, as others quoted by Elbel say, to hold that if the petty larcenies are committed on the same person at intervals, or on different persons at the same time, then as much, and half as much again, i. e. 2s. 6d., is requisite and enough for grave matter. But if both these things concur, namely, if they are committed on different persons and at different times, I think twice as much is needed, i. e. 3s. 4d. This however is to be understood with Lessius and Lugo, provided thefts are not purposely made in portions, and provided that there is not a long interval between the thefts. Layman, Bonacina, Lugo, &c. add, that petty larcenies do not coalesce if they are committed on different owners, and after a long interval, such as a year. Nay, Sanchez, Decian, Roncaglia, Viva, and Trulenchius, excuse from making restitution sub gravi, though the petty larcenies were committed on one owner, if there is an interval of a year. But Viva and Roncaglia reject the opinion of Filliuccius, Diana, Salaz, Vidal, Toletus, &c., who excuse from making restitution if fifteen days or a month have elapsed, as Navarrus in Sanchez admits: unless, excepts Viva, the matter is very small. Hence, I rather approve of Roncaglia's opinion, namely, that there must be at least an interval of two months, when the matter is, though not grave, yet very nearly grave.'—L. iv. 350.

1 Lessius de Just. 2, 12, 13.