The Ethical System of Adam SmithJ. Bowes, printer, 1898 - 67 pages |
Expressions et termes fréquents
actions Adam Smith admits affections age and society altruism arises artificial virtue benevolence cause Chap character conduct conscience consider consists constitutes dependent desire doctrine Dugald Stewart egoism emotions endeavour ethical system evil excite faculty feeling fundamental happiness harmony Hence History of Philosophy human nature Hume Hume's Ibid idea imagination impartial spectator importance inary individual Inquiry insists instinct interest justice Kant Kant's Leslie Stephen mankind means of sympathy ment mind moral distinctions moral judgments Moral Philosophy Moral Sense Philosophers Moral Sentiments Moralists motive never Oncken original ourselves passions pathy perception perfection person principally concerned pleasure and pain praise praise-worthiness principle proper object punishment reason resentment right and wrong rules Schubert self-love selfish sense of duty Shaftesbury and Hutcheson Smith finds Smith regards social society sympathetic sense System of Moral Theory tion Treatise ultimate utilitarian utility utterly virtuous writers
Fréquemment cités
Page 51 - We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glass by which we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct.
Page 55 - He desires not only praise, but praiseworthiness, or to be that thing which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise.
Page 52 - It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our conduct.
Page 28 - Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper.
Page 51 - I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct,...
Page 51 - When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of.
Page 49 - ... by what means does it come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenor of conduct to another; denominates the one right and the other wrong; considers the one as the object of approbation, honour, and reward, and the other of blame, censure, and punishment?
Page 34 - But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations with the person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize.
Page 33 - ... the great, the awful, and respectable, the virtues of self-denial, of self-government, of that command of the passions which subjects all the movements of our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct, require, take their origin from the other.
Page 35 - ... his situation fully, and in all its parts, we should without doubt most sincerely sympathize with him. It is upon the consciousness of this conditional sympathy, that our approbation of his sorrow is founded, even in those cases in which that sympathy does not actually take place ; and the general rules derived from our preceding experience of what our sentiments would commonly correspond with, correct, upon this, as upon many other occasions, the impropriety of our present emotions.