there is one act of the will determining another. But if the will is not active in the determination, then how does it exercise any liberty in it? If either part of this dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty, consisting in self-determining power, is overthrown. If there be an act of the will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the will is determined by another; and so we have the absurdity of every free act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act or exercise of the will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining power of the will. Secondly, in reply to the position that liberty consists in indifference, or in that equilibrium by which the will is without all antecedent bias, it is affirmed, that to make out this scheme of liberty, the indifference must be perfect and absolute; there must be a perfect freedom from all previous inclination. If the will be already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself. If, when two opposites are proposed to the mind for its choice, the proposal does not find the mind in a state of indifference, then it is not found in a state of liberty for self-determination. Does the human mind ever exert its will while it yet remains in a state of indifference? The putting of the question is sufficient to shew the absurdity of the doctrine against which we contend. How can the human mind choose one thing before another, when, at the same time, it is perfectly indifferent with re spect to each? This were to affirm, that it prefers one thing to another at the very time it has no preference. Choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderating scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium. Thirdly, in answer to the position that the acts of the will are contingent; it is maintained that no acts of the will are contingent in such a sense as to be without the necessity of consequence or connexion ; because every act of the will is connected with the understanding; and because the human mind always wills or chooses that which in the present view of the mind appears most agreeable. The external action is determined by the will: the will by desire; and desire by what is agreeable or disagreeable. The agent cannot will but according to desire, and he cannot desire but according to what is agreeable or disagreeable in the objects perceived. We have no reason to believe that ever a man acted against his own desire, who was not compelled by external force. On the contrary, constant and universal experience proves, that human actions are governed by certain laws, and that man does not exert his self-motive power, but in pursuance of some desire. Such, then, say the Necessarians, are the laws that govern our voluntary actions. Man is free to act according to his own will; greater freedom than which is not conceivable. As he is made accountable for his conduct to his Maker, to his fellow-creatures, and to himself, he is not left to act arbitrarily. Is it not desirable that the will of Him to whom we are sub jected should be under restraint? Could we wish that our own will should be under no regulation? According to the present system we are the fit subjects of moral government. An argument, or rather another class of arguments, adduced in support of what I call the doctrine of moral certainty, but what is usually termed, necessity, is taken from the prescience of the Deity. The argument may be stated thus: God foresees all the determinations of the human mind; but whatever he foresees shall certainly come to pass; therefore all the determinations of the human mind shall certainly exist. As this is a subject of very great importance, and closely connected with some of the fundamental doctrines of religion, I must be allowed to enter into its consideration at some length. CHAPTER XIV. EXPLANATORY REMARKS. "THE decrees of God are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath fore-ordained whatsoever cometh to pass." To the doctrine thus explicitly stated, which maintains not merely the divine foreknowledge, but the divine plan in regard to all events, and to all beings that exist, objections have always been offered. The subject has certainly been often handled injudiciously and rashly, apart from its scriptural simplicity and practical bearings. A doctrine in itself abstruse has been rendered repulsive, by the length to which it has been pushed by the zeal and presumption of disputants. But still, as a doctrine of revelation, when treated with the humility which it so eminently requires, it must be profitable for reproof, for correction, and for instruction in righteousness. What are we to understand by the terms, that the decrees of God are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath fore-ordained whatsoever cometh to pass? The word decree usually signifies a public law or edict; whereas when it denotes, as in the present instance, the eternal purpose of God, in regard to all beings and events, it signifies that plan, as known to God only, according to which all things exist. The word counsel, also, as referring to the deliberations of finite creatures, implies imperfection. But it can have no such signification in relation to God, before whose all-seeing eye all things lie naked and open. His counsel is intuitive as well as perfect judgment; the unincumbered and comprehensive plan of divine wisdom. It is denominated the counsel of his own will, to signify, not any thing capricious or arbitrary, but the act and determination of the divine mind alone, in the exercise of all its attributes. "Who hath directed the spirit of the Lord, or being his coun sellor hath taught him? With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and taught him in the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding?" There are also certain distinctions to be attended to when we speak of the will of God. This term is sometimes used to signify the purpose or plan according to which all things exist, as well as the divine energy by which this plan will surely have effect. The will of God is justly distinguished into secret and revealed: a distinction not expressive of any thing like opposition or contrariety, but of what is known, and of what is yet unknown. The whole will of God at one time was secret, that is, was known only to himself, and must have remained so, had it not pleased him in part to reveal it. It is obvious that we are concerned only with what is revealed, and that this forms the rule to us of our obedience. The will of God is also distinguishable into efficient and permissive-a distinction between his will as bringing into being, and his will as permitting or not hindering things to be. He may, for reasons unfathomable to us, allow things to exist which are in themselves most hateful to him, and directly hostile to his authority and government. As we, therefore, conclude, that whatever God brings to pass, he did from eternity purpose should exist, so must we believe, that what he permits he never purposed to hinder. All his purposes are co-existent and eternal; and nothing can possibly happen in his dominions which he did not himself resolve to produce, or to allow others to be the means of producing. We must also carefully retain in our minds, as essential to the right understanding of this important subject, and to the salutary influence which it ought to have on our lives, that the purpose of God invariably |