II. Under the second heading, only one case was generally given. It arose when a marriage of relatives occurred before the lines of the two individuals met in the one common stock. A, B, and X, e.g., were first cousins. C was the son of A and B (married by dispensation), Z the daughter of X. Between C and Z there was a two-fold impediment of the third degree, because, though they had only one stock in common (JN, the grand-parents of A, B, and X), C descended from that common stock in a two-fold way (through A and B).

III. Of the third class also only one instance was generally given-that in which, before the lines met in the ultimate common stock, another common stock had intervened.1 C and Z, e.g., were first cousins whose common grand-parents (AX) were also first cousins-descending from a common stock (JN). Between C and Z there was a three-fold impediment: one of the second degree, because each descended from the common stock AX; two of the fourth degree, because each descended also from the common stock JN-and that in a two-fold way (through A and X).2 There were two common stocks,' and two lines of descent' from one of them.3

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1 It must be distinguished from the case given under II.

2 The case was at one time much debated. It was settled by decisions of the Holy Office, 11th March, 1896, 22nd February, 1899-the principle being accepted that, in the ultimate stock, only one person is considered, but, in an intermediate stock, both.

3 The cases are enumerated in different ways by different authors. As a good few of our readers may have got their ideas from Lehmkuhl, we may translate the passage in which he deals with the matter (ii. 988), and compare his cases with those given above:

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Multiple consanguinity [he states] may exist between two individuals (Julius and Anna, say) in various ways: (1) When the line of descent of Julius and Anna leads to several common stocks; (2) When they descend from the same common stock in a double or multiple fashion ; (3) When both these things take place. The first holds: (a) when the nearest common ancestors of Julius and Anna were related to each other; when, e.g., the wife of the common grandfather of J. and A. was also his niece-in which case J. and A. are related both in the second degree and in the fourth touching third. [This is the case given above under heading III-except that first cousins are replaced by uncle and niece. J. and A. are really related doubly 'in the fourth degree touching third,' or, perhaps more correctly, both in the third degree and in the fourth. The case does illustrate heading I; but, since it involves a double descent from one of the stocks, it is better placed under heading III]: (b) when among the ancestors of J. and A. there occur marriages in which several relatives on one side married several relatives on the other; when, e.g., the grandfather of J. and the grandfather of A. were brothers who married two sisters-in which case you have two common stocks for J. and A., and they [J. and A.] are twice related in the third degree. [This is case I, 1°, above]; (c) when the mutual relationship of J. and A. arises from a levirate marriage, i.e., from the union of an

That was the old law. The new regulation makes it clear that the multiple stock' is still to be taken into account, but the multiple line of descent' disregarded. Applying that principle to the three classes enumerated, we find that the two cases under No. I remain as before, and that the case under No. II disappears completely. As for problems occurring under No. III, the double impediment arising from the two 'stocks' may still remain, but the third-resulting from the double' descent from the more remote ancestors-is a thing of the past. So in theory. In practice there will hardly ever be more than one impediment. For, since (as before) marriage between a brother and sister is never allowed (§ 3), the relationship arising through descent from the more remote stock will be found, in the vast majority of cases, to be of the fourth degree at least, and, consequently, of no importance whatever as a matrimonial impediment (§ 2).1

Affinity. The definition of this relationship has been fundamentally changed, and most of the information given about it in the text-books becomes absolutely meaningless. In the old law it was based on carnal intercourse; now it is based on valid marriage exclusively-irrespective of whether the marriage has been consummated or not (97, § 1).2 other words, a person is now connected by affinity with

In

ancestor with several persons related to one another; when, e.g., the grandfather of J., after the death of his wife, married her sister, and J. is the [mediate] issue of the first marriage and A. of the second; in which case they [J. and A] are related both in the second and in the third degree. [This is case II, 2°, above.] The second holds, i.e., there is descent in multiple fashion from the common stock: (a) when, among the ancestors of J. or A., before you come to the common stock, there occurs a marriage of relatives [case II above]; (b) when you have a second marriage of a widow with a widower, whose son and daughter (by the previous marriages) are themselves united in marriage and want to give their daughter to their common brother-the issue of their parents' second marriage. [Anyone who has leisure enough may work out this problem for himself. We agree with Father Barry (I. E RECORD, April, 1915, p. 355), that it is a case sui generis. It cannot be classified under any of the headings. Still, it strongly suggests a double relationship of some kind. If anything like it ever occurs, the proper course would be to draw a diagram illustrating the situation, and then let the dispensing authorities settle the matter for themselves.] From all of which it is easily understood how the third case (embracing first and second) takes place : eg, if, in the last case given, the widow was already related to the widower.' [For the reasons just mentioned, we prefer not to touch this case, but to take number III above as our illustration of the third principle.]

1 As for Lehmkuhl's sui generis case, the answer will depend on whether the parties should be regarded as coming from two stocks, or from the same stock in different ways. It is hard to say which alternative, if either, is correct.

2 It will be noticed, however, that intercourse renders a dispensation more difficult (1043).

those, and only with those, who, in popular language, are termed his relatives by marriage.'1 Some of the old principles are re-admitted; but their meaning is modified by the fundamental change in the relationship itself. The bond exists only between a married man and his wife's bloodrelations, and between a married woman and those of her husband-the old principle affinitas non parit affinitatem in a more restricted field of operation (97, §2). The degree and line, as before, are determined by the degree and line of the corresponding consanguinity (97, § 3).

Canon 1077 tells us how far the relationship, understood in its new sense, operates as a bar to marriage:

§ 1. Affinity in the direct line voids marriage in all degrees; in the collateral line as far as the second degree inclusive.

§ 2. The impediment of affinity is multiplied:

1o. As often as the impediment of consanguinity from which it proceeds is multiplied;

2o. When a subsequent marriage is contracted with a bloodrelation of a deceased partner.

To students of the old law the words have a familiar ring; but, in consequence of Canon 97, they convey a very different meaning. The statements and discussions about unlawful affinity' go by the board. So we shall never have to trouble again about the physical or physiological conditions of its existence, the various views as to whether it arose from several classes of invalid marriages, the special deprivation of marital rights it entailed in the case of a married offender, etc. The new impediment, it will be noted, is confined to the limits within which the old impediment of unlawful affinity' used to operate-all the degrees of the direct line," but only the first and second of the collateral. The two rules given for the multiple' impediment are borrowed from previous legislation. It will be remarked, however, that the second is modified to suit the new definition; and that there is no mention, even in a correspondingly modified form, of the additional rule that used to accompany them-' when each of the parties has had intercourse with a blood relation of the other." As for the old distinction between antecedent' and 'subsequent' affinity, the thing has now no meaning.

1 The principle of the Roman, and of most civil laws.

2 Cf., e.g., Lehmkuhl, ii. 998, etc.

Cf., e.g., Marc, op. cit., 2028, etc.

* Lehmkuhl, ibid., 1000, etc.

• This was at least the more probable view.

The impediment is purely ecclesiastical-most probably even in the first degree of the direct line. There used to be a controversy as to whether it affected converts who had contracted the relationship in their pagan days. The opinion was at one time strongly against the enforcement of the impediment in such cases, and even a succession of unfriendly Roman decisions had not quite destroyed the belief that the general law left the converts free. The fact that the decisions in question dealt with an impediment very different from that described in Canon 97 will probably strengthen the liberal view in the discussions on Canon 1077.

Public Propriety.-Here, too, the fundamental concept has been changed. The impediment of public propriety,' as if to justify its name, used to be based on a union of 'wills,' while 'affinity' rested on carnal intercourse. Their rôles have been reversed. 'Affinity' is now purified of its lower associations; whereas, in regard to 'propriety,' as we remarked before in some other connexion, one might almost sum up the situation by saying that there is no 'public propriety' now unless there is public impropriety. That is evident enough from Canon 1078:

The impediment of public propriety arises from an invalid marriage, whether consummated or not, and from public or notorious concubinage; and it voids nuptials in the first and second degrees of the direct line between the man and the blood-relations of the woman, and vice versa.

Which means that the impediment, as we understood it, has almost disappeared. The disability arising from engagements has gone; so has that resulting from valid marriage, except in so far as it reappears as affinity.' Of the old definition nothing remains but the little clauseeven from invalid marriage '-that used to be added halfapologetically and with many exceptions; and the additional statement about 'concubinage,' intensifying as it does the unpleasant character of the new impediment, is a poor compensation for what has been lost. To complete the rout, only two degrees of the direct line have been left; all the collateral impediments-the most important in practice-have vanished.

There is, therefore, little to discuss. Even the small controversy as to whether the impediment arises from an

123rd August, 1852; 28th August, 1891; 16th December, 1898, etc. 2 Cf. Lehmkuhl, ibid., 999; Casus Cons., ii. 977, etc.

invalid consummated marriage is settled by the terms of the canon. It may, perhaps, be contended that the exceptional cases-in which 'propriety' did not arise from an invalid marriage-must still be taken into account. With all reserve, we think they need not. One of them-that in which a return to a previous fiancé or fiancée was allowed -has no meaning now, inasmuch as a marriage with his, or her, relatives in the first degree is no longer invalid. The others-in which consent was defective, or the marriage civil 1-will, we think, disappear as well. Seeing that invalidity or concubinage is now made the test (1078), it would seem strange to hold that the impediment does not exist when there is concubinage, or when the marriage is, if we are pardoned the expression, very specially invalid.❜

The impediment is merely ecclesiastical. It does not affect a convert who fulfilled the conditions in his pagan days.

Spiritual Relationship.-The new impediment is defined in the simple statement that the spiritual relationship described in Canon 768, and that alone, voids marriage.' We have made some remarks on the matter already."

But

Adoption.-In pre-Code days there were canonists who claimed that, in regard to adoption, the Church sanctioned the attitude of the civil law now in force in each particular country; i.e., that, when the present-day civil law recognized adoption as a bar to marriage, the Church accepted the position and decreed an impediment of her own. that was not the common view. The more widely-accepted opinion was that the Church took the old Roman law as the decisive test; i.e., that she decided for or against the impediment according as the adoption recognized by the modern law did, or did not, present the essential features of its Roman prototype. In the Roman system itself there were two forms of the relationship, the 'perfect' and

1 On all of these cf., e.g., Lehmkuhl, ii. 1102-3. The declaration on civil marriage (of Catholics) comes from Pope Leo XIII (17th March, 1879), and involves, we think, a departure from previous principles.

2 The Leonine declaration just cited.

The case of defective consent.

4 So (at least in regard to the old impediment) the Holy Office declaration, 9th April, 1837,

8 I. E. RECORD, Fifth Series, December, 1917, pp. 450-3; March, 1918, pp. 214-5; Oct., 1918, pp. 320-2.

De Angelis, B. 4, t. 12, n. 3; Rosset, Santi, etc.

7 So, e.g., Gasparri, n. 852, sqq.

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