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If any one of my readers wishes to know what Lehmkuhl really thinks of the principle, let him turn to the chapter on The Duel.'1 He will find that Lehmkuhl fully adopts the principle that we must not choose danger of death as a means to an end, and uses it to refute the milder forms of duelling as I do to refute the milder forms of hungerstrike. So Lehmkuhl, instead of founding a probable opinion in favour of the non-fatal hunger-strike, is proved to be a vigorous upholder of the principle which condemns it.

There is only one other objection that I have to reckon with another quotation. This time it is Dr. MacDonald, who, however, is not quoted as an authority, like Lehmkuhl, but merely as an author for whose opinions I have made myself responsible by granting his book the nihil obstat as a diocesan censor. Few censors take so strict a view of their duties as Dr. Cleary supposes. However, I am glad to say that I agree with my friend Dr. MacDonald here. I see nothing wrong in his teaching, and nothing in support of any form of hunger-strike. I will quote only the last sentence of the passage given by my critic: Why should not the same good aspect have equal efficacy even though the production of the good effect should perhaps be accelerated by the effect which is evil?' There is no reason at all why an act otherwise good should become bad merely because the evil effect accelerates the good. I think such a fact should rather be a recommendation of it-provided always that two conditions are verified: (a) that the acceleration is not intended by the will, and (b) that the evil effect is an incidental effect of the act. These two conditions, which would have the unanimous support of theologians, will render the doctrine quite true, and will at the same time prevent it being used in favour of hunger-strike. The evil effect in the hunger-strike is not incidental, but essential, and it is intended directly as a means to an end. Thus the teaching of Dr. MacDonald will assist the strikers only at the cost of rejecting two conditions which have the consensus of theologians behind them. The result is that there is not the slightest probability of any kind in favour of the mitigated, any more than in favour of the extreme, kind of hunger-strike. The proposition that would assert its lawfulness is so far without support either from reason or authority.

1 Vol. i. nos. 1016, 1017, edition 12.

The whole case as presented by Dr. Cleary is confined to the limited strike only, and rests entirely on two quotations, one of which is innocuous and the other a misrepresentation. I, therefore, reaffirm my conclusion that this minor form of strike is evil, because it implies the direct incurring of danger to life, and because this danger to life is ordained as a means to an end. I do not say that it is suicide, but it is a very grave sin that savours of suicide, and if the sacraments of the Church are sought and received by men who have the will to persevere in such sin, it is sacrilege, if we are to judge their acts objectively.

This ends my criticism of the article, regarded as an assault on my chief conclusions. There is, indeed, some slight attempt to turn the edge of my third argumentan argument which proceeds on the balance of good and evil in the hunger-strike, but it amounts to little, and any niggling with the third argument, if the other two hold their ground, as they do, is like addressing the jury after one's client has been hanged.

There are a great many other objections in this article which some people would perhaps like to see answered, and as the task is easy I will do so, if the Editor of this review does not object. First, there are two points of considerable interest in themselves which have a certain affinity with the main discussion. One of these I had mentioned in my article, the other I had for good reasons omitted, but I will deal with both now. (a) Dr. Cleary writes (p. 273) :

If a Christian in the early days of the Church was entitled to refuse meat of animals killed by strangulation, or if at the present day one is entitled to refuse food offered to idols, even when one can get no other food, why should not one be entitled to refuse prison food when no other food is offered and when its acceptance would imply the sacrifice of a big principle?

I will not question this, although I do not know on what authority it is stated that the prohibitions were intended to bind men, even when no other foods were available It causes no difficulty, however. God, who is the Author of nature and is active in all her operations, and who, of His own bounty, gives food to all in due season, may obviously refuse to give food, or may forbid a particular kind of food. If He does so, then we must treat such food as withdrawn, as not available for human use, and even

starving men would have to avoid it as not being human food at all. Clearly, however, God alone can do this. No human authority, resting on natural law, and making ordinances that derive all their validity from natural law, could possibly issue a valid prohibition of food that was made by nature to sustain human life, and to eat which there was, moreover, a primary natural command. Therefore no doctrine of 'tainted' food can be allowed.

An interesting case of hunger-strike is here suggested. Suppose a man thought his honour compromised by eating, or by eating the only food that was supplied, might he push his abstinence so far as to endanger seriously his life or to incur certain death? The case is very like that of duelling and the same answer must be returned. A man in such a case would not intend his own death or danger, and would not use either as a means to gain his purpose. His whole purpose is achieved simply by abstinence, and is not furthered by the danger into which he is brought. To this extent, he is more innocent than the ordinary hunger-striker, to whom danger of death is a means directly chosen to gain some end. Nevertheless, if the moment comes when death is the only alternative to taking food, he will have to take the food; for, as I showed in my first article, not to take it would be to kill himself, and no man may kill himself even to save his honour.

The second problem arises out of a difficulty put in the following passage (p. 269) :

Indeed, if my Carthusian is entitled to abstain from meat because his delicacy is an accident, it would seem that a hunger-striker, possessed by accident of a delicate constitution, and therefore likely to die sooner than the normal man, might very well contend that his "abstinence has no power to kill him by a law of his constitution,' and, consequently, that he may hunger-strike in or out of prison for a cause of some considerable importance.

Dr. Cleary here frames a case and draws an inference. The case is a real one, and will become more familiar as the hunger-strike becomes more frequent. I remember reading some years ago, in the newspapers, an account of a peculiar case of suicide in an English town. An unfortunate man was found hanging from a beam, but the medical evidence at the inquest showed that he died of heart failure and not of hanging or strangulation. This man could commit suicide, but he could not commit suicide by strangulation, because before he could succeed in hanging himself he would

have already died of heart failure. We need not regret that some of the avenues to suicide are occasionally closed. So, I have no doubt, there are men who could not kill themselves by sheer starvation. Before the process had gone as far as that, the abstinence from food would have found out some weak point in their constitution, and they would then, if they continued their fast, die of heart failure or of whatever other disease they were prone to. The death of a man under these circumstances would be incidental in reference to the means he took, but it would not be incidental in respect of his intentions. Dr. Cleary should not forget that, as I proved in my first article, strikers intend their own death as a means of wringing concessions from the Government. The striker with the delicate constitution may not die of self-starvation, but he intends his death, and that is suicide. There is no reason, after this, to ask whether such a man may strike for any good cause. No man, I repeat, may lawfully intend to kill himself for any cause whatever.

I may then solve the problem of the drug, which Dr. Cleary puts (p. 269):

I may not take a drug, a single glass of alcohol, let us say, which has an invigorating effect on mankind generally, but which through 'an accident of my constitution" will kill me.

Taking the drug in this case is undoubtedly an act of indirect killing of oneself, and may be justified on the same condition as other acts of the sort. One condition is that the advantage to be gained attaches, not to the man's death or danger of death, which must not be made a means to an end, but to the swallowing of a drug, which is not poisonous but 'invigorating.' Moreover, a proviso must be inserted that once the feat of swallowing the drug has been accomplished and the advantage gained, every remedy should be employed to save his life-otherwise there would be evidence that the man's death was intended.

I will next take Dr. Cleary's objections to the proof of the principle with which my first article began. These objections have only a very remote bearing on my theme, still I hope readers who have followed' so far will travel a little farther.

I began with the truth-that to kill oneself is always unlawful. One must begin somewhere. Lugo says of this principle that it was denied by some forgotten heretics,

but it is received as most certain by the unanimous assent of theologians and philosophers. I thought I had solid ground under my feet here. I quoted the teaching in the words of the master of all theologians, St. Thomas Aquinas, and, to make assurance doubly sure, I quoted one of his proofs. It is this proof which Dr. Cleary attacks in the following objections (p. 266) :

Somehow, this argument from St. Thomas has never appealed to me. (a) In the first place, it seems to prove too much. If we base the intrinsic unlawfulness of suicide on the fact that we love ourselves and naturally resist destroying agencies, it seems to me that we may kill nothing, since naturally everything loves itself.' (b) Nor would I care to lay too much stress on the contention that it is against a natural inclination and therefore wrong-I have a suspicion that there is a good deal of truth in the old axiom, nitimur in vetitum, and recollect that, as the Catechism tells us, the sin of our First Parents has left in us a strong inclination to evil.

The law here objected to is a law of all being and is not limited to men or even to living things. 'Omne ens appetit esse' is only another expression of it. To overthrow such a law would be to loosen the foundations of the world. I am not sure what Dr. Cleary questions in it. Does he say it is not true? or that this, the most fundamental law of nature, is not a good rule of morals? or that it cannot be ascertained and distinguished from counterfeits? No teacher of morals has a right to thrust such doubts on the public without answering them.

Let us now look at the first objection. To take concrete instances, the argument comes to this, 'Cats naturally love themselves, mice naturally love themselves, ergo cats love mice-an argument without a middle term! Let us, however, go behind the letter of the objection, and, without. claiming Dr. Cleary's authority, nurse it into some semblance of life. The essence of the argument in the mind of its author would seem to be that, e.g., since sheep naturally love themselves, a man who kills a sheep violates some part of the natural law. I answer-the law of nature is different in different things, and may enjoin different and opposite acts according to the various natures on which it is inscribed. Thus, there is the law of the cat and the law of the mouse— both natural laws-but the law of the cat commands the killing of mice that cats may live, and the law of the mouse commands it to thwart the intentions of the cat, if it is able. So it is with men and animals that men kill. A man, following

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