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other words, the mere execution of a papal rescript, is committed to the delegate. For a better understanding of this last case it is well to remember that two classes of executors are distinguished. Sometimes a rescript directly grants a favour to the person for whom it is sought, prescribing the service of an executor merely for the fulmination or application of the favour; while sometimes the concession itself of the favour is committed to the executor (c. 54). It is the office of the executor in the former case that is called the nudum ministerium, and that cannot be subdelegated. The acts preparatory to the execution of the rescript, such as the verification of the causes, may, however, be committed to some other person (c. 57).

2o. The delegate of a Superior, other than the Pope, who has ordinary jurisdiction, can also subdelegate in individual cases, if he is commissioned ad universitatem causarum, as it is said. That a person may be commissioned ad universitatem causarum, it is not necessary that his commission should embrace all the power of the person who delegates him: it suffices that he be delegated to one whole class of cases, e.g., to dispense from all impediments of consanguinity, to deal with all cases in particular localities, etc. Though it was certain under the old discipline that delegates of this kind could subdelegate, the teaching was not so definite as to how far this power extended. The Code makes it clear that the subdelegation can take place only in individual cases.

In this connexion it is not out of place to draw attention to the old controversy regarding the subdelegation of general delegated powers to assist at marriages. Many canonists, relying on the principle just dealt with, hold that such powers can be subdelegated. Others, however, contend that jurisdiction to assist at marriage is a nudum ministerium, and consequently deny the right of subdelegation.1 Personally, we favour the former view; but the matter is by no means certain, and consequently must be regulated by the principles governing antecedently probable jurisdiction, which we shall discuss later on.

3o. In other cases delegated power can be subdelegated only when an express concession to that effect has been made delegated judges, however, can subdelegate a nonjurisdictional matter, even without any express commission (c. 199). This principle, too, was fully admitted

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in the old discipline. Its first part needs no explanation. The words articulum aliquem non-jurisdictionalem of the second refer to any portion of a judicial process which does not involve the exercise of jurisdiction. Canonists regard the examination-not, however, the decision-of incidental causes and matters of a similar nature as belonging to this category.

The most serious difficulty which we find with this principle is its reconciliation with Canon 57, which states as a general rule that the executor of a rescript, even when granted by an Ordinary other than the Pope, may substitute another to execute the rescript for him. Now, it can very frequently happen that the executor of a rescript is simply a delegate in a particular case, e.g., when the concession of a dispensation to some individual is committed to him; and the substitution of another to execute the rescript is nothing other than the subdelegation of the power which it has conferred upon him. Canon 57, therefore, must be regarded as correcting the more general principle of Canon 199, § 4.

4°. Finally, subdelegated power cannot be again subdelegated unless that concession has been expressly made (c. 199, § 5). This again is a confirmation of the old discipline: it was regarded as a direct corollary of the principle that only the delegate of the Holy See could subdelegate.

Interpretation of Jurisdiction.-According to Canon 200, § 1, ordinary jurisdiction and delegated jurisdiction, when the delegation is ad universitatem causarum, are to be widely interpreted: other forms of delegated jurisdiction are to be strictly interpreted. It is always understood, however, that when delegation is conferred upon anyone, everything necessary for its exercise is also granted. Hitherto there was no express law upon this matter. Canonists, however, basing their conclusions on general principles whilst admitting that ordinary jurisdiction was to be widely interpreted, taught that delegated jurisdiction without distinction should receive a strict interpretation. They regarded delegation as a res odiosa, on account of its interference with the rights of the Superior who possessed ordinary power in the place where the delegated faculties were exercised1; and it is a general principle that favours

n. 245.

1 Cf. Branbandere, op. cit. n. 95; Bargillicit, Prael. Juris. Can., vol. i. VOL. XIII-15

or privileges which interfere with the rights of third persons are to be strictly interpreted. It must be added, however, that notwithstanding their advocacy of this general principle, authors held that general faculties to dispense from matrimonial impediments were to receive a wide interpretation.

The statement that one form of jurisdiction is to be widely, another strictly, interpreted, does not by any means imply that the ordinary meaning of the words may be departed from. When the meaning of the words conveying the faculties, taken in their ordinary sense, is clear and definite, it must be accepted. It is only when their implication is doubtful that there is room for the application of this canon.

Subject. In this special section on jurisdiction nothing is said as to the qualifications necessary for its active subjects, that is to say, for the Superior in whom the jurisdiction resides. Canon 118, however, confirms the old regulation that clerics alone can be the subjects of this power; and for delegated jurisdiction, in many cases, nothing further is required in the new discipline. The other qualifications for the acquisition of ordinary jurisdiction vary in accordance with the different offices to which this power is attached, and are dealt with in connexion with these offices.

In regard to the passive subject, the general principle is that jurisdiction can be exercised directly only on subjects (c. 201, § 1). As a general rule, subjection to local Superiors arises through domicile or quasi-domicile. Under the Code vagi also are completely subject to the Superiors of the territory in which they actually reside (c. 94, § 2). Even in peregrini jurisdiction may sometimes be exercised by the local authorities. This is the case, for example, in regard to crimes committed in the territory (c. 1566), in regard to certain dispensations from feasts, fasts, and abstinence (c. 1245, § 1), in regard to absolution from sins (c. 881, § 1), etc.

The direct exercise of jurisdiction upon subjects may, however, sometimes indirectly affect non-subjects. For example, a Bishop who grants a matrimonial dispensation to a diocesan to contract marriage with a non-diocesan indirectly frees the latter also from the impediment.

By stating that nobody can exercise contentious jurisdiction in his own favour, the Code clearly implies the contrary is true of voluntary jurisdiction (c. 201, § 2).

This, too, was the view held generally by canonists prior to the promulgation of the Code, though its reconciliation with more fundamental principles is a matter of no little difficulty. The exercise of jurisdiction, from the very nature of things, seems to require superiority on the one hand and subjection on the other. If that be so, how can anyone be his own Superior? We are not fully satisfied with any explanation of this difficulty which we have seen advanced.

Before passing on it may be as well to say a word on the distinction between contentious and voluntary jurisdiction, as it is an important one, and is not too very well known. Contentious or judicial jurisdiction is the jurisdiction which is exercised in a judicial process. From Canon 201, § 2, it is evident that judicial process must be taken to include the sacrament of Penance. Voluntary jurisdiction, in the wide and generally accepted meaning of the term, covers every other form of jurisdiction; and, hence, it includes not merely the power of granting dispensations and other favours, but also legislative, administrative, and executive power.1 It is incorrect, then, to define it as jurisdiction which is exercised in volentes ; sometimes those upon whom it is exercised are most unwilling, e.g., when punishment is inflicted extrajudicially.

Place of Exercise.-As a general rule a Superior can exercise contentious jurisdiction only in his own territory -in regard to a delegate, of course, it is the territory of the person delegating that has to be considered (c. 201, § 2). The external solemnities which must accompany the judicial process are the fundamental reason for this regulation. Their exercise by an outsider would derogate from the local Superior's authority.

The Code makes two exceptions to this general rule: 1o. Those who have ordinary jurisdiction to absolve from sin may use this power on their own subjects outside their territory (c. 881). It was from the fact of this exception having been made that we drew the conclusion that the power of absolving in the sacrament of Penance is included in contentious jurisdiction. It will be noted that the exception is confined to ordinary power: delegated faculties must be obtained from the Ordinary of the place in which the confessions are heard (c. 874, § 1). 2°. A judge

1 Cf, Branbandere, op. cit. n. 88.

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expelled from his territory or impeded from exercising jurisdiction there, may exercise it outside his territory, after giving due notice to the local Ordinary (c. 1637). The decretals, too, made a similar exception, with this difference, however, that the impeded judge was obliged, first, to seek permission from the local Ordinary; but even though the permission was refused the court could be set up.1

The general rule in regard to voluntary jurisdiction, on the other hand, both in the old and new discipline, is that it can be exercised when the Superior, subject, or even both are outside their territory (c. 201, § 3). Just as canonists place the reasonableness of the contrary regulation for contentious jurisdiction in the solemnities with which its exercise is attended, so they find the explanation of the present one in the absence of these solemnities.

This rule may be sometimes modified in particular cases, either by law itself or, in the case of delegated jurisdiction, by the delegating Superior. There was a wellknown modification of this nature attached to the Formula VI, in virtue of which its faculties could not be exercised, unless the subject were present in the territory of the Superior.2

Jurisdiction of the forum internum' and 'externum.'— The Code devotes a canon to the relations between jurisdiction of the internal and external forum. The rules given have been consecrated by long usage, and need very little explanation.

An act of jurisdiction in the external forum is valid also in the internal, but not vice versa (c. 202 § 1). An example will best explain this. An absolution from a censure in the external forum avails also in the internal; but, on the other hand, an absolution in the internal forum will not be accepted in external, so that if the crime is afterwards brought into the latter forum the criminal is treated as if he had not been absolved. There is a very practical illustration of this principle in the procedure to be followed in absolving from apostasy, heresy, and schism, as outlined in Canon 2314. The absolution from these sins in the internal forum, on account of the excommunication which is attached, is specially reserved to the Holy See. The The Ordinary, however, may absolve from this

1 C. 1, t. 2, lib. ii., Clem.

2 Nec illis uti possit extra fines suae dioecesis,'

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