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say, 'whether hunger-strike is in reality direct self-killing, or whether, rather, one might not possibly so regard the act as to find in the death merely an "incidental effect."" Having quoted a passage from Dr. MacDonald, I proceed (pp. 271-272): 'From_this_doctrine it seems possible to justify the hunger-strike. Hunger-strike is an abstention from food which will result in death or danger of death by starvation.' One would think this sufficiently plain, even if there were not a full page or two devoted to an elaboration of the argument.

The third thesis above mentioned was really not an independent thesis at all. In determining the morality of indirect self-killing, one had to consider the ratio proportionate gravis, the proportion between the good and evil results; and it should have been sufficiently clear that I suggested the presence of sufficient compensating causes in certain types of hunger-strike. If hunger-strike is indirect self-killing and, at the same time lawful, then there must be a fair proportion between the good and evil results.

Canon Waters, to my surprise, therefore, tells me that I am wholly concerned with a limited non-fatal form of hunger-strike. The Canon says he expected this form of attack on his doctrine, therefore, I suppose he sought for it in my article. But, no; I am not particularly interested in mock-heroics. I raised the question at all only because Canon Waters did not seem to make any distinction between fatal hunger-strike and strike which involves merely danger of death. The Canon seemed to condemn even this less extreme form; and I, on the other hand, practically took its lawfulness for granted, provided, of course, that there was a fair reason for undertaking the strike. I took it, moreover, that one might even directly run the risk of death for a cause of importance, for I could not see how any probabilist or equiprobabilist or compensationist could logically deny it. There is in the case merely question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act-there is no question of means to a necessary end, and no question of injustice to another-hence the case should not be excluded from the scope of the probabilist. There is question of an act whose morality is doubtful, for when there is merely danger of death, there is a fair probability that the act is not suicide: when the chances of surviving are equal to those of perishing, even the equiprobabilist might pluck up courage to apply his system. But even if probabilist

and equiprobabilist shirk the logical conclusion of their own principles, they have still to admit that the act is only a doubtful case of suicide; and thev can, with the compensationist, apply the general principle covering acts with two effects. They will admit with him that the act is lawful, when due account is taken of the gravity of the danger of death and of the compensating good which will result from the act in accordance with the principle that we may decide in favour of liberty in doubtful cases, when the good which will result bears a fair proportion to the probable evil. This line of reasoning I advanced as a matter of course, but Canon Waters takes no notice of it. Instead he makes me base my whole argument on a certain statement of Lehmkuhl, which he thinks I completely misunderstand. Here is the statement :

Licet virgini ad evadendam laesionem sui sese conic ere in certum mortis periculum, modo ne sit in certam mortem : nam si plane impossibile est vitam servari, sed illico necesse est, ut ex actione, quam virgo ponat, mors sequatur, sicut ex proiectione ex alta turri, id agere non licet, pati vero potius mortem quam violari omnino licet. Immo potius periculum mortis vel mortem subire consilii est, quia peccaminosi consensus periculum cum violentiae perpessione saepe coniungitur. 1

Canon Waters' treatment of this teaching of Lehmkuhl is full of interest. He criticizes me for suggesting that there is here question of direct killing and of direct danger. Plainly, he thinks, this is not so-one glance will show that Lehmkuhl is talking of indirect danger and of indirect death (in the first clause). . . The title of the paragraph is decisive.' Canon Waters has discovered a new locus theologicus-the titles of Lehmkuhl's paragraphs. He had already discovered another in the sayings of Arthur, who had no doubt of what killed him, when he said: 'My uncle's spirit is in these stones.' Presumably he has discovered a third in his own intellect as contradistinguished from my common sense and sense of humour. In Lehmkuhl's case he should have been more careful-he might have remembered Lehmkuhl calmly discussing the morality of acts with two effects 2 before he had settled what he meant by morality.3

But let us take the case in question. It was a standard case, well known to everybody, and I did not think it necessary to tell my readers that there was question of a

1 Theol. Moral., vol. i. No. 737, 11th ed. 2 Ibid. vol. i. No. 72, 11th ed. 3 Ibid. vol. i. No. 93 sqq.

maiden's jump from a tower to save her honour. Of course the phrase ad evadendam laesionem sui gives the case its point-but against the Canon. If there were question of indirect death in the case of the jump to certain death, the jump would surely be lawful because the good effect is certainly sufficient to compensate for the evil. That death is a minor evil compared with dishonour and probable sin is plainly Lehmkuhl's teaching, as may be seen at once from the last sentence quoted above. If it is wrong, then, to jump to certain death to save one's honour, it is wrong only because the killing is direct-because the jump is suicide; in other words, because the act does not come properly under Lehmkuhl's heading. But surely a jump into probable death is no less direct than a jump to certain death. Lehmkuhl himself was not very clear on the matter, perhaps. No; Lehmkuhl's common sense was often, for him, a better locus theologicus than his undigested theological principles and his loads of learned lumber.'

But Canon Water's treatment of Dr. MacDonald's teaching, and of my deductions therefrom, is a masterpiece -nearly as good as anything in his article of last August. He ignores the only portion of it that had any essential bearing on the matter in question-the portion which I elaborated to prove that self-starvation might be indirect killing of oneself. I do not say that the Canon shirks the difficulty presented-I merely say that his treatment looks like shirking. My argument was but an application of Dr. MacDonald's principle to the case in question. It ran thus :

Hunger-strike is abstention from food which will result in death or danger of death by starvation. That is one, an evil, aspect of the act or omission. Can the act have another, a good aspect? Let us see. Prisoners who have been unjustly condemned are entitled to protest against their own condemnation-they are entitled to maintain that they are innocent of crime and that they should not be treated as criminals. Refusal to take prison food might then be a refusal to acknowledge the right of the prison authorities to confine them to such food; it might involve a direct protest against an unjust condemnation, and, where the alleged crime is of a political nature, a vindication of some big national claim. Whereas, on the other hand, acceptance of food and general obedience to prison discipline might easily be construed into a tacit admission of guilt. Per se such prisoners are not bound to remain in prison or obey the prison rules; if they are bound the obligation arises not from any intrinsic wrong in their escape or disobedience, but from the fact that greater evils might ensue. Is it, then, intrinsically wrong to disobey the prison rule obliging one to eat prison food if obedience may be construed into an admission of guilt and of the authorities' right VOL. XIII-16

to treat one as a criminal? Now, if a big national issue is at stake, which would be very materially benefited by a strong protest against injustice, and which, on the other hand, would be seriously compromised by even an apparent admission of guilt, it would seem that in these circumstances disobedience might be not only a right, but even an obligation. It may be that incidentally the same act may result in the death of the striker: the principle is conserved not by the death but by the refusal to acknowledge the prison chains. If If a Christian in the early days of the Church was entitled to refuse meat of animals killed by strangulation, or if, at the present day, one is entitled to refuse food offered to idols even when one can get no other food, why should not one be entitled to refuse prison food when no other food is offered and when its acceptance would imply the sacrifice of a big principle ?1

Despite this lengthy argument, which he completely overlooks, the Canon fails to see why I quoted Dr. MacDonald's doctrine. He thinks I quoted it because of the perfectly innocuous doctrine that if the act with two effects is otherwise good, then the fact that the evil effect may help to secure the good more easily does not vitiate the act! Does the Canon, to quote himself, show a 'total disregard of the kind of argument which alone would be effective in such delicate discussions'?

Having failed to discover that I contended, in the lengthy quotation just cited, that the death resulting from hunger-strike might, in certain circumstances, be indirect or incidental, Canon Waters subsequently discovers the line of thought for himself; but his treatment of the case suggests a want of grasp of the difference between direct and indirect causality. Lehmkuhl was not clear on the matter, and, as somebody has said, solved his cases largely by the rule of thumb' method. I do not say that the Canon's method is the same; yet the Canon displays a singular want of consecutive thought. The logical deduction from the opening statement of the following quotation is the direct antithesis of the Canon's position at the close. The quotation is rather long, but as it is full of interest, I give it at length :

Suppose a man thought his honour compromised by eating, or by eating the only food that was supplied, might he push his abstinence so far as to endanger seriously his life or to incur certain death? The case is very like that of duelling, and the same answer must be returned. A man in such a case would not intend his own death or danger, and

1 I did not state, as Canon Waters says, that the prohibitions were intended to bind men even when no other food was available. I now state that they would be bound to abstain, even though they starved, if these foods were ofered in odium religionis.

would not use either as a means to gain his purpose. His whole purpose is achieved simply by abstinence, and is not furthered by the danger into which he is brought. To this extent, he is more innocent than the ordinary hunger-striker, to whom danger of death is a means directly chosen to gain some end. Nevertheless, if the moment comes, when death is the only alternative to taking food, he will have to take the food; for, as I showed in my first article, not to take it would be to kill himself, and no man may kill himself even to save his honour. 1

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The phrase, To this extent, he is more innocent than the ordinary hunger-striker,' is somewhat of a puzzle. It suggests a less degree of sinfulness, but not perfect legality. Yet from the last sentence-from the fact that the striker must change his tactics when death is the only alternative, I infer that Canon Waters regards the 'limited, nonfatal' strike as lawful, when employed to save one's honour. What I wish to insist on, however, is the fact that, according to the Canon, whilst the danger which results from temporary abstinence is indirect that which results from continued abstinence becomes direct. Why, in the name of all the theologians, is the man's honour not saved by the abstinence in the second case as well as in the first, and why, consequently, is the death not merely an incidental effect? Of course, it necessarily results from the continued abstinence, but this surely does not make it direct-just as, in the old classic example, the procuring of abortion is indirect though it is the necessary effect of the medicine which lowers the temperature. I am glad to have Canon Waters' testimony for the statement that a man's purpose may be achieved by abstinence and in no way furthered by the danger into which he is brought it will help, perhaps, to solve some of my difficulties on the hunger-strike, though in a way different from that intended by the Canon.

I pass by the case of the drug, which the Canon mangles beyond recognition. I merely note the extraordinary theology of the phrase (page 21): once the feat of swallowing the drug has been accomplished and the advantage gained, every remedy should be employed to save his life -otherwise there would be evidence that the man's death was intended.' I come to his treatment of the man whom abstinence has no power to kill by a law of his constitution' as his delicacy will have anticipated starvation. Canon Waters says (page 21) that the death of such a delicate hunger-striker would be incidental in reference to the

1 Art. cit., p. 20.

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