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held to favour this view where he says: Si ille qui maledicit, velit malum occisionis alterius, desiderio non differt ab homicida.' A third opinion referred to by St. Alphonsus is that of Lacroix, but it does not differ substantially from that just mentioned.

The truth of the matter is, I suppose, that only one sin is committed, unless the act of appetition covers the peculiar and precise injury accruing from each of the visitations, as well as the common injury to the enemy they entail.

Of course, it is clear that if a person were wicked enough to wish seriously that some one were dead and damned, a vague and indefinite statement that he wished evil to his neighbour would not suffice in confession; for his sin has in it the special malice of a direct insult to God. The theologians are unanimous in holding that if the sinner has had a definite purpose of himself inflicting the different sorts of injury, or of getting them inflicted, he must specify what they were. 'Nulli dubium vero explicandas esse species malorum, si desiderium sit efficax.' 2

The practical conclusion to be adopted in the generality of cases is well summed up by Lehmkuhl : ‘Qui plura, et diversa infortunia optat inimico, illa explicare non debet quia omnia haec sub eodem conceptu mali optat; aliter si optasset diversa mala inimico inferre. Nam in ultimo casu objectum peccaminosi desiderii sunt aliae actiones peccaminosae, quae, si sunt aut numero aut specie distinctae, totam suam specificam et numericam malitiam transfundunt in illud unum pravum desiderium.3

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IN previous articles we tried to indicate in outline the effects of the new legislation on pre-existing law and practice in regard to engagements, banns, impedient and diriment impediments, and the validation of marriages invalidly contracted.1 On the relations of the Ne Temere and the Code Code some remarks were made in another quarter. There are a few subsidiary questions left: and it may be well to group them together, and see how far their solution is affected by the remaining canons of the Code.

Divorce. The teaching on divorce has shared the history of most of our dogmas. It was questioned by many, and openly attacked and repudiated by some, before the date of final definition. In the early centuries, especially, individual Catholics of the foremost rank held views that would now be considered strange and heterodox, and in some localities practices were tolerated or approved that savoured strongly of the 'repudiation' policy of the Jewish dispensation. But these, after all, were only ripples on the surface, and had little or no effect on the onward sweep of Catholic development. They furnish no stronger argument against the teaching than do similar views and practices in regard, say, to the Incarnation or to the whole Penitential discipline. Whatever individuals might do or think, the Church championed the principle that no power but death could free the Christian from the bonds of a ratified and consummated marriage, and, when the time came, she enshrined it in a formal definition. In her

1 I. E. RECORD, Fifth Series, June, October, December, 1918; February, March, April, 1919.

I. T. Quarterly, April, 1919, pp. 133-55. * Trent, Sess. 24, cc. 5, 7.

struggle against the laxer tendencies she based her teaching essentially, of course, on the words of Christ: but she emphasized strongly, too, the evil results that, she asserted, would follow from the opposite policy-to all of which the recent developments in non-Catholic countries bear sad and eloquent testimony. For, as Pope Leo XIII put it,

how great are the evils of divorce it would be almost impossible to state. By reason of it, matrimonial agreements are made liable to change, mutual good-will is weakened, and dangerous inducements are offered to marital infidelity: injury is done to the up-bringing and education of children; opportunity is offered for the breaking of domestic ties, the seeds of discord are sown between families, and there is a lowering and lessening of the dignity of women-exposed as they are to the risk that, when they have served the desires of men, they will be cast aside and forsaken. 1

But it was only to 'ratified and consummated' marriages that these principles applied, and still apply (1118), in all their strictness. It was they and they only, that, according to Christian doctrine and concept, typified fully the indissoluble bond between Christ and the Church, on which the Apostle relied in his inspired description of the sacred properties of marriage. If even one of the conditions failed, the prerogative of absolute indissolubility went with it. When the marriage was pagan, though consummated, and when one of the partners was converted to the Christian faith, the bond was considered so frail that even the great apostle of Christian marriage made express provision for its dissolution, and established a precedent that the Church has followed ever since (1120). And when the marriage, though Christian, was not consummated, the same principle was allowed to operate. Solemn religious 'profession was unknown in St. Paul's time, but later on it came to mark the final stage in Christian self-denial and perfection: a spiritual death itself, it was allowed to produce on non-consummated marriages the same effect as natural death would on marriage of any kind; and the teaching, solemnly ratified by Trent, finds its place in the new legislation (1119). For centuries past the Church has been allowing complete divorce when, in the case of merely ratified marriage, there are very strong reasons for not holding

1 Const. Arcanum.

2 See Cath. Ency., article on Divorce.

31 Cor. vii. 15.
▲ Sess. 24, c. 6.

the partners to their bond1: and, though the canonists could allege no text of law till the new Code appeared" (1119), they had no trouble in arranging the facts in their proper setting. For the principle on which she acted was very old. It was realized so strongly ages ago that she had to restrain her experts from carrying it beyond all reasonable bounds. Some of the more daring, it may be remembered, saw in a non-consummated marriage nothing more than a special form of engagement: others viewed it so lightly that they claimed it was voided ipso facto by a subsequent consummated marriage.3 These were aberrations, of course, and were soon repudiated by the Church; but they show very clearly that, from the point of view of permanence and indissolubility, the non-consummated marriage stood on a lower plane and had to be judged on principles peculiar to itself.

And, if anyone objects that this involves a rejection of Christ's teaching-whom God has joined let man not separate we have only to repeat once more that the principle applied only to complete, Christian marriages, and that with unions of a less perfect character the Church was empowered to deal as occasion arose. Our best proof of that is found in the action of St. Paul. As against an unbeliever, who holds himself free to maintain that the Apostle misinterpreted the mind of Christ, the argument, we admit, is far from conclusive: it needs to be supplemented by others on the divinity of Christ and on the nature and claims of the society He founded-that lie outside our present scope. But to anyone who admits even the fundamentals of the Christian faith it can hardly fail to carry conviction. St. Paul knew the teaching of Christ, and repeated it in words as strong as the Gospel text itself. He can have had no intention of establishing a policy that would run counter to the wishes of Christ in this respect. He knew, moreover, that Christ had made no special provision for the converted infidel whose partner refused to continue matrimonial relations. Yet, in spite of all that, he declared most expressly and definitely that the convert was free to enter on another married union.

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1 Especially since the time of Martin V and Eugene IV.
Some even questioned the power; see Lehmkuhl, ii. 924.

See I. E. RECORD, February, 1919, p. 125. Cf. Canon 1069.

4 1 Cor. vii. 10, 11: the Lord commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband... let not the husband put away his wife.'

To the rest I speak, not the Lord' (1 Cor. vii. 12).

All of which proves, as fully and completely as can be desired, that Christ had left His Church a general power of dealing with cases of the kind, and that the Apostle was only applying this general power to the particular case that happened to arise.

Now, that particular action of St. Paul did not by any means exhaust the Church's power. As well say that the birth of one human being makes the birth of all others impossible. St. Paul applied the power to a particular class of cases: the Church can apply it to others. What he did in the way of binding and loosing,' his superior, the Pope of his day, could do also; and what the Pope of his day could do, the Pope cf our day can do as well. There our fundamental' Christian will part company with us to induce him to advance further, we should have to convince him of the authority and infallibility of the Church and of its supreme ruler. If we succeeded in that, he would admit what every Catholic admits as a matter of course-that it is for the Church to define the limits of her power, and the conditions under which that power is going to be exercised. As a matter of fact, she has done so. She has limited the power to three fairly well defined classes of marriages, not consummated after ratification. Possibly she could have extended it further; possibly she may extend it further at some future date, if circumstances so demand. But, for the present at least, that is the law. The marriages just mentioned may be dissolved, 1°, by solemn religious profession, 2°, by Papal dispensation, 8°, in virtue of the Pauline privilege (1119-20).


We may leave the first two aside: apart from the definite assertion of a power exercised for centuries past, the Code has effected no change in their regard (1119). But with the third it has dealt more fully (1120-7). And, seeing that the case may become a practical one any day in connexion with converted Jews or unbaptized Protestants, we may follow the example.

Conservative commentators have been anxious to show that all the cases in which the Church has granted freedom to converted infidels have been essentially the same as the one decided by St. Paul. Their task is quite unnecessary. The other two cases-religious profession and Papal dispensation-certainly lie outside the ambit of the Pauline privilege and, if the Church can extend her activities in those directions, there surely cannot be any difficulty in

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