man's honour might not be saved by suicide as well as by abstinence; that is a question I avoided, and my critic may choose whichever view pleases him. Death, however, is not incidental to the intention of nature, as I have proved.

I omit particular consideration of the Carthusian and other cases. There is nothing new in my opponent's observations on them. I stand to all my solutions of these problems. As a rule they are limitations on the hungerstrike, and the only effect of their being overthrown would be to strengthen the case against the hunger-strike.

I may now be permitted to sum up my views of the issues of this long controversy. It has never been denied that any hunger-strike involving self-starvation as a means to an end is suicide. There is now no dispute as to the futility of the lesser form of strike. I asserted that it was, moreover, morally wrong. This was questioned, both on authority and with argument. I have answered the argument, and I have shown that the authority is all on my side. The negative strike (viz., to escape contamination), is suicide, if carried the length of self-starvation. This strike has, however, not been in operation and it has no claim to be the hunger-strike.

JOHN WATERS.

NOTES AND QUERIES

THEOLOGY

DUTIES OF VOTERS-CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY

I

REV. DEAR SIR,-I am no supporter of bribery, but I often wonder whether the denunciations of it are not sometimes slightly exaggerated. They often take this form: The man who accepts a bribe is selling something that he does not own.' Is the statement correct? Is voting power merely a trust? Is a man bound in justice to vote at all? If not, is he guilty of injustice if he refuses to act except he is compensated for his trouble? What is the position of Councillors-County, Urban, and District? I grant that the vote given may be unjust itself, and that the person giving it may be held accountable for consequences and may be punished in the civil courts. But my contention is that there may be a title to the money received, and that the man who gets it may sometimes be entitled to keep it. If that is true, even occasionally, the statement quoted would seem to be untrue.

II

CONFESSARIUS.

REV. DEAR SIR,-A Local Government elector, who is a Liberal, is given a money consideration to vote at a district council election for a Conservative candidate who is quite as capable of transacting the affairs of the District Council as his opponent. The elector votes for the Conservative candidate, as agreed upon. What, from a moral point of view, is to be said (1st) of the action of the voter, and (2nd) of the person who caused the voter to vote in the way mentioned?

I presume the answer to this question would also apply to a Conservative voter voting under similar circumstances for a Liberal candidate, and vice versa.

PERPLEXUS.

The queries cover a great variety of cases. It will save repetition, if we arrange our principles in order.

Voting may be one of the duties attached to an office or position accepted on the ordinary contract or quasi-contract terms. If so, the individual appointed is obliged to discharge it in the same way as any other function of his office. Failure to comply will entail the same results as other breaches of commutative justice: if excuses are alleged, they must be judged by the same principles as govern other contracts, and they must be allowed to operate only on similar conditions. If a

man, therefore, is given a salaried position-is appointed, for instance, a Member of Parliament or a Resident Magistrate-he is obliged to attend and give his vote, except in circumstances that would excuse (say) a lawyer from working up his case or a doctor from visiting his patients. When there is question of supporting an unjust measure the conditions would be stricter still. Action of that kind would be allowed only when abstention would involve loss of position in life, or when the proposed measure was a necessary portion of some wider scheme of undoubted utility, or, finally, when there was nothing left but a choice between an evil measure and another still worse. 1

But the power of voting may also be conferred more or less as a privilege and without any idea-on the part of either conferrer or recipient -of strict obligations in commutative justice. That is the case certainly with the ordinary voters in Parliamentary or Local Government elections. As regards District or other Councillors, Poor Law Guardians, magistrates of the ordinary type, etc., the matter is not so clear. Some claim that, since there is no salary, these men are in the same position as ordinary voters. We must say we never saw much in the argument. If there is no salary in the ordinary sense, there is compensation of another kind. And, nowadays, there is always a contract, implied at least.

But let us suppose that a voter does belong to the second class-that he is merely 'privileged' to vote. If he refuses to exercise the power he has got, what are we to say of his conduct? First of all, that he is guilty of no breach of strict, commutative justice. To assure ourselves of that, we have only to recall the well-known principle that a man is never bound in strict justice to do anything positive, unless either, 1°, there be a law imposing the obligation, or, 2°, the individual in question has inflicted an injury which he is bound to repair, or, 3°, has made a contract, express or implied, by the terms of which he is bound to stand. In the case given there is question of something positive, and none of the exceptions hold: the law imposes no obligation in justice-in fact, generally no obligation of any kind--and the voter, normally, has neither injured anyone nor bound himself by strict contract. So long as he remains inactive, he keeps within the limits of strict justice: he will violate it only when he makes a positive use of his power and, in the process, injures some other individual.

But strict justice is not the only virtue in the calendar. There is legal justice as well—also honour, fidelity, gratitude, and a host of others, till we come to charity that crowns them all. Keeping to the lower level of mere legal justice, we must admit at once that it imposes on every man an obligation to contribute, as far as he reasonably can, to the general welfare of the community to which he belongs. Else citizenship has no meaning: and all talk of the duties of citizenship is the merest moonshine.

When, therefore, the vote of an individual, or, still more, the votes

1 Cf. Noldin, Th. Mor., ii. nn. 313-5.

of a group, are necessary or useful for some purpose of public utility, there can be no doubt whatever that the holders are obliged to use their power-even though that power be regarded merely as a 'privilege.' What that obligation exactly is, whether grave or light, will depend on the importance of the issue at stake and on the extent to which the votes are likely to influence the ultimate result. The decision on these points must be left to upright, intelligent men, closely in touch with the facts. But the obligation will certainly hold when the votes, though not sufficient to turn the scale, swell the minority sufficiently to inspire the majority with a salutary dread of making undue use of their technical, and perhaps temporary, advantage. And, in the case of any particular individual, it will vary with the effect his action is likely to have on his fellow-voters; in a rough way it will increase in proportion to the extent of his influence.

But the obligation is less, and yields more easily to excusing causes, than the obligation of a man bound ex officio. It must be put on the same level as the obligation resulting from positive laws of the ordinary kind : and that, according to the well-recognized principle, ceases when it entails serious special inconvenience-unless that inconvenience be itself inflicted in contempt of some worthy cause or high ideal. There is a certain amount of unpleasantness normally connected with voting -some loss of time, some slight expenditure of money perhaps, the ignorant and sneering criticism of disreputable opponents, etc. If things like these be allowed to excuse, the obligation itself becomes a mockery. But if there be something serious and abnormal-loss of very valuable time, very considerable expense, bitter persecution of an unusual type, the voter who abstains, while he forfeits claims to heroism, cannot fairly be regarded as failing in his duty.

Except for the questions of bribery, these principles will cover the queries of 'Confessarius' and 'Perplexus.' There is no obligation on the Councillors if the matter is one of mere routine, or if they know that their votes will have absolutely no effect. But, outside these cases, there will be. Whether it be grave or light depends on the circumstances: whether in strict justice or not, on the correct solution of the problem already mentioned. As for 'Perplexus'' voter, he has violated no principle of legal justice, seeing that the two candidates were equally wellqualified. But he is a man that neither organization has much reason to be proud of, and that certainly has no reason to be proud of himself. He cares little for honour, fidelity, or high ideals of any kind. Probably he is one of the wretched humbugs that talk loudly about principle, but would like to remain neutral in a crisis-hoping to retain the favour of all parties and to enrol themselves comfortably later on in the ranks of whatever section ultimately triumphs. His place is with Dante's 'caitiff band of angels' that sided neither with God nor with Lucifer.1 And the poet's comment is the best: 'let us not talk about them, but look and pass on.'

1 1 Inferno, canto iii.

On the bribery question, the distinctions already made are useful. Our conclusions will vary according as the voter is bound in strict justice or not. We may imagine various cases :—

I. 1°. He is bound in justice to vote in a particular way and insists on a bribe before doing so. Manifestly a breach of commutative justice. The vote itself of course is correct, and there is no obligation as regards its consequences. But, for giving that vote he is already paid a salary, real or equivalent: and, by insisting on a bribe, he is charging two prices for one and the same service. To the second price he has got no claim whatever, and he is bound in strict justice to refund every farthing.

2o. He is bound to vote in a particular way, is offered a free gift for doing so, and accepts. Theoretically, no breach of commutative justice. The vote given is correct: and free gifts may, generally speaking, be offered and accepted for any legitimate purpose. We may recall, in that connexion, the principles generally held in regard to rewarding children for fulfilling their religious duties. If we want a real' justice' case, we have it in the common practice of offering gratuities to officials, of various kinds, for services already provided for by contract. Or, to make the matter more definite, take the following. James owes a debt of £10, and shows no enthusiasm about discharging it. John discovers the fact and offers him a pound if he pays the bill. James accepts. Net result: The creditor is delighted; James is pleased to find that paying the bill is not quite so troublesome as he had anticipated; and John has the comfortable feeling that rewards the man who does something to redress the world's grievances.

But, as regards the voter, all that is largely theory. In practice, the man who begins by accepting bribes will end by insisting on getting them. At the very least, there will soon be a general impression to that effect; and, once that stage is reached, the voluntary gifts have in fact developed into obligatory taxes, and the principles of the first case must be rigidly applied. Nor will the evil stop there. If he accepts them for doing right, he will soon accept them for doing wrong. And, even though he avoids the worst pit-falls, his ́example is very infectious: once it begins to spread, there is hardly anything more calculated to poison the springs of honest dealing and rot the whole moral fibre of a nation. The practice, mean and contemptible and dangerous at its best, leads at its worst to a gross abuse of public trust and to the lowest forms of flagrant injustice. It should be denounced by everyone interested in the morality of public life. And both Church and State are fully within their rights in adopting, as they have done, the most stringent measures to root it out in every shape and form.1

1 Some of the ecclesiastical penalties may be found stated in Canons 729, 2371, 2392 of the Code. They include the loss of office, benefice or dignity secured by simony. In some localities there are penalties-reservations for instance for even non-ecclesiastical offences. The civil penalties are prescribed in 47 and 48 Vic. c. 70 (election offences generally) and 52 and 53 Vic. c. 69 (Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889); they affect both parties to the transaction, and include fine, imprisonment and occasionally loss of office.