He was taken severely to task by an eminent medical critic, whose contributions to the science of Pastoral Medicine entitle him to a respectful hearing.1 The practice of Drs. Krönig and Gauss were denounced in whole-hearted fashion; some gruesome records were quoted, and reference made to others that may not be printed in full except in a medical journal.' Alluding to the previous extract the critic stated that 'in my opinion very little can be said in favour of the twilight-sleep method, no matter from what point of view, except the commercial, we may consider it. . . . It is unscientific, and undoubtedly immoral.' And he concluded:

The twilight sleep method, when it is not foolish and unscientific, is as moral, and has as much to be said in its favour' as has shooting with a revolver at a target on a baby's head. It is one of the latest criminal fads. Fortunately, it will die out before long, just because it is foolish, yet in the May number of the American Journal of Obstetrics, Beach of Brooklyn had a study of a thousand cases here in the United States. There is even a 'Painless Labour League' gesticulating from the platforms, which boycotts physicians who, through respect for their scientific and moral consciences, refuse to go through the Dämmerschlaf hocuspocus.

...

The method can not be perfected unless someone invents a harmless narcotic, which is a contradiction in itself. If enough of the present narcotic we have is given, we risk the life of the woman, as I said, and we gravely risk the life of the child; if we do not give enough to get the desired effect of twilight-sleep, why, in the name of common sense, meddle with it at all, unless we are frank quacks?

We are strongly impressed though, by the latest statement we know on the subject-that given in the fourth edition of the well-known work by Drs. Tweedy and Wrench. Dr. Tweedy tells us that he began to use the drug in 1904, but discontinued it 'because of the unfavourable reports of its action published in different foreign clinics.' He began again in 1908, and requested two assistants, Drs. Freeland and Solomons, to record their experiences. In a paper read in 1911, they formulated several conclusions from which we select one bearing on our present point: no ill effects to mother or child need be expected to follow the rational administration of scopolamine.' They found it undesirable to keep patients in a darkened room, and were quite satisfied even though the amnesia were not complete. Much, they stated, had been said about the danger to the foetus: 'from our cases we consider that this has been exaggerated.' For himself, Dr. Tweedy states: if the first stage is prolonged, or very painful or ineffective, it becomes a positive advantage to give scopolamine and morphia'; 'the nurse should know where to find the doctor, if necessary; at all events he should make it his business to return to see his patient within an hour and a half.'

1 Dr. O'Malley, ibid. July, 1915, pp. 92-6.

2 Pract. Obst., London, 1919.

3 Ibid. p. 56.

The only statement we can find in the manuals is that in the SabettiBarrett Compendium.1 It reads:

Nec illicitus videtur somnus artificialis quo injectionibus medicinalibus inducto mulier pariens non persentiscit dolores partus. Durante isto statu, ita fertur, non orbatur usu sensuum; postea tamen dicitur non recordari eorum quae tunc acciderunt et somnus vocatur crepuscularis. Porro affirmamus si mulier in isto statu rite protegatur, si medicus cordatus sit, si cura adhibeatur ut neque mulieri neque foetui quidpiam nocivum occurrat, rem agi licitam. Aliud autem esset dicendum si istae conditiones non verificarentur.

The quidpiam nocivum seems too strict: undesirable results of a minor kind would certainly not render the method unlawful. The formula as a whole has the advantage, or disadvantage, of claiming the support of all parties; they would differ only in the emphasis laid on the 'si.' Most of those we have quoted would leave it as it stands: Dr. O'Malley would print it in large capitals; if we put it in italics, we shall probably be very near the truth.

M. J. O'DONNELL.

CANON LAW

CONFESSION OF NUNS-THE CONDITION FOR THE PEACE OF HER CONSCIENCE'

REV. DEAR SIR,-I am grateful for your reply in the current number of the I. E. RECORD to my communication respecting the effect of the clause for the peace of her conscience' on the confession of a nun or sister, made to an ordinarily approved priest in a public church, public or semi-public oratory. In that reply, whilst rejecting my main contention, you make, I gladly acknowledge, a very considerable advance on your original position, by admitting the validity of the confession in circumstances when there is a doubt as to the fulfilment of the condition for the peace of her conscience'; and as you tacitly accept my statement that this doubt would frequently exist, the margin of difference between us is not so great as it might seem after all.

There is, however, in principle, an essential difference between us, and if this only involved the invalidity of one single confession, it is serious, and the doubt must, if possible, be cleared up. Nor is the matter only serious, it is very practical, too; for to my personal knowledge many religious Sisters avail of this privilege of confessing to an ordinary confessor in a public church without troubling themselves much as to whether the peace of their conscience is involved or not.

Having carefully considered your answer, and with an earnest desire to find light for the solution of my difficulties, I must candidly confess that I am not convinced, but am rather confirmed in my doubt. With great respect I must say that I am unable to regard that reply as anything more than a repetition of your original position and a re-affirmation of the statement that the clause must be regarded as invalidating, without producing any really solid arguments in support.

1 N. 150, note 3o.

Let me quote the pertinent words of the canon as given in the Code: 'Si... aliqua religiosa. . . ad suae conscientiae tranquillitatem Confessarium adeat ab ordinario loci pro mulieribus approbatum Confessio in qualibet Ecclesia vel oratorio etiam semipublico peracta valida et licita est,'

The question at issue is: must the words ad suae conscientiae tranquillitatem be so interpreted as to imply an invalidating condition. Is any other reasonable interpretation possible? It will not do to say that they may bear the strict interpretation. That interpretation must be conclusively proved; for we are reminded by Canon 11 that invalidating clauses are not to be assumed. They must be either expressed or else shown to be equivalently implied. The burden of proof rests on him who would maintain the rigorous interpretation. If it can be shown that his proofs are inconclusive, a solid doubt remains, and my contention that the confession would not be invalid, even though the condition were unfulfilled, is amply justified.

Now, what are the arguments that have been adauced? I can only discover two statements in your reply that contain any attempt at a proof. First, you write: The statement that when these three conditions are fulfilled the resulting confession is valid and lawful, clearly implies that if any one of them is omitted the confession is both unlawful and invalid.'

Whose statement is this? It is not a statement found in the Code, as anyone comparing it with the canon quoted, can see. It is that canon manipulated in such a way as to make it seem to countenance the rigorous view.

The consequence which is sought to be drawn from the first member of the sentence would only be legitimate when each of the three conditions is laid down as invalidating. But this is the point for which proof is sought. You offer none. You only assert it.

The second attempt at proof is contained in the words: 'That the omission of any of these conditions involves the invalidity of the confession becomes more apparent, when we remember that, as a general rule, special jurisdiction is necessary to lawfully and validly hear the confession of nuns and sisters (c. 876). When, therefore, this canon, departing from the general rule, states that, under certain conditions, the confession may be made to a confessor with ordinary approval it is evident that the defect of any one of the conditions imposed involves the invalidity of the confession.'

What does this amount to? Simply the statement that the canon uses the words ad suae conscientiae tranquillitatem as an invalidating condition. But again no proof is offered. The rigorous requirement of the verification of these words as a conditio sine qua non is taken for granted. No proof whatever is offered that they must be accepted in this sense and no other.

What exactly is the force and effect of the words ad suae conscientiae tranquillitatem? In my previous communication I maintained that we were not obliged to regard them as anything more than a mere directive condition. And I adduced the subjective and indeterminate character of the matter as pointing to the improbability that the Church would regard them as an invalidating condition, adding that such an interpretation would inevitably breed endless doubts and scruples.

You retort by reminding me that the validity of acts is often

dependent on subjective considerations. Two instances are given. First the case of confession, which 'by divine law itself is invalid without certain subjective conditions on the part of the penitent.' One brought up in the school of Scotus would hardly be satisfied with this statement of doctrine, nor would he consider the example as a case in point. He would prefer to say that the confession was valid but informal. But. waiving this, it surely is no answer to my statement that the Church would be likely to attach a condition of invalidity to a matter necessarily subjective and vague, to say that the divine law does so in one particular instance.

The second instance is taken from the seventh clause of the Ne Temere decree, where, as is alleged, according to all authorities, the words ad conscientiae consulendum are of an invalidating character. But surely this is not a parallel case. The clause in the Ne Temere decree is not one which is left for decision to the subjective state of the person to be married, but it refers to cases, not subjective but objective, which canonists attempt to define and specify, such as the case of concubinage and the case of the civilly married, etc. There is no parity between such well defined objective cases and that of a nun or sister who thinks her conscience is seriously disturbed by every imaginary doubt and scruple. In the one instance the cases are clear cut and objectively marked off, in the other the decision turns on matters that are interior and subjective, and therefore oftentimes necessarily uncertain.

But even though it were to be admitted that such a clause may have an invalidating effect, even in a case that is subjective, it has still got to be proved that it must have this and no other meaning in the case in point.

In

It would be much more to the point if an example of the use of the clause were produced from places more germane to the matter under consideration. It just happens that we have substantially the identical phrase used by the Code on this very matter of faculties for nuns, and it will be most useful to compare it with the canon we are discussing. Canon 520, just the second previous to the one under dispute, and dealing with the same subject, occurs a phrase of precisely the same meaning and import as the phrase ad suae conscientiae tranquillitatem. It runs as follows: 'Si qua religiosa ad animi sui quietem, et ad majorem in via Dei progressum aliquem specialem Confessarium postulet eum facile concedat Ordinarius.'

Whatever be the force or effect of the phrase ad suae conscientiae tranquillitatem in Canon 522, the phrase ad animi sui quietem must have the same effect in Canon 520. If it be maintained that the clause is invalidating in Canon 522, it must also be maintained that the similar clause is invalidating in Canon 520; and it must, further, be maintained that each of the conditions expressed in the latter canon, viz., ad animi sui quietem and ad majorem in via Dei progressum is invalidating.

One who maintains the position you adopt regarding Canon 522 must consistently hold that each of these conditions is invalidating-they do not necessarily mean the same thing.

Now, let me suppose that a nun asks for a special confessor ad animi sui quietem, but she has no real reason but a mere imaginary one, and the Ordinary grants faculties to the special confessor asked for. Will you hold that the faculties are void, and the confession invalid? Further, let me suppose that she is really disquieted in mind by, let us say, some

serious perplexity, or doubt, or sin, but she has no intention of availing of the special confessor's skill to promote her progress in perfection. To be consistent you should say again that the faculties were void and the confession invalid. Surely no sensible man would admit this.

The question, then, remains: what is the real force and significance of the disputed words? I strongly maintain that it is not proved that they constitute an invalidating condition. Indeed, it may be well doubted if they imply any condition at all. The words are not couched in a way to express a condition. Taken as they stand they only imply an end or purpose to be attained. I venture to think that the ordinary plain man would read nothing more into them than a mere amplifying, or, if you will, redundant phrase, meaning nothing more than to express the end or purpose which ordinarily would be intended. Nine out of ten men would thus construe them. The Canon Law was meant for the plain man as well as for the expert, and, as in many other cases, the former may be right whilst the latter is wrong. Not only then the subject matter but the form in which the words are expressed seem altogether to exclude the strict interpretation.

Comparison with another example will serve to still further elucidate the meaning of the disputed phrase. I refer to the well-known words of the Council of Trent granting facilities to all priests for absolution from all sins and censures at the hour of death. The Council says: 'Verumtamen pie admodum ne in hae ipsa occasione aliquis pereat. . . omnes sacerdotes quoslibet penitentes a quibusvis peccatís et censuris absolvere possunt.'

The words I have italicised, viz., ne in hae ipsa occasione aliquis pereat seem much more likely to contain an invalidating condition than the the words ad suae conscientiae tranquillitatem. Compared with them the words ad suae conscientiae tranquillitatem seem very weak and harmless. Should they not be verified one might indeed be tempted to say that the faculties would not hold. I can well imagine you writing grandly about these words of the Council: The law on the point at issue is so clearly stated that there is no need to have recourse to extrinsic considerations to determine its meaning.' Yet it was always maintained as a very probable opinion, that the faculties would hold even in circumstances in which a condition was not verified, viz., when an unapproved priest absolved a dying man in the presence of an approved confessor. This interpretation is borne out by the new Code, and the probability of the opinion is now changed into absolute certainty.

The conclusion arising from these considerations is that in interpreting clauses which seem to restrict liberty, especially when there is a question of a privilege not prejudicial to the rights of others, we must be on our guard against being deceived by the forms and phrasing of words. But we must look behind and beneath them, bring to their interpretation the dictates of common sense, and above all, not forget that the Church is an indulgent mother, and that the last thing she would countenance would be the laying down of conditions which would make for doubt and perplexity and not for peace and tranquillity of conscience. Favores sunt ampliandi is the well-known principle that governs the interpretation of privileges like those under discussion. The principle, I fear, has been unwittingly ignored in the solution of the case.

VOL XIII-29

INQUIRER.