the supposition of their repentance being sincere. The confessions and humiliations of Pharaoh likewise were repeatedly followed by the removal of those judgments which appalled his proud spirit, and so occasioned them; yet few will attribute goodness to Pharaoh. Not only the Divine Being, but Moses himself, saw his insincerity, and bid him glory over him. God, however, would remove the judgment when he made confession, let his motives be what they might; and even though he might laugh to himself for having imposed upon Moses so far as to gain his point *. The young man who came to Christ, appears to have been a conceited pharisee, who loved the present world, and not God; and is represented by our Lord as being as far from entering into the kingdom of heaven, as a camel was from passing through the eye of a needle t. The only difficulty arises from its being said, that the Lord beheld him and loved him; which may seem to imply at least a partial approbation of his character. But to this it may be answered: Our Lord was at this time acting in the character of a preacher, or an instructor of men. His feelings towards the young man in question, were much the same as ours would have been, had we been possessed of true benevolence, and in the same circumstances. Let the best man that ever existed, be addressed in this manner; let him behold a poor, self-deceived youth, flattered by all around him for his seeming virtue, and flattering himself with the hopes of heaven, while in reality he is a slave to the present world; and let him, if he can, forbear to feel towards lem like our Lord. He would tell him the truth, though it should send him away sad and grieved; but his * Exod. viii. 8-10. † Matt. xix. 16-24. F heart would at the same time melt in compassion to his poor deluded soul. But this would imply no more of an approbation of his spirit or conduct than was included in our Lord's looking upon Jerusalem and weeping over it. As to the scribe, who answered our Lord discreetly, and was assured, that he was not far from the king. dom of God; read the passage *, and you will per ceive that it was not in relation to his spirit, or conduct that our Lord spake, for not a word is recorded of either; but merely of his confession of faith: That the love of God and man was of more account than whole burnt offerings or sacrifices. This doctrine was so true, and contained so much of the spirit of the gospel-dispensation, that our Lord very properly assured this discreet inquirer, that he was not far from the kingdom of God; that is, that the principles which he had avowed, if truly imbibed, and properly pursued, would lead him into the very heart of Christianity. The remainder of your objections I must take another opportunity to answer; and at present, subscribe myself, Your affectionate friend, * LETTER THE THIRD. GAIUS. On the Total Depravity of Human Nature. [In reply to the Objections of CRISPUS.] My dear Friend, I TAK K-, Feb. 9, 1795. TAKE up my pen to answer some other of your objections, as stated in yours of July 3, 1794. You * Mark xii. 28-34. not only reason from the case of Ahab, the Ninevites, &c.; but secondly, from the common sense of mankind, which attributes amiable qualities to persons whom nevertheless, on other accounts, we are obliged to consider as destitute of true religion. But let me intreat you to consider whether the common sense of one man can take cognizance of the motives which govern the actions of another; and whether therefore it can be any competent judge of the acceptableness of his actions in the sight of God, who sees things as they are? All the morality in the world consists in the love of God and our neighbour. There is not a virtue, nor a virtuous action in being, but what is an expression of love; yet, as there are numberless actions which bear a likeness to those which arise from love, and as its beyond the province of man to take cognizance of the heart, it is common for us to call those actions amiable which appear to be so, and which are beneficial to human society. It is fit we should do so; otherwise we invade the province of the Supreme Being, who alone is able so to judge of actions as perfectly to ascertain their motives. He is the God of knowledge, by whom actions are weighed. It is right, no doubt, that children should be dutiful to their parents, parents affectionate to their children, and that every relation of life should be filled up with fidelity and honour. But these duties require to be discharged in the love of God, not without it: nor is there any duty performed, strictly speaking, where the love of God is wanting. Read those parts of Paul's epistles, where he exhorts to relative duties, and you will find that he admonishes children to obey their parents in the Lord; parents to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord; servants to obey their masters in singleness of heart, as 1 unto Christ; and masters to be just and kind unto their servants, as having an eye to their master in heaven-adding, And whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men*. Now all those persons, whose behaviour may appear to be amiable in such relations, but who have not the love of God in them, do what they do merely as unto men; and, consequently, fly in the face of the apostolic exhortation, instead of complying with it, even in the least degree. It may be asked, If a merely external compliance with relative duties be a sin, would the omission of them be any better? I answer, no; but worse. There are, as hath been allowed before, different degrees of sin. To perform an action which tends to the good of society from a wrong motive, is sin; but to neglect to perform it, or to perform one of an opposite tendency, is a greater sin. In the one case, we sin against God; in the other, against both God and our neighbour. Thirdly: You allege, That " every man is possessed of conscience, which bears witness to him in numberless instances of what is right and wrong; and this witness is known to have considerable influence even on wicked men, so as to impel them to the performance of many good actions, and to deter them from others which are evil." To this I answer, - (1.) Conscience, though necessary to the performance of both good and evil, does not partake of either the one or the other. Conscience is that branch of the intellectual faculty which takes cognizance of the good and evil of our own actions; but is itself distinct from both. It is simple knowledge, essential indeed to moral agency, being one of the principal things by which we are distinguished from the brute creation; * Ephes. vi. 1-9. Col. iii. 23. but, as all duty is contained in love, good and evil must consist entirely in the temper or disposition of the heart, and the mere dictates of conscience including no such dispositions, neither good nor evil can, strictly speaking, be predicated of them. Neither men nor devils will ever cease to possess consciences, witnessing to them what is good and evil, even in a world of misery, when, as all must allow, they will be utterly destitute of virtue or goodness. We read, it is true, of a good conscience, and an evil conscience, of a conscience seared as with a hot iron, &c. ; and so we read of an evil eye, of eyes full af adultery that cannot cease from sin: but as there is neither good nor evil in the sight of the eye, only as it is under the influence of the temper or disposition of the soul, so neither is there in the dictates of conscience. If there be any virtue or goodness in wicked men, it consists not in their knowledge of the difference between good and evil; but incomplying with the one, and avoiding the other.-(2.) That compliance with the dictates of conscience of which wicked men are the subjects, has nothing of the love of God in it; and consequently no real virtue. While conscience suggests what is duty, a variety of motives may induce men to comply with it, or rather with those actions which are usually the expressions of it; such as, self-interest, a sense of honour, the fear of reproach in this world, and of divine wrath in another: and while they act in this manner, they are considered as acting conscientiously; but if love be the fulfilling of the law, where love is wanting, the law is not fulfilled, no not in the least degree. Fourthly: You allege, that, "If all the actions of unregenerate men be not only mixed with sin, but are in their own nature sinful, then, whether they eat or drink, or whatever they do, they sin against God: F2 |