absolutely or strictly a monarch *. The limitation of his prerogatives extends to his executive as well as his legislative functions. Even the judicial sovereignty, which may with more strict propriety be said to reside in the Crown, has been virtually surrendered, since the Judges have been rendered independent of the royal pleasure, and consequently irresponsible. Or may we not say that, in this country, the Crown itself, with its sovereign prerogatives, is put in commission?-that while the majesty of the State is lodged in the hands of a single person, who is the fountain of all honours and dignities, the rights of sovereignty are divided among the respective Commissions to whom the judicial, military, legislative, and administrative powers have respectively been assigned by the theory or the practice of the Constitution? All the powers of the Crown still exist, but they are no longer vested in the monarch. Of the monarchy, if we may be allowed the expression, the Supreme magistrate is but the co-trustee; sovereign in his reserved prerogatives, but not in his authority; the head, but not the possessor of the actual sovereignty.

In these as well as in some other respects, the British Government, though including monarchical institutions, resembles, Mr. Lewis remarks, that of the United States of America, 'barring ' the differences caused by the nature of a federal union,' far more nearly than the monarchies of Russia, Austria, and Spain.

'If, at the Revolution, the name (title) of the King of England, as well as his power, had been changed, but he had nevertheless exercised precisely the same influence in the Constitution as the Crown has exercised since that time, the Government would have been called republican, instead of monarchical; although the only difference would have been, in the name of the first person in the State.' p. 68.

The English Government is, scientifically considered, though not in popular language, a commonwealth or republic: it is so, inasmuch as the sovereign power is divided, and not in the hands of a single person. A limited monarchy must, in the very nature of things, be a republic, and, in the spirit of the government, in effect an aristocrasy.

The phrase, sovereignty of the people, is one to which, our Author remarks, it is not very easy to give any determinate meaning, but, as generally employed, it seems intended to express ' the moral control and influence exercised by the community at 'large upon the acts of the legislature.' Sometimes, however,

* It is perhaps unfortunate,' Mr. Lewis remarks, 'that usage has sanctioned the extension of the term monarchy to all states in which a King is chief; in other words, has identified monarchy with royalty. p. 66.

the phrase means, 'the admission of all the members of the com'munity, or all the free adult males to the election of representatives or magistrates.

6

In this sense, it appears to be applied to the government of the United States of America: but this usage is not less improper and figurative than the other just mentioned; as the right of voting for the election of one who is to possess a share of the sovereignty, is itself no more a share of the sovereignty, than the right of publishing a political treatise or a political newspaper. The exercise of the one right may influence the decision, as the exercise of the other may influence the formation, of the sovereign body.

• When the difference between the literal and metaphorical meanings of the sovereignty, between legal power and moral influence, -is clearly perceived, there is no danger in speaking of the sovereignty of the people in states where the people is not sovereign: we may indeed avoid it, as a clumsy and inaccurate mode of expressing an idea which may be conveyed by precise and convenient terms, but not from any fear of its producing a worse result than obscurity. This phrase, however, is often presented to persons little acquainted with political reasoning, who may easily confound real with figurative sovereignty, and thus be led to suppose that the people truly possess the sovereign power, and therefore are not subject to it. On the mischievous tendency of such notions, which are incompatible with the existence of government, it is unnecessary to make any comment.' pp. 43, 44.

The origin of the phrase, Mr. Lewis derives from Rousseau's theory of a social contract and the opinions connected with it.

The origin of Rousseau's error,' he remarks, 'appears to have been, that he saw the whole community so far virtually possesses the sovereign power, that if all, or a large part of the members of it agree to destroy the existing government, and to substitute another, they can carry their agreement into effect, as all government is ultimately a question of superior force. But, because the community holds in its hands the issues of sovereignty, it is not to be called sovereign; any more than the Earl of Warwick is to be called King, because he was called King-maker.' pp. 47, 8.

The power of resistance or rebellion is assuredly not a legalwe question whether it can be termed a virtual sovereignty. Something beyond this, indeed, would seem, according to Mr. Coleridge's Idea of the Constitution, to reside in the nation at large;-a latent, reserved power in the people, which under a free constitution, is never alienated nor delegated, and which, under extraordinary circumstances, becomes as it were constituent and sovereign *. When this metaphysical notion, however, is analysed, it comes to this; that the moral energy of a nation will, where political liberty is enjoyed, operate as an efficient check

* Eclectic Rev. 3d Series, Vol. VI. p. 8.

upon the Government; a truth which cannot be doubted. There are moral limits to legal sovereignty, wherever it resides. Absolute despots have found their powers limited in this respect; but we do not attribute sovereignty to either the press or the bowstring.

Rousseau pushes his notion, that sovereignty essentially consists in the general will, to the absurd conclusion, that, as will cannot be represented, the deputies of the people cannot be its representatives, but are only its delegates. 'The English people ' imagines,' he says, 'that it is free, but it is much mistaken: it ' is free only during the election of members of parliament: as soon as they are elected, it is enslaved; it is nothing. This ridiculous statement proceeds on the supposition, that the electors are, between the sessions of Parliament, possessed of the sovereign power, which they surrender to their representatives. The fact is, that except during the session of Parliament, the legislative sovereignty in this country is in abeyance; and as to the executive sovereignty, that at no time vests in the representatives of the people, as such.

In all cases of delegation, one party puts another in his place; transferring to the delegate an authority which he is either unwilling or unable to exercise for himself. Thus a man delegates to his steward the management of his estate, to a tutor the education of his children; arming them with certain powers, which, for specific purposes, he possesses in his capacities of proprietor and father. But no one can delegate a power which he does not possess. If an elector does not himself, under any circumstances, possess the power of making laws, he cannot properly be said to delegate to another the power of making laws. A representative exercises this power by virtue of the votes of his constituents, but not by a delegation from them.' pp. 140, 141.

The right of voting is properly a political right; nor does it bear any resemblance to the exercise of sovereignty. The possession of this right enables a voter to influence the formation of the sovereign body; but a voter never has any part of the governing power, nor does he wield a power which in any way resembles the authority of government, except that the decision of those who really wield that authority may be influenced by his vote. The moral duty incumbent on an elector is to vote for that candidate whose services as a member of the legislature are, in his judgement, most likely to prove beneficial to the state. His power, conferred by this right, is strictly limited, and is confined to one point, namely, the contributing to the choice of the supreme legislative body. There is no question of public policy,-no matter of legislation, in the decision of which he has directly any voice. At the times when the mass of electors are called on to exercise their franchises, (for example, after a dissolution of Parliament in this kingdom,) the legislative sovereignty is in abeyance, and no law can be made. But the power of a member of the legislature is by law unlimited, and may extend to any matter falling within the compass of legislation.

'Indeed, no two things can be more clearly distinguished, than the

powers of a member of a sovereign representative assembly, and the right of voting for his election. Yet they are perpetually confounded in popular discourse; as when a state is called a democracy, because a majority of its freemen have a vote for the election of representatives; for instance, the United States of America, the government of which, as has been already observed, is in strictness an aristocracy; and when the same term of universal suffrage is applied to the votes of the citizens in the ancient democracies, who were members of the supreme legislature, and to the votes of electors in modern states, who are not. Nor is this confusion always confined to popular usage, but it occurs even in the most recent works of political philosophers.' pp. 131, 2.

But is it not an erroneous notion which confounds the representative and the legislator as one character, because the two characters are, in certain cases, united in the same person? That they are really distinct, a moment's consideration will be sufficient to render palpable. The Peer is no representative, although a legislator; whereas, originally, the burgess attended parliament, not as a legislator, but simply as a delegate, appointed to protect the interests of his constituents, but having little or no share in the affairs of Government. By slow degrees, legislative powers were conceded to compliant parliaments; and at length, the whole business of legislation and government has come to be carried on by the instrumentality of the House of Commons. Yet, in its constitutional forms, and its exclusive right to originate money bills, its primary character is still to be traced, as the representative and guardian of the municipal, mercantile, and agricultural interests of the people.

The fundamental principle of the Constitution is, that the people shall tax themselves by their representatives. Upon this, some would graft the claim to govern themselves by their representatives. But this supposed right of self-government, (so favourite a notion with the democratic politicians of America,) is a mere theory, involving something very nearly approaching to a contradiction; since self-government must imply, in such a reference, the not being governed by others, or the non-existence of that sovereign power which is essential to government. The care of public interests may be delegated to representatives as trustees; but the governing power cannot be delegated by the people, who never possessed it. In choosing the person by whom that power shall be exercised, they do not convey the power which the Constitution vests in the office. A constable, for instance, though elected by the parish, derives his powers, not from the people, but from the Crown. All government is a control upon the will of the community, and cannot therefore emanate from that will. As law and arbitrary rule are opposed, so are law and arbitrary conduct in civil intercourse; and the freedom and security derived

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from the protection of the laws against despotism on the one hand, are not less dependent upon the restraining force of the laws upon the popular will and the conduct of individuals on the other. A community in a capacity to govern itself, through the universal prevalence of virtue, intelligence, political wisdom, and self-restraint, and standing in need of no other protection than a mutual good understanding, such a community might safely exist and cohere without any sovereign, without any government. In such a state of society, laws would need no sanctions; there would be no wrongs to redress; there would be no occasion for superiors to command; there would be no subjects, for all would rule; and the public will, the homogeneous aggregate of the will of each individual, would be the supreme law. There are principles which, if fully developed and ascendant, would produce a condition of things answering to this supposition; but they are not political principles; they have but slender relation to the elements of human polities. To realize their triumphant operation, and the felicitous results, is reserved for the economy of heaven.

To return, however, to the subject of representation. Mr. Lewis remarks, that 'the distinction between real and virtual 'representation appears to be founded on the erroneous notion, 'that a representative is merely the delegate of his constituents." But so far as he is their representative, we should say, he is merely a delegate. The error lies in considering him as a mere representative, when he is also entrusted with a share in the public business of legislation. As regards the specific interests of his constituents, the representative is bound to act as their delegate; but it is not as their delegate that he is called to act in the national councils. In all that affects the trade and local interests of the towns they represent, the members for Liverpool, or Leeds, or Birmingham, are constitutionally bound to represent the sentiments, to watch over and defend the rights and privileges of their constituents. But, as the people of Leeds or Liverpool have no right to legislate for England, their representatives, not deriving from them their legislative powers, but acting as trustees for the nation at large, are, in all public questions, required to consult only the general welfare. Having to legislate for the empire, no member of the national council ought to be guided by instructions that may be dictated by, local interests, when they interfere with the general interests of the country. This is the opinion of our highest constitutional authorities; it is also that of the most enlightened American jurists, who deny that even the constitution of their republic confers upon constituents the right of giving binding instructions to representatives, or that such right is the consequence of the relation between the representative and his constituents. Neither the expressed will nor the known * wishes of constituents, to whatever respect they may be entitled,