He then proceeds, very naturally, to inquire in what light Lord Grenville views this publication; and he might have extended his Inquiry to other members of the present Cabinet, to Earl Spencer, Mr. Windham, the sage Lord Sidmouth, and his protegè, the Chief Justice of the King's Bench.

"We believe it is without example in the history of those constitu tional parties which have divided the attachments of our countrymen, that a Minister should lend his sanction to a pamphlet, replete with the most bitter censure of his colleagues-a colleague who is not only a distinguished member of the Cabinet, but the head of administration. The allusions to the former conduct of the Noble Lord are direct-the condemnation they convey is unqualified. The author dweils on the high, unbending, unaccommodating tone which we have been accustomed to hold all over the world. Now, Lords Hawkesbury, Harrowby, and Mulgrave, the successors of Lord Grenville in office, have never even been accused of giving offence to foreign courts by haughty or unbending con duct. The reprobation so pointedly expressed in the Inquiry, is applicable, therefore, in a particular manner, to Lord Grenville. Indeed the author leaves us in no doubt in this respect. I shall quote his own words : To have looked forward beyond the next year, to have taken measures in silence for the slow preparation of distant events; to have gradually disposed the minds of a people in our favour by kind treatment, for which no immediate return was expected, or won them by any other means than a manifesto from a commander, at the head of a paltry force; to have laid plans of war before hand, which should not for some time burst into view with glare and noise—” “

We must here interrupt the quotation, just to observe, that if Mr. Fox has been doing any thing of this kind since he has been in power, it must have been in silence; the preparations have certainly been as slow as this beardless monitor could have wished them; and they have, most assuredly, not yet burst into view, either with or without glare and noise; should the importance of parturition bear any proportion to the mystery of conception, the fable of the Mountain and the Mouse will, to the delight and astonishment of the age, be reversed. But we beg pardon for this involuntary digression, and continue our ex

tract:

"All this would have indicated a strange, unaccountable deviation from the system which has been unremittingly at work since the Treaty of Pilnitz, by day and by night, during war and during truce, in aggran dizing

* Such were the expressions in the first edition of this work; but the author thought proper subsequently to strike out the words, since the Treaty of Pilnitz." Was Lord Grenville galled by the pointed censure of his conduct, which was thus spread abroad by his colleagues in office? Did Mr. Fox and his friends shrink from the just indignation they had

roused,

dizing the proud, and crushing the humble. These expressions require no comment. Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville are the acknowledged leaders of the Cabinet, and I leave the reader to judge of the prudence of the Minister who can give circulation to such unqualified accusations of the former conduct of his colleague."

Our author exposes the falsehood of the Inquirer's assertion, that the Treaty of Concert had no definite object, by quoting the Treaty itself, in opposition to him, which clearly defines the object; and he then detects his ignorance on a point, in which ignorance, in a schoolboy of fourteen, would be inexcusable.

"Our author appears entirely unacquainted with the nature of the Dutch frontier. His words are- As soon as a new war breaks outas soon as the occupation of Holland is of the smallest importance to France, or detriment to us, has she not the means of again over-running the Dutch territories in a week?' After so confident an assertion, we should be induced to think that the Dutch barrier, once so famous, had been totally swept from the face of the earth. How has this writer, then, disposed of Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom, two of the strongest cities of the universe? Where has he placed Bois-le-Duc and Gertruydenberg, or has he forgot how much French blood was shed before the fortresses, comparatively inconsiderable, of Grave, Williamstadt, and Sluys? By every treaty between France and the United Provinces, all these places, as well as others of strength, have invariably constituted an integral part of the latter.

"He proceeds to state, that the whole of Flanders, from Ostend to Antwerp, from Antwerp to Wesel, is French. No barrier remains between the enormous mass of the French dominions, and the little, insu lated, defenceless province of Holland. The strongest part of her frontier, the triple line of fortresses which surround France in the North, is opposed to the weakest side of the Dutch territories.' The whole of this extract, with the exception of the two first lines, is erroneous. That part of the Dutch territories which is opposed to the French frontiers, instead of being their weakest side, is the strongest barrier in Europe. It contains the fortresses I have mentioned, and can besides be completely inundated in twenty-four hours. Our author calls it the weakest side of the Dutch territories. Now the fact is precisely the reverse; for it is their only strong side. Where else do they possess a fortress which de. serves the name? Is this the sum of that volume of knowledge in foreign affairs which has been so lavishly ascribed to our Right Honourable Secre tary in that department? And after this detection, what claim can an author-have to our confidence ?"

We answer, without hesitation, no claim at all. After shewing his ignorance of the state of the Continent, in other respects, he

roused, and attempt to eat their words? But was this mere withdrawing of so pointed an allusion, a sufficient reparation for this public and gross insult? Or, indeed, does the mere omission of these five words in any degree alter the directness of the censure?

points out an inconsistency, very natural in a writer, who is not guided by principle, but by interest, in his disquisitions; and whose object is not the establishment of truth, but the esevation of a party.

"Inconsistency is the genuine offspring of error; and the performance under review now affords a striking exemplification of this maxim. The author blames ministry for cultivating an intimate connexion with Russia, at a time when he conceives Austria was offended with that power. Yet, in the next page, he finds out that these two cabinets were so well reconciled, that the influence of Russia with Austria was formidable, and a principal cause of the court of Vienna acceding to the league."

As to the delay which the Inquirer contends was so necessary for Austria, our author proves that ministers were stimulated by every member of opposition, with the solitary exception of Mr. Fox, not only to continental alliance, but to continental co-operation; and he asks, why Mr. Fox did not, at the time, explain his reasons for thinking that England, Russia, and Austria, were not able to cope with France? Mr. Fox has been through life an advocate of peace and the opponent of government-the prophet of success to France, and of failure to her adversaries.

"The French revolution had been formerly described by him as an event splendid but harmless. In 1802, when France had half a million of soldiers, he counsels a reduction of our army. Then, indeed, he assigned his reason. It was on account of the strength of our navy, and because the navy was a more constitutional force. In 1802, then, the danger from France does not appear to him sufficiently great to share his jealousy with the influence of the crown; but, in 1805, so formidable does he consider France, that if England, Russia, and Austria, with united force, dare to take the field against her, the war is not only hopeless, but the existence of Austria is endangered.

"Did Mr. Fox, in dissuading an active co-operation on the continent, recommend any other efficient measure in its stead?-The only suggestion he offered, was the vague and nugatory plan of a general congress. Offer,' said he, at once the most reasonable terms. France will either accept them, or, by her refusal, she will draw on herself the indignation of Europe, in a degree commensurate with your moderation. In reply, I ask, what will this avail you? Europe has been indignant for years at the aggressions of France. No new display of arrogance, no fresh violation of sacred treaties, were requisite to increase her sense of injury. The independent powers had long complained, but the gate was barred to every demand of satisfaction. The cup of the bitterness of Europe was full'; but when she appealed to Buonaparte, the substance of his replics were, You shall drain it to the dregs, and you shall not even remonstrate.' "Mr. Fox, therefore, opposed a continental coalition, without offering any effectual substitute. In the blindness of his predilection for peace, he forgot that, with so domineering a neighbour as France, the only chance for obtaining permanent tranquillity is in vigorous war. In depreciating the importance of an alliance with Russia and Austria, he differed not only from all the leading men on both sides, but, with that inconsistency

which

which has frequently marked his conduct, he differed from himself. In June, 1805, he says, I will refuse my sanction to any subsidy to Russia, even if leagued with Austria.' But in May, 1803, so highly did this profound statesman estimate the influence of Russia and the conde scension of Buonaparte, that he exclaimed, I ask any one who has at tended to the affairs of the Continent, whether he thinks that France, if she saw Great Britain and Russia firmly united against her, would not be appalled into justice and moderation?'

On which of these two contradictory opinions will Mr. Fox, now he is at the head of our foreign department, act? the result of the present negotiations will shew. Our conduct, in respect to Prussia, is thus rescued from the misrepresentations of the Inquirer.

"The author of the Inquiry finds fault with Ministry for not attempting to avail themselves of the favourable change produced in the sentiments of Prussia, by the violation of the territory of Anspach, in submitting the whole dispute to Prussian mediation at a time France,' he affirms, would have listened to whatever came from Berlin; while the forces of Austria were not irreparably injured, and the armies of Russia were still unimpaired.' In this instance, as in many others, our author's reasoning is at variance, not merely with probability, but with facts of public notoriety. The violation of the territory of Anspach took place on the 4th and 5th October; and in a week afterwards, by Mack losing the opportunity of retreat, his army was lost to Austria. The sentence I have quoted must have one of two meanings: Either that Ministers ought to have acquired the knowledge of the violation of Anspach, procured the mediation of Prussia, and saved the Austrian army in a week,' which is too absurd ever to have been in the contemplation of the author; or that they should have obtained the Prussian mediation before the Austrian forces were otherwise injured than by Mack's surrender, and while the armies of Russia were still unimpaired.' Strange to tell, this explanation of the author's meaning is equally inconsistent with fact as the other with possibility; for before the Austrian force was otherwise injured than by Mack's surrender, before the Russians had fought at all, (except at Krems, where they were victorious) Count Haugwitz did arrive in the French camp with offers of mediation, to which Buonaparte refused to listen, except on the terms he had already offered to Austria-terms équivalent to her absolute and unconditional submission.

"Mediation is a favourite topic with our author. He seems disposed to recommend it on every occasion; and there is an obvious correspondence between his views in this respect, and the strain of pacific sentiments expressed at all times by Mr. Fox in the House of Commons. It is important, however, to observe, that the French are still more formidable in negotiation than in the field; and the history of Europe since 1792 offers a series of proofs of the fatal effects of armistices and treaties. Their object in making these is not to conclude an equitable peace, but to gain time, to divide allies from each other, to effect separate negotiations, and always to avoid treating with a confederacy. Even in the latter case, if obliged to treat with several powers at the same time, all the chances of success from diplomatic artifice are in favour of France. In the progress of the negotiation, she will calculate on detaching one at

NO, XCVII, VOL. XXIV,

X

least

い

least of the allied courts from the league. In regard to the duration of the conferences, as she is under no necessity to consult any other power, she may make it as long or as short as suits her purpose. She may at one period gain time, by inducing false expectations of a conceding disposition, or she may proclaim a sudden rupture, if she consider her forces in ' a state of preparation to anticipate the allies. Upon the violation of the territory of Anspach, Prussia with one hand unsheathed the sword, and with the other, opened the path to amicable negotiation. Our ministry then dispatched Lord Harrow by to secure her in the interest of the league. The chief object of his mission was probably a liberal overture of subsidy, if she would join her forces to the common cause. Had Ministers omitted so important a measure, or had they confined themselves, as the author of the Inquiry recommends, to soliciting her mediation, what a torrent of abuse would have been poured upon them by the Opposition! They would have been told that a confederacy is formidable only in the field-that in negotiation it loses not only its energy, but the chance of its existencethat when a coalition has been formed, the only just policy is to proceed to immediate action-that when a great power indicates a disposition to accede to a league, the most decisive measures should be adopted to procure her immediate co-operation in the field—and that Ministers, by confining their application to Prussia, at such a crisis, to the solicitation of her mediatory offices, had lost the only moment for the redemption of Europe a moment which would never return."

On the folly and cowardice of the Inquirer's observations respecting Bavaria, we briefly animadverted in our review of his pamphlet, and his opponent places them in a striking point of view.

"The conduct of Austria to Bavaria ought to have been similar to that of the King of Prussia to Saxony in 1756. That vigilant prince foresaw the approach of a war, in which he had reason to believe that his neighbour was concerned-he therefore took immediate possession of his country. The connexion between Buonaparte and the Elector of Bavaria was notorious. The electoral house is the hereditary enemy of the house of Austria. When his troops have fought under its banners, it has been the effect, not of cordiality but of necessity. The known duplicity of the Elector not only justified but necessitated the promptest measures. The obvious policy of Austria was, therefore, as soon as she judged hostilities inevitable, to invade Eavaria with a very numerous army, to overrun it with the greatest celerity, to disarm every electoral soldier, and to strip the treasury of its last dollar, not with the mean intention of finally retaining the money, but to deprive the Elector of the means of fulfilling his perfidious engagements with France.

"The invasion of Bavaria took place on the 7th September. The time appears to have been well chosen, as it was exactly the period at which Buonaparte ceased to entertain all ideas of peace, and to prepare with energy for war. While the main body of the Austrians passed the Inn, a division under General Klenau was ordered to advance by forced marches to Neuburg on the Danube, to cut off the retreat of the Bavarians into Franconia. Hitherto all was well managed, and the electoral army, it was probable, would soon have been surrounded, when the cre

dulous