PsychologyT.C. & E.C. Jack, 1905 - 122 pages |
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aroused assertion associated sensation association of ideas association of sensations attempt bacterium believe billiard ball brain cause central nervous system centre chapter common path complete concept consciousness consider criticism definition Descartes doctrine emotion environment epiblast epistemology evolution of mind evolutionary evolutionary psychology evolutionist existence experience expressed external layer external world function heredity highest level human idealist implies important impulse inference instance instinctive intellectual intermediate level James-Lange theory Kant knowledge leucocyte lower animals lowest level means mechanical merely mesoblast mind and matter moth motor nerves muscles N-rays nature nerve cell nerve fibres neural object ontology organisms ourselves philosophic physical Plainly primitive Professor Sherrington protoplasm psychical fact psychical research psychology reader realism recognise reflex action regard relation response sciousness sense sensory sentiency simplest skin Spencer stimuli telepathy term theory things thought tion tropisms true truth vertebrates volition whilst word Wundt
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Page 29 - eludes all mental presentation " ; and hence the logic seems of iron strength which claims for the brain an automatic action, uninfluenced by states of consciousness. But it is, I believe, admitted by those who hold the automaton theory, that states of consciousness are produced by the marshalling of the molecules of the brain ; and this production of consciousness by molecular motion is to me quite as unthinkable as the production of molecular motion by consciousness. If, therefore, unthinkability...
Page 29 - ... this view, is a kind of byproduct inexpressible in terms of force and motion, and unessential to the molecular changes going on in the brain. Four years ago, I wrote thus: ' Do states of consciousness enter as links into the chain of antecedence and sequence, which gives rise to bodily actions? Speaking for myself, it is certain that I have no power of imagining such states interposed between the molecules of the brain, and influencing the transference of motion among the molecules. The thing...
Page 48 - No less inscrutable is this complex consciousness which has slowly evolved out of infantine vacuity, consciousness which in other shapes is manifested by animate beings at large, consciousness which, during the development of every creature, makes its appearance out of what seems unconscious matter, suggesting the thought that consciousness in some rudimentary form is omnipresent.
Page 23 - There is frequently, too, an increased and excoriating catarrhal secretion from the nasal mucous membrane. These accompaniments probably do not stand to one another in the relation of cause and effect, but are the general and local signs, as De Wecker puts it, of a feeble power of cuticular resistance. In obstinate cases — in...
Page 29 - I, however, reject neither, and thus stand in the presence of two Incomprehensibles, instead of one Incomprehensible. While accepting fearlessly the facts of materialism dwelt upon in these pages, I bow my head in the dust before that mystery of mind, which has hitherto defied its own penetrative power, and which may ultimately resolve itself into a demonstrable impossibility of self-penetration.
Page 47 - When to the new eyes of thee All things by immortal power, Near or far, Hiddenly To each other linked are, That thou canst not stir a flower Without troubling of a star...
Page 109 - Anschauung), a sort of perception that would enable it to perceive essences. Substantial Forms, or whatever. But there is no such faculty. "Nothing is in the mind that was not first in the senses except the mind itself", as Kant put it, quoting Leibnitz.
Page 29 - eludes all mental presentation "; and hence the logic seems of iron strength which claims for the brain an automatic action, uninfluenced by states of consciousness. But it is, I believe, admitted by those who hold the automaton-theory, that states of consciousness are produced by the marshalling of the molecules of the brain : and this production of consciousness by molecular motion is to me quite as inconceivable on mechanical principles as the production of molecular motion by consciousness....
Page 31 - ... Huxley in supposing that our thought-activities — whether perceptions, images, feelings or volitions — as such, have no influence upon our conduct; that they are mere ' epiphenomena,' caused by, but not reacting upon, neural activities in the brain. Others say that the psychoses and the neuroses form two series that run parallel to one another but never meet or interact.
Page 29 - ... pushed it on? When one attempts to sanctify himself by effort, he is trying to make his boat go by pushing against the mast. He is like a drowning man trying to lift himself out of the water by pulling at the hair of his own head. Christ held up this method almost to ridicule when He said, "Which of you by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature?