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stitutionalists are most of them respectable, well-intentioned men; lovers of their country, and capable of facrificing their petty wrongs at its fhrine, as well as of uniting to preserve it from immediate horrors from without, and of depending with a generous confidence upon the approaching conftitutional renewal of the legiflature for redrefs of what is wrong within.-The allies, therefore, will be foiled. They will, indeed, unite France, but it will be against themselves; they will extinguith anarchy, only to revive a constitution; and they will restore an order to it, which will be oppofed to their own injuftice. This is fure prophecy, for it is the voice of history.

The manifefto disclaims all design of dismembering France; but as the language of a manifesto is always fuch as will best ensure its fuccefs, it never imposes upon any but weak perfons; and thofe must be weak indeed, who give much credence to it, after recollecting that the Empress of Ruffia who originally pledged herself for the indivifibility of Poland, is now about to tear it into pieces a fecond time.—But if we grant that the allies are fincere in renouncing conquefts upon France; there needs little forefight then to know, that the invasion of France will foon terminate with the first obstacle; that the French King will be complimented with the pretended merit of having opposed it; and that the allies will retire to folace themselves with their projected booty in Poland or other quarters. It is unnatural that German powers, who like the Swifs, never move but for profit, can have engaged in a war without counting its coft, and without making fure of their indemnity; and it is impoffible

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impoffible that powers like Auftria and Pruffia, (which never see their rivals acquire a pound of earth or a fingle fubject, without alarm,) can have viewed the progress of the Ruffians in Poland with so much fang froid and complacency, without terms having been definitively concluded between them refpecting it. Upon the fuppofition, therefore, that defigns upon the territory of France are to be abandoned, Poland or fome other poffeffion it is obvious to conceive, will be the "pillow upon which they will reft their disappointments;" -and the fuppofition of fuch abandonment is certainly rendered colourable, when we observe the unmanaged and disgusting terms of the manifefto, the tranquillity with which the French nation attend their enemy, as well as the little deference fhewn by the allies to the French emigrants. To thefe confiderations, let us add the known fpirit of intrigue of one of the allies, who cannot well be fuppofed fincere in withing to drive back France by force into its old alliance with its rival; and likewife the probable anxiety of the two allies, now employed against France, to infpect the critical tranfactions paffing in Poland.As to Poland, he must be a young politician indeed, who can suspect that a triumvirate who have once diffected Poland, can have any delicacy about repeating an operation which has paid them fo well. The Emprefs and Prince Kaunitz continue to govern Ruffia and Auftria; and Prussia, by its abandonment of Poland, has fhewn, that the prefent monarch will not be more fcrupulous than the laft. Befides, to the motives for the first divifion I mean, are added others which call for a fecond. the removal of a benevolent fovereign from the Polish throne, who feeks to govern his nation in a manner

fo much more popular than these princes, as to form a dangerous example in their neighbourhood; and who, by strengthening his nation, has probably caused a jealousy, left it should feek to reclaim its former poffeffions; not to omit, that as a war has been thought advifable to be rifqued againft France, it might feem natural to make one kingdom furnish the funds for a crufade against the other.

But whatever may be the motives or designs of the triumvirs, is of little confequence to France or to GreatBritain, each of whom must provide for the worst, left the worst fhould happen.-France muft remember, that military defpotifm, when established, has no control left to it, but its own fenfe of justice; and that this fenfe of juftice is conftantly weakened by the extenfion of its power.And Great-Britain must recollect, that the triumvirs are in too good an understanding with one another, for herself to be safe, while it is fo eafy for them, after abandoning all projects upon France, to quarter themselves not only upon Poland in their centre; but upon Turkey to the right, and upon Germany to the left, (Pruffia already calling itself a preponderating member of the Germanic body.)

As to individuals in France, who wish to choose their political principles upon mere fpeculation, we may obferve to them, that the allies either are, or are not fincere, in their joint manifefto.-If either of the allies, and still more, if both of them, are infincere in it, which, from its extravagance (fo unworthy of grave men,) and from other circumftances is more than poffible, the decifion becomes clear.--If on the other hand, the allies are in earneft, thofe are not wife men


who range themselves on the fide of fo much folly. The French never will hear with patience from mercenaries, who fight without any opinions, that well-intentioned men are to be punished with death, for defending theirs. Nor is it in the chance of things, that 150,000 acting troops can conquer 300,000 acting or local ones, occupying fortified posts, and perpetually augmenting their numbers, if the latter are but true to their caufe. If the allies loiter on the frontiers, France is fafe by delay;-if they undertake a course of sieges, in that cafe autumnal ficknefs, refiftance, or even a fuccefs which calls for garrifons to fecure their conquefts, will equally difable their progrefs, till winter brings its protection; and if they advance at all hazards, with an enemy in front, in flank, and in rear, and leave no way open for their fupplies except what depends upon convoys, while the enemy can every where affemble forces for attack, and every where take shelter in fortifications for defence, their distress is no less certain. An army which is obliged to double the strength of its detachments, when it either occupies a pòst, or fends out parties for convoys or to forage, on account of the known or possible hoftility of a military country, will foon be haraffed and broken down; and the havoc which will be made in the pursuit of every corps which is defeated, where every townfman, every peafant, and almost every woman is an armed enemy, will be another dreadful contingency. Xenophon himself, if leading 100,000 men, would find it difficult to retreat from fuch a country, though every step would bring him. nearer home; but how he would advance in it, even with 150,000 men, when every ftep lengthened his communications, and augmented both his enemies and his employment for his own troops, I leave to the


Duke of Brunswick to answer.-To thofe who deny the hoftility of the country, I reply that a cautious General must always reckon upon it, till he finds proof to the contrary; and he has too fure ground for doing fo, when he fees, that with only 15,000 regular troops left in the interior parts of France, rebellion at present is no where able to keep its ftandard flying. But if France is to be deemed only as neutral, the enemy (it must be allowed) at leaft will have no aid to hope from it; especially as perfons who do not engage in a civil war upon its original principles in the commencement of it, are generally fooner or later induced to take part in it upon fecondary ones; and the fanguinary orders iffued through the Duke of Brunswick, (which will be executed to the full letter of them by German free-booters, as far as their power goes,) will not leave them long undecided.-I know indeed that great accumulations of force to the allies, and great desertions from the popular army are expected, as the war proceeds; as well as great difafters to the latter from treachery, and from want of difcipline. But first, as to acceffions of force, they may happen on both sides. Next refpecting defertions; the French, at prefent experience few, except among their officers, and thefe are leffening; and it remains to be feen, whether the ftream of desertion will not turn its course, when the victims of military and civil tyranny among the Germans, are better acquainted with facts, and find opportunities for escaping, especially fhould they receive any check in their enterprizes. * With regard to experience, more of it is acquired in fix weeks, in the prefence of an enemy, than in fix years in barracks; and a de

*The French afterwards published premiums to invite desertion.


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