:

ous that the less slanting, or the more perpendicular the line of attack is, the more it approaches to the first case, and is liable to the same objections: and in proportion as the course is made more slanting, it is manifest that a longer line must be described before thevan ship of the assailing squadron can fetch the van of the enemy, during the whole of which course the van ships being exposed to a heavy fire from nearly the whole of the enemy's line, will suffer proportionably, and be more or less disabled. But if even a single ship in the van of the attacking fleet is materially injured, her course will be retarded, as also will be that of every ship in her rear: hence the headmost ships will be separated from the rest, and exposed to an unequal combat with the enemy. If the damaged ship is unable to proceed, or if her second astern is impatient to join the van, the wounded ship must be passed either to windward or leeward in her of which cases time is lost, and the line runs a great risk of being broken: not to mention that each ship which passes to leeward is subject to be raked fore and aft, while performing this manœuvre. Another circumstance decisively in favour of the fleet thus attacked, is that the ships composing it present their windward or starboard broadsides to the enemy, and therefore their shot takes a much longer range than the larboard batteries of their adversaries, and this in proportion to the force of the wind at the time. Hence it appears that a fleet to windward joining battle with another to leeward in the manner described, even if both parties are equally willing, must suffer severely, especially in its rigging, before it has an opportunity of retaliating; and where the fleet receiving the attack is not disposed to come to close action, it may readily retire under cover of the smoke of both fleets from an adversary already crippled. Such was the relative state of British and French naval tactics during many years: the former aiming at the entire destruction of the enemy, made the attack as described; in consequence of which the van of the British was always more or less crippled, and separated from the rest of the fleet, and thus began the action with the van of the enemy unsupported, and to great disadvantage; in the mean time the van ships of the enemy, after a short action, wore in succession, and passed to leeward, while the rest of their fleet making sail ahead, filled up the vacancy, and thus discharged

the fire of the whole line on the British van, before the centre and rear divisions could come up to its support. Thus the enemy was enabled to form a new line, unmolested, two or three miles to leeward of the former, in readiness to repeat precisely the same manoeuvre, if their adversaries were at all disposed to hazard a second attack. So entirely were the French convinced of the efficacy of this system of defence, that they often voluntarily yielded the wind to the British, and as often gained the advantage in the subsequent battle, as far as withdrawing un hurt and damaging their adversaries can be called an advantage.

Having thus explained the old system of naval tactics, both of the British and French, as far as regards the attack from the. windward, Mr. Clerk proceeds to cite, in confirmation of the objections which he has made to this mode of proceeding, the battles of admiral Byng off Minorca, admiral Byron off Grenada, admiral Arbuthnot off the Chesapeak, and admiral Rodney oti Martinico; in all of which the British line being disordered while at a distance, the van has been separated from the rest of the fleet, and has had to sustain the whole fire of the enemy ship by ship, as they passed in succession, to form a. ew line to leeward.

The mode of attack proposed by Mr. Clerk to supersede that, the disadvan tages of which he has thus demonstrated, is the following: let the attacking feet, instead of forming one long line, be ar ranged in three parallel divisions or colums. When the headmost ships of the fleet have got within the distance of three or four miles from the rear of the enemy to leeward, let one of the divisions be detached to force an attack on the three or four rear ships of the enemy, by falling in their wake, and coming up alongside, while the rest of the fleet forms a line by divisions to the windward, in order to ob serve that part of the enemy's squadron which is not engaged. This being dene, and the wind still continuing in the same quarter as at first, one of two things must necessarily happen: either the enemy must abandon the ships in his rear that are already engaged; or he must return to their support, and come into action to a disadvantage, and as close as his adversary pleases. Having laid down the geral plan of attack, Mr. Clerk proceeds in the subsequent sections to examine the different methods by which the remainder of the enemy's fleet may attempt to dis

engage their rear ships. They may attempt it in four ways, by tacking to windward in succession, or all at once, or wearing to leeward in succession, with the van ahead, or at once with the rear ahead. But in none of these cases, as the author sliews by diagrams, can the enemy succeed without coming, at a disadvantage, into close action with the reserved part of the adverse fleet.

If the commander of the enemy is aware in time of the meditated attack upon his rear, he will endeavour to avoid it by wearing and endeavouring to pass to leeward of the other fleet on the contrary tack; but the time requisite for this will enable his adversary to obstruct the line of his course, and either bring him to close action, or force him directly to leeward : in which latter case he must sustain a cannonade on equal terms, and will probably lose any ship that happens accidentally to be crippled.

The concluding sections of the first part are occupied in demonstrating what would be the modifications of the attack from the windward in case of a change of wind during the action.

The second part relates to the attack of fleets from the leeward. This may take place when the two opponent squadrons are on the same or on opposite tacks. Of the first case, or the simple attack, there are very few examples, the French always preferring to receive battle to leeward, or on contrary tacks to windward. This latter, called by Mr. Clerk the cross at tack, used to be thus conducted: the leading ship of the leeward fleet fetching the enemy as near the van as possible, the two squadrons were brought parallel, and continued under easy sail, exchanging broadsides till they had entirely passed each other. By this manner of proceeding the hostile fleets engaged indeed on equal terms; but the action was necessarily of such short duration, as to prevent any thing decisive from taking place. Suppose the rate of sailing in each fleet to be no more than two miles and a half an hour (a motion absolutely necessary to give the rudder a good command of the ship), then the time during which any two ships can be in direct opposition to each other does not exceed half a minute, and the space between any two contiguous ships in the same line will be passed over in one minute and a half, if the ships are drawn up with the usual intervals between each other. Therefore, in order that each ship should give and receive only as many

broadsides as there are ships in the opposite squadron, every broadside must be prepared in a minute and a half, and discharged in half a minute.

In order to make the attack from the leeward more decisive than it has hitherto been, Mr. Clerk proposes the manœuvre of cutting the enemy's line. This can only be done whe, the two fleets meet on opposite tacks; and the most simple manner of effecting it is for the van ship of the attacking squadron, instead of ranging parallel with and to leeward of the enemy, to pass through the first interval that occurs, and thus lead the line directly across that of the enemy. In consequence of this the van of the leeward fleet will be to windward of the enemy's rear, while its rear will still be to leeward of the enemy's van: thus the attacking squadron will preserve its own line entire, while that of its adversary will be cut in two. Further, the ships in the rear division thus intercepted having their progress obstructed, are very likely to crowd one upon the other and get into confusion, in which state they must be forced to leeward.

If the line of the enemy is cut within. three ships from the rear, these ships must necessarily be forced so far to leeward, that the admiral of the attacking fleet, having detached a sufficient force to com pel them to a speedy surrender, will be able to form the rest of his squadron in line of battle between the main body of the intercepted rear of the enemy; the consequence of which will be, that these ships will be secured before the enemy's van can be brought to their assistance, nor can he possibly recover them without previously defeating in close action the interposed line of battle.

When the line of the enemy is cut near the centre, all the ships astern of the interval through which the attacking fleet has past will be retarded and forced to lee ward: in the mean time the van of the assailants ranging to windward, and their centre and rear coming up, the enemy's rear will be forced to put before the wind, and will probably lose all their heavy sailing vessels before their van can give any

assistance.

Similar consequences will ensue if the line of the enemy is cut so as to separate the rest of the fleet from the van; but in this case the attack being made on the combined rear and centre of the enemy, the success will not be so certain.

Another mode of attack from the lee ward is, for the yan ship of the attacking

squadron, followed by the three next astern, to range under the lee of the enemy; while the fifth ship, with all the rest astern, passes across the enemy's line and thus cuts it in two. This mode, like the preceding, divides itself into three separate cases. If the attack is made on the four sternmost ships of the enemy, the four leading ones of the attacking squadron range close under their lee, while the rest pass between the fourth and fifth from the enemy's rear, thus completely separating these four ships from their friends, which being vigorously attacked both on the windward and leeward quarters, and also ahead, must necessarily be taken. If the enemy's line is cut about the centre, in the manner just described, the success is more doubtful, as the four ships detached to leeward will have to sustain unsupported a cannonade from half the enemy's squadron. Still greater will be the risk of failure when the line of the enemy is cut between the van and centre; so that upon the whole Mr. Clerk is of opinion that this mode of attack should be directed only upon the enemy's rear.

A third modification of attack from the leeward is, for the attacking admiral to fetch the centre of the enemy's fleet with his leading ship, to range with the van and half the centre to leeward of the enemy, and to pass across his line with the remaining half of the fleet. By this means, if the two fleets are of equal force, say 24 sail each, the 12 rear ships of the enemy will be separated from the rest at the very time in which they are engaged with an equal squadron to leeward. The headmost ships of this rear division will be forced to leeward by the ship which cut the line, and will be pressed still further and further down the wind as the rest of the attacking squadron comes up. In the mean time, the leading ships of the division which passed to leeward having ranged beyond the enemy's rear, will put about in succession to obstruct his passage to leeward on the starboard quarter, while the rear ships of the windward division will bear down on the larboard. In these circumstances the intercepted division of the enemy must put about to go before the wind, and in effecting this will be severely raked by the van ships of the wind ward division, with the certainty of having his crippled ships picked up by the

vessels that are closely pressing on his starboard and larboard quarters. At the moment of cutting the line the van ship of the enemy will be at least two miles ahead, and the distance will have considerably increased before any measures can be taken to assist the intercepted part of his fleet; so that they will be able to give little or no molestation till the crippled ships of his rear are secured by the assail ants.

The last mode of attack investigated by Mr. Clerk is the perpendicular, or the attack at right angles. Suppose a numerous fleet, formed in an irregular line abreast, extended to a great length from windward to leeward, and let a much smaller hostile fleet be observed, as the fog clears, steering in a contrary direction to the larger fleet, with the line of battle formed ahead, at a few miles distance. In this situation of affairs (as actually happen, ed in the morning of the battle off Capa St. Vincent), it is plain that the larger fleet may be defeated with the loss of his windward ships. The smaller fleet must push on to windward, and divide the ene my's line between the fifth and sixth ship to windward; then the whole fleet tacking at the same time, a sufficient force from the rear must be detached to carry the intercepted ships, while the van forms a line to leeward of the divisions now engaged in close action, in order to prevent the rest of the larger fleet from working to windward, and disengaging the division thus cut off.

The third part of this work consists only of a few pages written in a very desultory manner, and applying the principles laid down in the two former parts to the engagements of Matthews and Byng.

The fourth part is entirely historical, and narrates the gallant action of Sir Samuel Hood, in Basse Terre roads, St. Christopher's, February 24, 1782. Admiral Rodney's battle of the 12th of April, 1782, and the two actions in the East Indies, between Sir Edward Hughes and Suffrein, on the 17th of February, and the 12th of April in the same year.

The style is plain and clear, and the nu merous diagrams render the various descriptions sufficiently intelligible even to those who are but very superficially as quainted with naval tactics.

THE work before us is intended as a sequal to Dr. Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, and accordingly commences where that useful publication terminates. It is divided into two parts or series, of three volumes each; of which the former part, which concludes with the peace of 1762, was first published about sixteen years ago, and is reprinted without any material alteration in the present edition.

The arrangement of these memoirs is chronological, and in the form of annals: the first, second, fourth, and fifth volumes are historical and narrative; the third and sixth volumes are appendixes to the two parts, and are occupied by various useful documents, which could not without inconvenience have been introduced into the narrative.

The account of the naval transactions is full and compleat; giving a particular account not only of the combats of fleets and squadrons, but noticing every action fought by single ships in the public service, and the more remarkable of those in which privateers have been engaged. The military transactions are "only such as have a relation to maritime affairs, or are connected with naval services." But though this is the declaration of the author in the preface, yet the interesting events of the revolution war in America have in many instances seduced him to deviate from his original intention; for we know not by what latitude of construction the surprise at Trenton, and the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga, can be considered as in the smallest degree connected with naval transactions.

The pen of Dr. Beatson is so generally characterized by fairness and impartiality, that we are both surprised and concerned to find him still bestowing on the American republicans the appellation of rebels, and in many instances declining to confer

on Washington, Gates, Lincoln, and the other leaders, the title of general. The display of such à petty party-spirit, is a proof of bad taste and illiberality, and is no more justifiable than it would be to call the royal house of Brunswick a dynasty of usurpers, and the convention that decreed the expulsion of James II. an assembly of rebels and traitors.

The frequent want of success attending our general naval actions with the French, previously to the great victory on the 12th of April 1782, is not attributed to a defect in our system of naval tactics, but to the imperfect state of our naval signals: it may, as appears to us, with great propriety be charged to both causes.

Another instance in which Dr. Beatson differs from received opinion, is in representing the division of the enemy's line of battle by admiral Rodney, on the 12th of April, as the effect of accident and the wind, and not of a preconcerted plan. In part perhaps this may have been the case, but as the British admiral, before he sailed from England, was certainly acquainted with Mr. Clerk's essay on naval tactics, in which this manoeuvre is proposed; as he also had expressed his approbation of it, and his resolution to prac tise it on the first opportunity, it is surely reasonable to conclude, that, although accident may have created the opportunity, yet some credit is to be given to the admiral for availing himself of it.

Dr. Beatson has performed the task which he has undertaken so well, that we trust he will consider himself as in some degree bound to undertake the naval history of the last war, and record those splendid triumphs of our maritime forces, which have been equalled by no country, and in no age, and to which Britain is so deeply indebted both for her glory and her safety.

MR. LAWRENCE is author of the "New Farmer's Calendar," a "Treatise on Horses," and other works connected with agriculture, which have great reputation for utility. He has joined to very extensive personal experience and observation the result of the experience and observation of many of the best writers, ancient and modern, who have treated on cattle and the comparative excellencies of the various breeds of them. A large body of facts and opinions as to their management and diseases are brought together in these pages; they are related with perspicuity, and reasoned on with judgment. We consider Mr. Lawrence as a writer of good sense and extensive observation, and as being exempt from those vulgar prejudices which ignorance has generated and obstinacy perpetuated on the general treatment of cattle, and particularly on their diseases. In his humorous and spirited attacks on quack medicines and quack doctors we heartily join, and cannot but express our surprize as well as regret, since stock of every description is bred with such care, and reared to such perfection, that the value of them has of late years incredibly increased; yet we have few or no persons professionally conversant in their diseases, or regularly educated in the investigation of them. Mr. Lawrence may see, by a reference to the An

nual Review (val. I. p. 755), that the necessity of some such plan as he now proposes for the education of a number of persons in comparative nosology, to be afterwards distributed over the country, had before impressed itself upon our minds, and that we suggested it to the consideration of a worthy baronet, who has for many years evinced great zeal in the interests of agriculture. Mr. Law rence's proposal is, that

"The affair of providing the country with regular-bred surgeons, for the practice of cattle medicine, be immediately undertaken by the agricultural societies; at least, that the experiment be made by some of the most considerable, each society engaging a gentleman of that description, at a suflicient and repectable annual stipend. The contract may run in such form, that should the surgeon's annual emolument from practice; come short annually be made good by his patrons the of the stipulated summ, the deficiency should society. No person to be engaged on any pretence, but who shall have received the usual education of a surgeon, and have attendthe hospitals the usual length of time. A selection of veterinary text-books to be made, and the books purchased for the use of the surgeon, but to remain the property of the society. This may consist of Gibson's last Layard, with our late writers; and La Fosse edition, 2 vols. Bracken, Bartlett, Osmer, and Bourgelat from the French, with whatever may have been published since their