Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, Second Session ...U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976 - 416 pages |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
action advice and consent amendment Answer ANTONIN SCALIA appropriate Bartlett Berger bill Bricker Amendment Case-Zablocki Act Chairman Circular 175 Committee on Foreign concerning conclude executive agreements concurrent resolution Cong congressional-executive agreements constitutional authority constitutionally consultation cooperation delegation Department disapproval effect enacted enter into executive example executive agree executive agreements executive branch executive power FINDLEY foreign affairs foreign policy Foreign Relations framers Gerhard Casper gress hearings House of Representatives implementing international agree international agreements international law Justice LAGOMARSINO LAYLIN Legal Adviser legislative veto LEIGH matter Meeker ment military Monroe national commitment national security negotiation practice presentation clause President Presidential authority problem procedure Professor Casper proposed pursuant question Raoul Berger Report role Rush-Bagot Agreement SCALIA Senate separation of powers specific statement statute STUDDS Subcommittee submitted supra note Supreme Court tion tional transmitted treaty power United vote War Powers Resolution ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 413 - The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Page 40 - That no free government, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles.
Page 4 - For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section — (1) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment of Congress sine die ; and (2) the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the computation of the 60-day period.
Page 213 - In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the Nation.
Page 306 - He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands.
Page 31 - ... where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
Page 108 - TITLE I Sec. 101. In order to carry out the policies and accomplish the objectives set forth in section 2 of this Act, the President is authorized to negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly countries to provide for the sale of agricultural commodities for dollars on credit terms or for foreign currencies.
Page 244 - President by an exertion of legislative power; but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations...
Page 410 - Congress is in session (in computing such thirty days, there shall be excluded the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days...
Page 34 - It was shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.