non-elect, is it not just as inconsistent to invite them to partake of them, as if there were a want of sufficiency? This explanation therefore seems only to be shifting the difficulty." James. Pharaoh was exhorted to let Israel go; and had he complied, he had saved his own life, and that of a great number of his people: yet, all things considered, it was not God's intention to save Pharaoh's life, nor that of the Egyptians. And is there no difference between this, and his being exhorted under a promise in which the object promised had no existence ? It is a fact that the scriptures rest the general invitations of the gospel upon the atonement of Christ*. But if there were not a sufficiency in the atonement for the salvation of sinners without distinction, how could the ambassadors of Christ beseech them to be reconciled to God, and that from the consideration of his having been made sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him? What would you think of the fallen angels being invited to be reconciled to God, from the consideration of an atonement having been made for fallen men? You would say, It is inviting them to partake of a benefit which has no existence, the obtaining of which, therefore, is naturally impossible. Upon the supposition of the atonement being insufficient for the salvation of any more than are actually saved by it, the non-elect however are in the same state, with respect to a being reconciled to God through it, as the fallen angels; that is, the thing is not only morally, but naturally impossible. But if there be an objective fulness in the atonement of Christ, sufficient for any number of sinners, were they to believe in him; there is no other impos * 2 Cor. v. 19-21. Matt. xxii. 4. John iii. 16. sibility in the way of any man's salvation, to whom the gospel come's at least, than what arises from the state of his own mind. The intention of God not to remove this impossibility, and so not to save him, is a purpose to withhold not only that which he was not obliged to bestow, but that which is never represented in the scriptures as necessary to the consistency of exhortations or invitations. I do not deny that there is difficulty in these statements; but it belongs to the general subject of reconciling the purposes of God with the agency of man: whereas, in the other case, God is represented as inviting sinners to partake, of what has no existence, and which therefore is physically impossible. The one, while it ascribes the salvation of the believer in every stage of it to mere grace, renders the unbeliever inexcusable, which the other, I conceive, does not. In short, we must either acknowledge an objective fulness in Christ's atonement, sufficient for the salvation of the whole world, were the whole world to believe in him; or, in opposition to scripture and common sense, confine our invitations to believe, to such persons as have believed already. John. May I ask you, brother Peter, whether, on a review of what has passed, you consider brother James as denying the doctrines of imputation, and substitution, or either of them? Peter. Though I consider brother James's statements as containing various mistakes; and though I am exceedingly averse from the necessary consequences of certain tenets, which, if I rightly understand him, are avowed in them; yet I am now convinced that respecting those doctrines, he did not intend what I supposed he did. It behooves me therefore frankly to acknowledge, that I have unintentionally misrepre 1 sented his sentiments respecting them, for which I am truly sorry. John. I hope, brother James, you are satisfied with this acknowledgment. James. Perfectly so; and shall be happy to hear brother Peter's remarks on those particulars in which he may still consider me as in the wrong, CONVERSATION THE TIHRD. ON PARTICULAR REDEMPTION: PETE ETER. Notwithstanding what our brother James has stated, I am far from being satisfied with his views as they affect the doctrine of Particular Redemption. If I understand him, his sentiment may be expressed in this position: THE PARTICULARITY OF THE ATONE MENT CONSISTS IN THE SOVEREIGN PLEASURE OF GOD WITH REGARD TO ITS APPLICATION. James. I should rather say, THE PARTICULARITY OF REDEMPTION CONSISTS IN THE SOVEREIGN PLEASURE OF GOD WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF THE ATONEMENT; that is, with regard to THE PER SONS TO WHOM IT SHALL BE APPLIED. John. It is to be understood then, I presume, that you both believe the doctrine of particular redemption, and that the only question between you is, wherein it consists? James. So I understand it. Q Peter. I consider the aforementioned position as merely a reconciling expedient, or compromise between principles which can never be reconciled. James. I am not conscious of embracing it for any such purpose-but let me hear your objections against it. Peter. It places the particularity of redemption in application. I understand indeed, that by application you include not only what the new testament denominates receiving the atonement-the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ and faith in his blood; but also the absolute intention of Christ in his death to save all those who shall be finally happy. But notwithstanding the unauthorized latitude of meaning which is here claimed for a particular term, to render the position more plausible, various and cogent reasons may be urged against it. Among others, it confounds the atonement itself with its application to the sinner. Whereas, though the former completely ascertain the latter, yet not being the same fruit of divine favour, they must not be identified. The term application always supposes the existence of whatever is applied. The atonement therefore must be considered as existing, either actually, or in the divine decree, before it can be applied to the sinner. The application of a thing to any person, or for any purpose, ought not to be confounded with the thing itself. Hence in former times hardly any distinction was more common among theological writers, than that between what they denominated the impetration and the application of redemption. To represent the intention of Christ in his death to save Paul, for instance, and not Judas, under the notion of applying the atonement to the one and not to the other, is to me at least a perfectly novel sense of the word application, and was, I presume, adopted to meet the necessities of this hypothesis. James. The whole of what you have said rests upon a mistake at the outset. You say, the position in question "places the particularity of redemption IN APPLICATION." Whereas, if you recollect yourself, you will find that it places it IN THE SOVEREIGN PLEASURE OF GOD WITH REGARD TO APPLICATION. The difference between this and the other is as great as that between election and vocation. Instead of my confounding redemption or atonement, therefore, with application, I have just cause to complain of you for having confounded application with the sovereign pleasure of God respecting it, and for having loaded me with the consequences. Peter. But have you never made use of the term application, so as to include the divine intention? James. I am not aware of having done so; but whether I have or not, you were not animadverting on what I may have said at other times, but on the position which you yourself had stated, which position affirms the very opposite of what you allege. -Allowing you to animadvert, however, on other words than those contained in the position, and admitting that I may have spoken or written in the manner you allege, still it has been merely to distinguish what the death of Christ is in itself sufficient for, from what it was the design of the Father and the Son actually to accomplish by it. This distinction is neither novel, nor liable to the objection of confounding the impetration of redemption with its application. I have no other meaning, that I am aware of, than that of Dr. OWEN in the following passage-" Sufficient, we say, was the sacri"fice of Christ for the redemption of the whole world, " and for the expiation of all the sins of all and every |