Individuals, Institutions, and MarketsCambridge University Press, 10 mai 2004 - 336 pages Individuals, Institutions, and Markets offers a theory of how the institutional framework of a society emerges and how markets within institutions work. The book shows that both social institutions, defined as the rules of the game, and exchange processes can be analyzed along a common theoretical structure. Mantzavinos' proposal is that a problem solving model of individual behavior inspired by the cognitive sciences provides such a unifying theoretical structure. Integrating the latest scholarship in economics, sociology, political science, law, and anthropology, Mantzavinos offers a genuine political economy showing how social institutions affect economic outcomes. |
Table des matières
IV | 3 |
VI | 7 |
VII | 10 |
VIII | 12 |
IX | 16 |
X | 22 |
XI | 34 |
XII | 43 |
XXXIII | 149 |
XXXIV | 152 |
XXXV | 159 |
XXXVI | 161 |
XXXVII | 164 |
XXXVIII | 167 |
XXXIX | 172 |
XL | 178 |
XIII | 46 |
XIV | 50 |
XV | 54 |
XVI | 59 |
XVII | 63 |
XVIII | 65 |
XIX | 67 |
XX | 69 |
XXI | 73 |
XXII | 83 |
XXIII | 85 |
XXIV | 90 |
XXV | 94 |
XXVI | 99 |
XXVII | 101 |
XXVIII | 106 |
XXIX | 118 |
XXX | 126 |
XXXI | 131 |
XXXII | 147 |
XLI | 181 |
XLII | 185 |
XLIII | 188 |
XLIV | 193 |
XLV | 197 |
XLVI | 203 |
XLVII | 208 |
XLVIII | 214 |
XLIX | 218 |
L | 227 |
LII | 232 |
LIII | 235 |
LIV | 240 |
LV | 241 |
LVI | 248 |
LVII | 257 |
| 259 | |
| 303 | |
| 311 | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
action parameters activities alternatives analysis argument arise artificial selection cognitive communication competition consumers cooperation coordination coordination game cultural cultural evolution discussed economic agents economic growth emergence empirical employed Endogenous Growth Theory enforcement entrepreneurs environment evolution evolutionary economics evolutionary epistemology exchange existence explain external fact formal and informal Franz Böhm Hayek human hypothesis imitation important increase individual behavior informal institutions informal rules innovation institutional framework interaction interpretation issue learning process legal rules market process means mechanism mind moral rules motivational neoclassical nomic organism outcomes path dependence pecuniary external Popper possible prisoner's dilemma problem situation problem solutions production profits property rights protective agencies rational choice rational choice theory relationship role rulers selection shared mental models social norms social order social rules society solve stress structure sumers tacit knowledge takes place technologies theoretical tion tional tive Translation by C. M. utility