we have reason to believe, been written under the immediate direction of Lord Holland; we do not mean to say, that it is actually the composition of his Lordship; for, though the principles of it be conforma ble with his; though most of the arguments are feeble and weak ; still it displays marks of much greater ability than his Lordship possesses. Indeed, with a single exception, we know no public character whose talents have been more over-rated than those of Lord Holland; as they who know him best will readily acknowledge. Had Buonaparte hired an advocate for the express purpose of degrading this country in the eyes of all others; for rendering us ultimately an object of indignation, and an object of contempt to Europe; for raising the courage of our enemies, and for exciting a national despondency at home; such an advocate, however zealous, and however able, could not possibly have pleaded his cause with greater earnestness than the author of this pamphlet has done. Never was so black a picture drawn for any good purpose; never were facts more miserably perverted; and never were conclusions more flagrantly erroneously drawn. The author seems to lament extremely, that a Parliamentary Inquiry was not instituted into the state of the nation, before the present ministers came into office; and if the omission be really a subject for lamentation, why did not Lord Holland move for such an inquiry? and why did not the present ministers promote it? It is notorious, that the late administration wished for it; that they frequently pressed it; nay, that they even dared their opponents, after their accession to power, to enter into it. It was much more convenient, however, to make this inquiry partially, through the medium of the press, where the author would have the field to himself, and would probably be left to enjoy his imaginary triumph without let or molestation. God forbid, that the freedom of the British Press should be infringed; that Britons should be deprived of the privilege of amply discussing the public characters, and conduct of public men, however grating to the feelings of such men the discussion may prove. Let this right, say we, to which we are indebted for many of the greatest blessings which, as British subjects, we enjoy, be preserved and exercised in its fullest extent. But it is one thing to condemn the conduc of ministers, and to uphold one party against its adversaries; and another to plead the cause of our enemies against ourselves. In France, and in every other nation of the Continent, whatever difference of opinion may have obtained on public questions, no man has ever been known to feel the desire to plead the cause of his country's enemies; if his country had weak points, if she had really been defective in her system of policy, domestic or foreign, a Frenchman would labour to conceal those defects; never would he have exposed them to the eye of a foreigner; much less would he have pleaded the cause of her enemies against herself, in time of war. We allude not to times when the press, the tongue, and the mind are alike shackled by the manacles of a ferocious tyranny; but to the better periods of the monarchy, when true honour and genuine patriotism went hand-in-hand. When When the ambition of the Fourteenth Lewis had reduced his country to the most deplorable state of distress, every head and every heart combined to afford the means of extricating him from his difficulties; and not one individual was found, so lost to every sense of honour and of shame, as to endeavour to excite despondency in the minds of his countrymen; but all, on the contrary, united in exhorting them to meet like men, the danger which threatened them. The writer of this pamphlet has probably amused himself with the perusal of Voltaire's Optimist, and has thence resolved to treat seriously, what that impious wit had treated ludicrously, and to prove that, (as far as his own country is concerned, at least) every thing is for the worst, in this worst of all possible worlds! The whole system of our foreign politics for the last twenty years is involved in one indiscrimi nate censure; hence a considerable part of the new ministry, whom he praises as "the distinguished statesinen who are now happily placed at the head of the government," is included in his attacks; his particular censures thus falsifying his general praise; or his general praise thus falsifying his particular censures. Our readers are not to learn, that, during a considerable portion of the war before last, Lord Grenville, the present premier, was Secretary of State for the Foreign Depart ment, and a nobleman better qualified for that office is not to be found in Europe. The policy then pursued in respect of foreign powers, whatever complexion the jaundiced eye of this partisan may have given to it, was such as secured the approbation and respect of every distinguished Statesman in Europe. It was supported by Mr. Windham, Earl Spencer, Lord Sidmouth, Lord Ellenborough, all members of the present Cabinet, who are now to be told, by the advocate of their associates in power, that they have brought the country to the very brink of ruin. Nay, if this writer be worthy of belief, we are reduced to such a wretched state of degradation, that we have not the smallest chance of success in the present contest, and the only means of securing the continuance of our independence with reduced power, and cramped resources, is to bow our necks to the Corsican's yoke, and to submit to any terms of peace which he may be pleased, in his tender mercy, to bestow on us. We defy the most acute and subtle mind to discover, in this inquiry, any other object or tendency; the sum and substance of all the inquirer's arguments amount to neither more nor less, than the necessity of an unconditional surrender of our country to the will of our enemy. If his intention were differ ent, which it is not our province to decide, he is the most weak, and inconsistent writer that ever took up a pen; but we cannot with honesty, compliment his motives at the expence of his understanding. The composition, though occasionally deformed by grammatical inaccuracies, is not of the cominou class. It is evidently a work of study and of labour, executed with the skill, and with the spirit, of a jesuit. If it were written with the privity and assent of Lord Holland's uncle, we should incline to regard it as intended to sound the minds of the people, and either to pave the way for a disgraceful peace, or to M 3 enhance enhance the merit of making a good one. But it would be unjust to adinit this supposition, since it forms, in some respects, a perfect contrast with certain recent speeches of that minister in parliament, in which he expressed his full determination to uphold the honour, and to preserve the interests of the country, on all occasions, and in every respect. For obvious reasons, the inquirer dwells less on the conduct of the British Government, during the war which termina ed with the peace of Amiens, than on its policy during the presar wir, The late ne federacy he condemns, because it had no preci e and limited object. But here he wilfully confounds (for we suspect him of any thing rather than stąpi ury), th object with the means. The object was cie rly defined, but the meas by which that object was to be accomplished were not detailed in the treaty and hence, forsouth, the objects of the confederacy are all to be condenard as vague ad indefinite! The military force necessary for the attament of the end was, indeed. specified with precision, but ne ther the manner in which it was to be employed, nor yet the provisions for securing the independence the states meant to be emaciated from the French yoke, were laid down in the treav, and therefore its object was vague and indefinite! A man of common sense would have supposed that it sufficed to provide the means of emancipation, in the first instance, and that it would be time enough to provide for their present government and future security, after that emancipation should have been effected. But this does not satisfy our sagacious inquirer, who would have loaded the treaty with a vast quantity of such matter, as never, we believe, entered into any treaty of the kind before; and the arrangement of which must of necessity have greatly retarded, and, in all probability, have ultimately defeated, the main object of the treaty itself. But neither the terms of the treaty, nor the time at which it was concluded, pleases this discontented writer; who finds every thing wrong. Our ministers are accused of having taken advantage of the very first coolness that appeared between France and Russia-chiefly on account of the Duc d'Enghien's death."(He would not, for the world, characterize that atrocious deed by its only appropriate term— MURDER)" to offer subsidies, and precipitate Russia towards a war."-We confess, that we were always weak enough to think that the ministers were deserving of praise for the promptitude with which they seized the first favourable moment for forming an offensive alliance with Russia; and certain it is, that most of the present ministers, and particularly Mr. Fox, incessantly urged the necessity of such an alliance, in parliament, as the only means of opposing France, with a reasonable prospect of success! But it required ail the assurance of this inquirer to advance such an assertion, as that of our having precipitated Russia into a war, after its falsehood had been demonstrated, again and again, in parliament. All his assertions respecting the defects of the late confederacy are, evidently, arguments a posteriori; he argues from the effect to the cause, and attempts to shew that the latter could not fail fail to produce the former. But the assertion is, like most of his assertions, at variance with the facts to which it refers. For no human sagacity could possibly foresee the pertinacious imbecility of Mack; nor the unaccountable weakness of the Austrian Emperor. And, to shew the futility of all this insidious reasoning, it is sufficient to mention one fact:-the Archduke Charles had, after the French had taken possession of Vienna, sent two couriers to his Brother, the Emperor, informing him that he was hastening to his relief with a powerful and high-spirited army; and earnestly requesting him not to venture an action until his arrival. Buonaparte, however, intercepted these couriers (whose dispatches he had anticipated), by extending his out-posts to a miest unusual distance from his camp. But, had they reached the place of their destination, the Battle of Austerlitz had never been fought; and Buonaparte, with his whole army, had been exposed to the most imminent danger of total destruction. The whole state of affairs would, unquestionably, have experienced an immediate change; and it is more than probable, that Prussia would have joined the allies. It was not, then, as is most falsely stated, any defect in the grand scheme of the confederacy which occasioned its failure; but that failure was owing to circumstances which the British Cabinet could neither foresee nor control. Another article of the "Treaty of Concert," as he calls it, affords this writer a pretext for drawing another most absurd and most dishonest inference. It was stipulated that Russia and Austria might, if circumstances should render it expedient, disavow their connexion with England, at the opening of the campaign, though they should afterwards avow it; and hence our inquirer infers, that a Concert with England was so odious on the Continent, at this time, that our ministers ought not to have urged her allies to enter into such a Concert. But he does not condescend to use one solitary argument, in order to prove that such a Concert was more odious at that time than it would be at any other; and hence it follows, that if there be any validity in his objection, it must be equally applicable to a continental confederacy at all times; for it is difficult to conceive any period when a confederacy of this nature would not be odieus to France, to her minion the Elector of Bavaria, and all the petty parasites which surround her; and to whom else, the Concert in question was odious, the author has not attempted to explain. 66 He first invents a dislike of us, in the minds of our allies, which certainly never prevailed, and then attempts to justify it, by a great distrust of our political wisdom in continental affairs; and perhaps some doubts of our good faith, arising from our conduct in former wars."-But as he has not descended to specify the facts on which he builds these assertions, it is sufficient for us to give them a decided negative, without entering into any formal justification of our country against such a libel upon her character, by one of her degenerate sons. He insists, too, that we should not have suffered the Austrians to give the command of their army to General Mack; but that we M 4 should should have insisted on nominating their commander. The position is too ridiculous to require serious notice. But we should be glad to know, if a new confederacy were on the point of being formed, and our Allies were to say to Mr. Fox, "You shall not send Lord Lauderdale to India, he was the bosom friend of Brissot, he writes a good party pamphlet, and has no small portion of zeal and activity in the defence of his principles, but he is no statesman; we dislike his principles, and can have no confidence in him; you must therefore appoint either the Marquis Wellesley, or Mr. Hastings, to the Govern ment-General of your Indian territory, or we will not conclude a treaty with you;" we should be glad, we say, to know what kind of an answer Mr. Fox would give to such an attempt to interfere with the appointment of our own officers? We are not disposed to defend the conduct of Austria in any part of the last short, but decisive, campaign; it was one continued scene of imbecility, treachery, and error. We have exposed it in much stronger terms than our inquirer; but we have contended, and ever shall contend, that no blame can possibly, on that account, attach to the British Cabinet. But it is too ridiculous to hear this man contending, that we ought to have interfered, to prevent the injustice attending the violation of the Bavarian territory by the Austrians; in other words, we should have countenanced the base treachery of an unprincipled enemy to our ally! Britons have credulity enough, we know; but surely they are not quite such idiots as to be the dupes of such party quackery as this. Lest we should be tempted to look forward, from the contemplation of the h rrid picture here presented to our view, to better times, this political fiend seeks to blast the wretch's last comfort-Hope, by insisting on the absurdity of expecting any improvement" in the fortunes of the Continent "for a long course of years;" and he deprecates every attempt to form a new confederacy against France! 66 The conduct of our Ministers, in declaring war against Spain, forms another ground of censure to our inquirer, who boldly maintains, that never was our popularity greater in that country, than at the period immediately preceding the war; when France was odious to Spain, who was inclined towards an offensive alliance with England. As this is a mere gratis-dictum of the author, utterly unsupported by proof, and at variance with all the facts known respecting the dispo sition of the Spanish Cabinet at the time, when it was under the controul of that minion of France, the Prince of Peace, who did not blush to render his native country the tributary slave of a foreign assassin, we shall content ourselves with a simple contradiction. Never was greater forbearance shewn to any Power by another, than was shewn by Great Britain to Spain at the juncture alluded to; indeed the extent to which it was carried could only be justified by the abject state to which Spain was reduced by the tyranny of France, and by the pity which it was calculated to inspire. But had this indulgence been extended any farther, and Spain been suffered to draw her |
