Images de page
PDF
ePub
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

not take it amiss if we put him into the order of prophets, and assign strength of conviction rather than of argument as his fort. We will begin with Mr. Maurice's philosophy respecting conscience, and his reflections on the defects and uncertainty of Bishop Butler's doctrine on that subject. As Butler is commonly interpreted,' he says, 'he assumes all moral principles to depend entirely on probable evidence.' He regards Butler as entertaining 'strong presumptions in favour of a moral consti tution of man,' but, apparently, no more than presumptions. We wish Mr. Maurice had stated positively what he considered Bishop Butler's grounds to have been, and not put his assertion respecting those grounds into the ambiguous form of an assertion respecting them as commonly interpreted.' But as he considers this to be the common interpretation of Butler, and nowhere endeavours to prove that this interpretation is a wrong one, but proceeds to argue at length on the supposition of its truth, we shall suppose Mr. Maurice to state that Bishop Butler 'assumes all moral principles to depend entirely on probable evidence,' and to assert that his scheme only puts forth'strong presumptions in favour of a moral constitution of man.' And when Mr. Maurice proceeds, as he does, to lament the scepticism of such a scheme, and to treat it as erecting the whole moral law upon a basis of uncertainty, we understand him to describe consequences which, in his opinion, flow from the natural interpretation of Bishop Butler's doctrine respecting conscience.

Now, of such a charge against Bishop Butler we can only say, that we cannot easily understand how anyone can make it, who has read Butler's statements on the subject of conscience and human nature with ordinary attention. Probability has been defined by Butler himself and his definition is one which nobody can object to-to consist principally in likeness. Where we have no actual perception of any thing or event, we may still argue the truth of it from the fact of its likeness to other things or events which we have perceived. Probability, therefore, does not apply in the case of things of which we have actual perception: these are not probable, but certain. And though there may be cases in which we do not know for certain whether we perceive or not, and in which, therefore, probability comes in, still so far as we perceive, so far we are certain about a thing. Now, Butler places moral obligations upon certain plain and immediate perceptions inherent in our nature-perceptions which distinguish some actions from others, and attach to them the respective epithets of good and bad. It is almost frivolous to prove by extracts, what runs through the whole of the Sermons on Human Nature, and either appears in, or is supported by, every statement which Bishop Butler makes respecting morals,

[ocr errors]

6

from one end of his works to the other. There is a principle,' he says, ' of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions. We are plainly 'constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own 'nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as respect'ing such objects and such degrees, and of the several actions consequent thereupon. In this survey, it approves of one, dis'approves of another, and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by which he disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is 'conscience.' Here is a certain act of the mind described, which is plainly that of perception; to approve or disapprove being evidently to see a certain character good or bad in the actions which come under our view. And just as the act of conscience is an act of perception, so the authority which attaches to this act is an object also of perception. And supposing a man to allow the fact of a conscience, but deny its authority, Butler tells him in reply, that the authority of conscience is perceived. The principle of reflection or conscience being com'pared with the various appetites, passions, and affections in men, the former is manifestly superior and chief, without regard to 'strength.' It 'manifestly' is superior and chief, i. e. it is seen quite plainly to be so. The appeal which Butler makes throughout is to certain immediate and clear perceptions in our nature; and it might as well be asserted that the evidence of our bodily senses rested upon presumption, as that moral obligations did upon Butler's system.

But it may be said that though Butler places morality upon the basis of natural perception, he places religion upon a basis of presumption simply; and that for the grounds for believing in a Divine moral government of the Universe, and a final state of reward and punishment, he refers us to analogy;-to the circumstance, that is, that we see a moral government in this world, and therefore that we may expect it in another. Now it is quite true that Butler does not-and it would be absurd if he did-represent the evidence of religion as being that of immediate perception, but neither does he represent it as being merely presumption. There is a mode of proof which is neither immediate perception nor presumption, which is commonly called reasoning; that act of the mind by which we see a certain conclusion follow from certain premises before us, without being actually in or part of those premises. There are, it is true, different kinds of this sort of proof-different kinds of reasoning. There is demonstrative, or mathematical; and there is a less urgent kind, such as the argument from final causes:

but both kinds are in strength far above the argument of mere presumption or analogy; and Butler moreover proved the truth of religion by both these modes of reasoning.

[ocr errors]

First, he held the existence of a God to be proved demonstratively, in the same way in which mathematical conclusions are deduced from their premises. And there later philosophy does not appear to go along with him. But this mode of proof was part of the religious philosophy of the age in which he lived, and which he seems to have adopted out of respect to high names, and-we may almost say-contrary to his own better judgment. Locke and Clarke proved the existence of a God by demonstrative reasoning; they argued from the principle, that all things that begin to exist must have a cause, and by a keen and subtle use of this argument, professed to reduce the atheist to the position of a man who denied that two and two were four, or that things that were equal to the same were equal to one another. Locke begins his chapter on the proof of a Deity with these words, We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God:' and by certainty he proceeds to say that he means 'a certainty equal to mathematical certainty ;' adding indeed-'if I mistake not a rather ominous commencement of such a proof, but of which the spirit does not appear to last or to operate as a hindrance on him. His reflection upon his argument, after the explanation of it, is From 'what has been said, it is plain to me that we have a more ' certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say that we may more certainly know that there is a God, than there is anything else without us.' 'It 'is as certain,' he says elsewhere, that there is a God, as that the ' opposite angles, made by the intersection of two straight lines, are equal.' Clarke expanded the fundamental axiom on which all this reasoning went, and said not only, everything that begins to exist must have a cause,' but everything that exists has a cause,'-a startling proposition, but which he makes orthodox by means of a larger sense which he annexes to the word cause. 'Whatever exists has a cause, a ground of its 'existence, a foundation on which its existence relies; a ground or reason why it doth exist, rather than not exist; either in 'the necessity of its own nature, or in the will of some other 'being.' The former of these two grounds or reasons he then applied to the case of the Supreme Being, and laid down a necessity for the existence of a God, as contained in the existence of Time and Space, which, as being not substances themselves, but modes and attributes of substance, implied a substance which supported them; and, inasmuch as they were

6

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

infinite, an infinite and eternal substance. This necessity for the existence of a God, he calls a necessity absolutely such in its own nature,' i. e. nothing else but its being a plain impossibility, or implying a contradiction to suppose the contrary,' a necessity of which the relation of equality between twice I two and four is an instance; it being an immediate contra'diction in terms to suppose these two unequal.' And upon this proof of the existence of a God, he bases this reflection: From hence it follows that there is no man whatsoever, who 'makes any use of his reason, but may easily become more ' certain of the being of a Supreme Independent Cause, than he can be of anything else besides his own existence. For how 'much thought soever it may require to demonstrate the other 'attributes of such a Being, as it may do to demonstrate the greatest mathematical certainties; yet as to its existence, that there is somewhat eternal, infinite, and self-existing, which must be the cause and original of all other things; this is one of the first and most natural conclusions that any man can 'frame in his mind: and no man can any more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four. 'Tis 'possible, indeed, that a man may in some sense be ignorant of this first and plain truth, by being utterly stupid, and not 'thinking at all. But this I say, there is no man who thinks 'or reasons at all, but may easily become more certain that 'there is something eternal, infinite, and self-existing, than he ' can be certain of anything else.'

[ocr errors]

It may appear indeed somewhat strange that it did not occur to a philosopher that he was getting out of his depth when he argued that the existence of the Deity was necessary as the substratum of time and space; and the correspondence between Butler and Clarke, given in the common editions of Butler's works, shows that that suspicion was entertained by Butler, though then a youthful thinker, and expressed as became a young man writing to the great metaphysician of the day, with the utmost modesty and caution. I cannot say that I believe your argument not conclusive; for I must own my ignorance, 'that I am really at a loss about the nature of space and duration. But did it plainly appear that they were properties of a substance, we should have an easy way with the atheists; for it would at once demonstrably prove an eternal, necessary, and 'self-existent Being; that there is but one such; and that He ' is needful in order to the existence of all other things; — which 'makes me think that though it may be true, yet it is not obvious to every capacity; otherwise it would have been 'generally used as a fundamental argument to prove the being ' of a God.'

Now this metaphysical ground for the existence and attributes of God has its weaknesses, but one weakness certainly cannot be laid to its charge, viz. that of being too diffident, and too doubtful. It professed to be a demonstration, a mathematical proof of the existence of a God. And so far as Butler acknowledged this ground,--and he always does appeal to abstract reasonings,' as proof of religion,-so far, certainly, he cannot be said to have based the evidence of religion on mere probabilities and presumptions.

But such arguments as these could not prove the moral government of God. To prove this, philosophy has used the second sort of reasoning. It has argued from the moral nature of the creature to the moral character of the Creator; and from the moral character of God to His moral government. This common recognised argument of religious philosophy is always supposed and its validity taken for granted by Butler. He regards conscience as the voice of God within us,' and its approbation and disapprobation as anticipations of a future and final Divine judgment. This is not demonstration; but neither is it an appeal to mere chances and presumptions.

[ocr errors]

6

[ocr errors]

To Mr. Maurice's charge then-that Butler 'assumes all moral principles to depend on probable evidence,' our answer is plain. If by moral principles' are meant moral obligations, moral principles are maintained by Butler to be the objects of clear mental intuition if by moral principles' are meant the Divine moral government, moral principles we then allow are made by Butler to depend on probable evidence; but only on probable evidence as distinguished from demonstration, not as being mere guess and presumption; on sound, valid and irresistible probable reasoning.

[ocr errors]

But it will be said, that the arguments which Butler has put forward are at any rate arguments of analogy or presumption; and that he has written a book called the Analogy,' which is entirely devoted to them. He has; and nothing can show more clearly that which we assert of Butler-that he did not rest the evidence of religion on analogy-than the ground which he assigns to analogy in this book. He tells us expressly, that he adopts analogy as an appeal to men who will not acknowledge any other ground. He says in the advertisement, It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is now not so much as a subject of inquiry; 'but that it is now at length discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if in the present age this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing ' remained but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth ' and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals for having so long

« PrécédentContinuer »