appointment itself the priesthood was by no means necessary. Now, if at the present time a cleric in minor Orders, for example, were appointed a parish priest, he would not lose the parish next Pentecost, even though he had not then received the priesthood. This example may, indeed, be rather speculative, considering modern conditions, especially in this country, but it illustrates very well the meaning intended. This idea, that acquired rights are not interfered with, may be expressed in another way by saying that the laws of the Code are not retrospective. It is scarcely necessary to add that laws never have been retrospective unless the contrary has been expressly stated; and so the regulation on this matter is in thorough conformity with the past.

Not only acquired rights, but also privileges and indults granted by the Holy See to physical and moral persons, remain unaffected by the new Code. Privilege in the strict sense is a permanent or quasi-permanent concession against or beyond the common law: in a looser sense the term may be applied to a similar concession granted even for a short period. Hence, for example, we sometimes find triennial and quinquennial faculties spoken of as privileges, though, in the strict sense, the term is inapplicable to them. Indult,' on the other hand, strictly speaking, refers only to concessions which grant power to a person to do something which he is incapable of doing by the common law. Those faculties, therefore, which we have just referred to, are indults in the strict sense. wider senses of indult' and 'privilege' are practically coincident. The net result, even though the terms be given their stricter meaning, is that both permanent and temporary concessions of the Holy See are included.

The

The canon speaks of privileges and indults granted to physical and moral persons. The latter class need some explanation. By a moral person is understood something other than a physical person, which by divine or ecclesiastical ordinance is capable of having rights. There are two classes of such persons-collegiate and non-collegiate. A collegiate moral person is composed of a number of physical persons, of whom there must be at least three. A noncollegiate moral person is a thing recognized by law as capable of possessing rights. From the definitions given it follows clearly that everything which is capable of acquiring a right is either a physical or moral person; and as

privileges and indults confer rights, they can therefore be granted only to physical or moral persons. The practical conclusion, accordingly, is that all the permanent and temporary concessions of the Holy See against or beyond the common law, unless they are specially revoked, remain unaffected by the Code.

For us here in Ireland this regulation will have some very important effects. For example, our Bishops will still retain the powers of the Formula VI and any other faculties which they may have obtained from the Holy See. So, too, we shall still retain the privilege granted us regarding the use of meat on the second of two successive days of abstinence outside of Lent. Again, in virtue of the indults of Popes Paul V and Pius IX, the time for fulfilling the precept of Paschal Communion may, at the will of the Bishops, be extended from Ash Wednesday to the 6th of July.

or

Can. 5. Custom.-This is another very important canon regulating, as it does, the relations between the laws of the Code and customs opposed to them. It distinguishes between laws which expressly reprobate contrary customs, and those which contain no such reprobation. Express condemnation has an effect not only on the past but also on the future. In virtue of it, not only are existing customs, whether general or particular, ordinary immemorial, withdrawn, but their revival in the future is also strictly forbidden. This is quite in accordance with the existing teaching on this particular matter. Canonists have always maintained that reprobation of a custom is equivalent to a declaration that it is an abuse, and therefore defective in a really essential condition, viz., reasonableness. Condemnation or reprobation must, however, be carefully distinguished from mere prohibition. The latter has, indeed, the effect of rendering the introduction of a custom more difficult, but it does not make it altogether impossible, nor does it declare its object to be unreasonable. Formerly some writers held that the two produced the same effects, but the opposite has always been esteemed the saner view, and in latter times seems to have been universal.1

Laws which contain no condemnation abrogate both general and particular customs, unless they are immemorial

1 Suarez, De Legibus, Lib. vii. c. 7.

or of a hundred years standing. Ordinaries may tolerate these latter, if it is thought, from the particular circumstances of place and person, that they cannot be prudently withdrawn. This is a clear indication that, when circumstances permit, even immemorial customs in opposition to the new Canon Law should be abolished.

A brief recapitulation of the prevailing teaching on this matter will show the great modifications which are here introduced. Under the existing discipline a general law, indeed, abrogates a general custom of whatsoever kind; it does not, however, revoke a particular custom, even though it be of ordinary duration, without the special mention contained in some such phrase as nulla obstante consuetudine. For the abrogation of a particular custom which is immemorial or of a hundred years standing still more direct and express mention is required: the abrogating clause must contain explicitly the words immemorialis and centenaria.

There is no provision made in this canon regarding the rise of future customs against laws which contain no condemnation; and hence the general regulations of the Code under the title De Consuetudine must be followed on this point. It must be remembered, too, that this canon is meant to define only the relations of custom with the laws of the Code: its relations with future laws must be determined by the general regulations just referred to. We may remark, in passing, that they involve a much less serious break with the past than the canon which we have just discussed. For instance, canon 30 states that a law does not revoke a custom which is immemorial or of a hundred years standing, nor a general law a particular, without express mention.

Neither is there any provision for custom praeter legem ; and, therefore, we should say that these continue unless the opposite is stated or implied.

Looking through the Code we have been struck by one or two very practical points which this canon raises for our consideration. Thus, canon 1249 clearly supposes that the obligation of hearing Mass on Sundays and Holidays will not be satisfied by attendance at the Holy Sacrifice in private houses; whereas, in some parts of Ireland at least, we still have an immemorial custom to the contrary. At most this custom can now have toleration, and that only if Ordinaries deem its withdrawal imprudent in the

circumstances. It will be a practical question, then, for each Bishop to decide for his diocese, whether the evils that would result from the abolition of this custom are so great as to justify its toleration.

Again, we find it prescribed that a Bishop before appointing a curate should consult the parish priest concerned; and this, too, as far as we can find out, is opposed to immemorial custom in Ireland. Whether circumstances justify the toleration of this custom is another point of great importance (476, § 3).

As an instance of reprobated custom, we may cite the practice of exacting, without express Apostolic sanction, taxes on the occasion of granting matrimonial dispensations, beyond such sums as are required to cover expenses in the case of rich people (c. 1056).

Can. 6. Written Law.-Just as the preceding canon defined the relations between the Code and custom or unwritten law, so the present one deals with its effect upon written law. That the new Code should be in substantial agreement with the old discipline is what one would naturally expect beforehand. History but too clearly demonstrates that a sudden, abrupt departure from old laws and institutions in any society is inevitably attended with disaster. The complete break with the past which characterized the French Revolution was not the least of the causes of the many evils by which it was attended. The reason of this phenomenon is not far to seek. It arises from the fact that laws and institutions are intimately connected with the nature of society itself, being the expression of what experience has shown to be its needs.

One is, therefore, not surprised at the opening words of this canon which announce this general continuity with the past. After this brief, general statement as to content, the canon then divides off into six different sections, each of which must be dealt with separately.

1°. The first section declares that all laws, general or particular, which are opposed to the prescriptions of the Code, are abrogated, unless some special provision to the contrary has been made.

This is not quite in agreement with the existing discipline. Hitherto general laws, indeed, revoked general laws which were directly opposed to them; they did not, however, revoke, without a special clause, particular laws, no matter the source from which the latter were derived,

whether it was the Holy See, or National, Provincial, or Diocesan Synods.

It must be remembered here again that this section applies merely to the Code itself. Future laws will be governed in this particular matter by canon 22, in the title De Legibus, in which we find it stated that a special clause is required for the abrogation of a particular by a general law.

2o. It is a time-honoured principle in Canon Law that when antecedent and subsequent legislation are in agreement, the latter must be interpreted in the light of the former. The second section merely applies this general principle to the Code, when it declares that canons which restate the old law in its entirety must be explained by the old, and consequently by the interpretations adopted by approved authors.

This regulation will come as a disillusionment to those who hoped that with the publication of the new Code the old law and the old books would become obsolete from the practical standpoint, however valuable they might be for historical purposes. In fact, as we have already indicated, the new legislation is in very many matters merely a restatement of the old, and as it is sometimes a re-statement by broad general principles, it is evident that a knowledge of the existing discipline will be not only useful, but frequently even necessary to supply details.

Let us illustrate this by an example. Under the new legislation trading continues to be forbidden to clerics; the canon on the point, however, is very general: Prohibentur clerici per se vel per alios negotiationem aut mercaturam exercere sive in propriam sive in aliorum utilitatem.' Without a knowledge of the old canon law, and especially of the recent decrees on this matter, how are the many intricate questions which arise in connexion with this obligation to be solved?

3°. This section is very similar to the preceding one and scarcely needs comment. It deals with canons which are only in partial agreement with the old law. The parts in which agreement exists must be interpreted in accordance with the old teaching: those which are different must be interpreted on their own merits by the recognized rules of interpretation.

4°. Departure from existing law has always been regarded as a res odiosa in Canon Law, and hence it was a