alliance, by traducing Mr. Fox as the most fickle of mer, as absorbed in interests purely English, and an enemy to the co-operation of Britain and Russia.

We much fear that by thus acting, Buonaparte will not traduce Mr. Fox; for we have too much reason to believe that Mr. Fox has done more, through his elève, Mr. Adair, to detach Russia from her alliance with this country, than the Usurper himself has done. At least the latter would not have been able to achieve his purpose, in this.respect, withour the aid of the former. We are persuaded, that Mr. Fox was so intent on making peace, that he gave instructions to Mr. Adair to discourage Russia, in all his communications with Mr. D'Oubril, the Russian Envoy, from continuing the war; and we know, that the Court of St. Petersburgh has been induced to take steps which it otherwise would not have taken, from a want of confidence in his Majesty's present Ministers. Indeed what could be expected from the appointment of Mr. Adair, at such a crisis, but the disgust of the Emperor of Russia, who had seen that gentleman sent to the Court of his Grandmother, by this same Mr. Fox, as the emissary of a faction, to frustrate the authorized efforts of his Majesty's ambassador, during a Ministry, of which Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, and Mr. Windham, formed a prominent part? a transaction which Mr. Windham's bosom-friend, the late illustrious Edmund Burke, characterized, and with Mr. W.'s perfect approbation, as a high treasonable misdemeanor. Among the Ministers "estimable for their illumination,” Buonaparte will not, of course, include Lord Grenville, who sent the first spirited answer to his insolent note, on his assumption of supreme power in France; nor Earl Spencer, who so long presided over the Admiralty with equal wisdom and success, during the existence of that Ministry which the Usurper constantly execrated; nor yet Mr. Windham, whom he stigmatized to Mr. Fox (on his memorable visit to Faris) as an assassin! No; he will limit his praises to the Foxites; and much good may they do them!

When the author was writing this Supplement, and thinking of "parcelling out Germany," he little imagined, that before the expiration of a few days (for in the revolutionary almanack, alas! years have become months, and months days!) this insatiate Usurper would impudently throw off the mask, and proclaim the Revolution of Germany, by his Imperial fiat, as a common occurrence! The Constitution of the German Empire, the work of ages, which every one of the Members of the Empire bound, by oath, to support; and for his violation of which he is rendered subject, by laws to which he has consented and subscribed, to condign punishment, is thus to be annihilated by the breath of a beggarly upstart, a base-born stranger, a perjured rebel, a vile regicide, a general plunderer, and a savage assassin! A man, in whose mind is united the opposite extremes of vice and crime; every thing that is mean with every thing that is daring; every thing that is fraudulent, with every thing that is ferocious; every thing that is hypocritical, with every thing that is sanguinary! Great only in sin, and little in every thing else; a coward by and courageous only from necessity. And if the advices this day (August 21) received from France, through the contaminated press of Paris, be to be credited, the great powers of the Continent have sanc. tioned this fresh act of perfidy, this new usurpation, this assumption of

nature,

a right

a right to destroy, at his pleasure, any, (and of course, all) of the exist. ing institutions of Europe;-institutions which most of them have solemnly sworn to observe! It is perfectly consistent in him, who has violated every oath which he has taken (and for which no doubt his minion, the Pope, has given him full absolution) to seek to reduce all legitimate sovereigns so far to a level with himself, as to steep them equally deep, if possible, in the gulph of perjury! Rat, though nothing can add to the guilt of Prussia, after her recent conduct, we must have much better proof, than any which the asseverations of Frenchmen can afford, before we can believe that ei ther the Emperor of Russia (disgusted as he is, and disgusted as he has reason to be), or the Emperor of Germany, has sanctioned this outrageous conduct of the Corsican savage. If Austria be really so degraded as to have acknowledged the beggar, Joseph Buonaparte, for the lawful king of the Two Sicilies, she is sunk beneath pity, and is only fit to lick the dust off the shoes of the Usurper. At ich conduct the ghost of Maria Theresa would rise in judgment against her degenerate grandson! But we hope for better things. We will not insult the House of Austria, all hu. miliated as it is, by giving credit to such a damning fact; we will rather believe, that the spirit of Maria is revived in the bosom of the gallant Archduke Charles, that his genius will at once animate the counsels, and guide the armies, of his country; and that his noble efforts, wisely and seasonably exerted, will not only rescue her from impending ruin, but enable her to inflict ample vengeance on her sanguinary foes.

As to the fact itself, it completely verifies all that we have, for years, laboured to impress on the public mind, in respect of the intention of the French, whether governed by a committee of public safety, by a directory of fools and knaves, or by one blood-stained tyrant, to accomplish the declared object of the first revolutionists-Robespierre, and Lord Lau derdale's worthy friend, Brissot-to revolutionize Europe! Buonaparte has now plainly told all the petty Princes of Germany (who, sooner or later, will be made to pay dear for their treachery to their lawful chief) that to him alone are they indebted for their existence; that he can and will alter the constitutions of their respective countries at his pleasure; that he can alter, curtail, extend, or abrogate their laws; and enlarge or destroy their power at his will. It is not that we lament the subversion of an ill-constructed and worse-supported confederacy, with a chief, vested with legal authority indeed, but without the means of enforcing obedience; but we deplore that meanness of spirit, that dereliction of principle, that degradation of soul, that loss of all honourable feeling, which lead sovereigns to resign, without a struggle, the institutions which their an. cestors framed, and which, with all their imperfections, have become, in some degree, venerable from age; and to resign them, too, at the insolent demand of an upstart foreigner, who has no earthly right to interfere in their internal concerns, yet, to whom they bend, obsequiously bend, either from dastardly fear, or from grovelling ambition. Princes who can so conduct themselves, and who can consent to hold their domi. nions by the frail tenure of an Usurper's will, are sunk beneath the lowest of their peasants, in the estimation of every honest man, and deserve the worst that can befall them.-"A breath may make them, as a breath bas made."-But, after this flagrant usurpation, this open outrage on the rights and independence of neutral powers, this profligate contempt of

Ee 4

every

every thing which constitutes the law of nations, is it consistent with the dignity of the crown and honour of the country, to suffer a British Minister Plenipotentiary to remain one moment at Paris! If Buonaparte meant to hold us up as objects of derision, to the nations of Europe, he could not act otherwise than he has done. The moment a negotiation is opened for peace, he proclaims not merely his designs upon Germany, but his orders for releasing the petty Princes from their allegiance to their chief, and for rendering them his own vassals; thus, at once, shewing his contempt for all the leading powers of the Continent, and telling the world, in language too plain to be misunderstood, that nothing which we can say or do can deter him from the accomplishment of his ambitious schemes, and that he will dictate laws to the universe, in spite of our interference, and while our Minister is dancing attendance on the Usurper, or rather on his secretary, his official papers are filled with the most unequivocal demonstrations of hostility. Nay, in the same breath in which he declares the tranquillity of the Continent to be secured by the peace of Presburgh, he issues his mandate for increasing his murderous hordes, by a fresh levy of 50,000 of his slaves! Is this the spirit of peace? Is this the conduct of a man anxious to secure the happiness of his own country, and to respect the rights of others? Or is it not rather the malice of a fiend, rioting in blood, thirsting for boundless sway, and bent on universal destruction? No one values the blessings of peace more highly, or deplores the curses of war more deeply, than we do; but there are circumstances which alter the nature and properties of peace and war, rendering the former a curse, and the latter a blessing; and such, in our opinion, are the circumstances under which we are now negotiating. We hope, therefore, that our Ministers, of whose wish for peace no human being can entertain a doubt, will no longer trifle with the honour and the dignity of the country, or with the feelings of the people, by prolonging the farce, or rather the tragedy, of negotiation. Two thirds of the year are very nearly elapsed, and not a blow has yet been struck! The facul. ties of our body politic seem to have been benumbed, and its efforts pal. sied, by the chilling prospect of peace!!!

On the terms of peace, we differ from the author of the pamphlet before us, who thinks the acquisition of the Cape and of Malta, with the restitution of Hanover, would suffice for our honour and our security. At the period, indeed, when the hollow trace of Amiens was concluded, such terms might, with some shew of reason, have been deemed equitable. But, we repeat, that no terms will be fair, honourable, or secure, which have not for their basis the establishment of something like a balance of power between Great Britain and France. Considering the vast accession of territory which the latter has acquired since the war, the former ought to insist on much more than the two settlements abovementioned. What reason is there for departing from the established principles of negotiation? Why not adopt either the status quo ante bellum, or the uti possidetis? If France insist on retaining all that she has acquired upon the Continent, (Hanover is not in her possession), we ought to insist upon retaining all the colonies which we have conquered. If we cannot dispossess her of her conquests, she certainly cannot dispossess us of ours. She can do us no injury; but we can make farther attacks upon her territories. The sca is ours; our navy rides triumphant in every quarter of the globe;

while

while her ships are blockaded in her harbours. Opposed to her, singlehanded, the advantage is all on our side; and that circumstance should never be lost sight of in negotiation, We understand, however, that our Ministers have evinced a disposition to accede to less favourable terms. We have heard, indeed, of two projects; one, that we should sanction all the usurpations of Buonaparte and his family, in Germany, and in Naples; and that we should give up Malta, and Russia Corfu, &c. to the lawful King of the Two Sicilies, who should thenceforth assume the title of King of Sicily, Malta, and the Seven Islands; the other, that Sicily only should remain to the King; and that Malta should be secured to us, with the Cape of Good Hope, and Hanover be restored. By the first notable project, it is evident, Buonaparte would attain one of his grand objects, in the ex pulsion of Great Britain and Russia from the Mediterranean, which would leave him at full liberty to pursue his plans of conquest in Egypt and Turkey. The King of Sicily, even if left in quiet possession of his new dominions, could oppose no possible obstacle to his designs; but it is perfectly clear that he would be utterly unable to defend either Malta or Sicily against the French, who would not fail to attack both, in a very few months after the conclusion of a treaty of peace; or, possibly, Buonaparte might deem it more expedient to proceed by way of negotiation, and to frighten the King of Sicily into a voluntary surrender of Malta, in order to deprive us of the right of interference. The other project would leave that Monarch very soon without any dominion at all. It is pretty well understood, however, that Buonaparte will accede to neither; and that he has absolutely insisted on the surrender of Sicily to his hopeful brother; and yet, after this explicit avowal of his projects Lord Lauder. dale remains at Paris!!!

Again, alluding to the subsisting negotiation, the author, to whom we now return, pertinently observes, if we urge the necessity of security to Britain, "(and, if we do not urge, and do not insist on it, we deserve to perish!)" on account of the immense increase of the French domi. nions, Buonaparte will affect to consider our visionary conquests in India as equivalent to his solid acquisitions in Europe. Conscious that Russia has taken nothing for herself in Europe, he will fabricate tales of aggression against Persia. When we alledge the subjection of Holland and Italy to France, he will consider us as answered by the statutes of his venal senate," (a set of despicable mutes, worse, infinitely worse, than those which the Grand Signior invests with the honours of the bow-string!)" which stipulate, that those crowns shall never be united on the same head as the diadem of France, as if they were not substantially provinces of the same Empire. When we demand to retain a part of our conquests, "we are entitled to retain the whole!"he will argue his moderation in demand. ing cessions from Austria, not for himself, but for his Allies-as if a politic appropriation rendered these acquisitions less dangerous to Europe. And, when we mention a barrier against further encroachments, he will have the confidence to appeal, as he did in 1803, to his known pacific dispositions!"aye, known as much, and as real, as his justice, his mercy, his religion, and his morals!" and affect to treat the suspicion of ambi. tion as an indignity."

"If we yield in any one important point, we shall find him altogether untractable in every other."This, experience has amply proved.-"Have

we

we forgotten the delays and artifices he practised at Amiens ?"-Mr. Fox and Lord Sidmouth may possibly have drunk deep enough of the Parisian Lethe, to have consigned to oblivion these important circumstances; but Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, assuredly, have not!

Even then it was necessary to threaten and to equip armaments, in order to make him agree to the few sacrifices," which were they?" we required in a treaty so highly favourable to him,"-rather say, a treaty which he dictated. "In negotiation with Buonaparte, there is only one effectual plan to be followed: let our terms be explicit, our language direct and firm. Offer, in concurrence with Russia,"-(that opportunity Mr. Fox, with his usual indiscretion, has wantonly thrown away),-" a peace on such conditions as our success justifies, and the security of Britain and of Europe demands,"—and as the surrender of the Cape, and of Malta to us, will certainly not afford." Tender him a treaty on these conditions with the one hand, while in the other you hold the alternativę of war. Adhere to these terms with inflexible firmness--a firmness equally remote from haughtiness, as from submission. He will alternately storm and flatter; but we must despise his threats, beware of his artifices, and refute his sophistry. Our claims are just, and our means ample for their attainment. We ask to deprive France of nothing,"--more's the pity, that she, the great aggressor, the general disturber of the peace of Europe, should not be compelled to make some atonement for her infamy; some sacrifices for the attainment of peace, and for the acknowledgment of all her monstrous claims!" But to stipulate protection and tranquillity for our. selves."Good heavens! and are we reduced to solicit these from France, to whom our superiority, wherever we have met her, in the field, or on the ocean, gives an unquestionable title to demand them ?" A manly perseverance will attain our end. The war can be conducted only by sea, and it is our's to rule the ocean. Buonaparte, convinced that we are nei ther to be over-reached, nor intimidated,"-would to heaven he were convinced of this!" will relinquish the hopeless contest, and seek a more solid glory in peace."-Alas! we fear, this is a vain expectation.

We firmly believe that Buonaparte has not a wish for peace; only as far as it will facilitate the accomplishment of his warlike purposes. He feels, that as to his army alone he was indebted for the power which he now enjoys, so to his army alone is he, and will he be, indebted for its continuance. He must keep his troops in good humour, in order to preserve himself from destruction-and without pay he cannot so keep them. Now he has so drained the resources of his own miserable land, that it will not supply him with the means of supporting his army; he therefore must be at war, or at least he must attempt new conquests, that he may, in the first instance, have a pretext for maintaining his famished hordes at the expence of foreign countries;-and secondly, that he may ultimately acquire the ability to reward them with the fruits of his plunder. Ever since the Peace of Presburgh he has maintained a very formidable force, without the deduction of a livre from his own treasury-at the expence of Germany, Italy, and Holland; and, we may be assured, that they will not be withdrawn from those countries, but in order to be poured into European Turkey, or to invade the Austrian and Prussian territories. That he will attempt the conquest of Turkish Dalmatia, and the adjacent Provinces, and so open a way to the gates of Constantinople, we have

never